

by anybody upon that side. It is in the RECORD for the people themselves to read.

Mr. President, a very distinguished man in this country said the other day that the Republican Party had not had a new idea in 30 years. [Laughter.] I think he was wrong as to the time—and time is not of the essence of the charge—but certainly the Republican Party has not had a new idea since the year of our Lord 1912. It positively has not had a new idea since the nomination or election of Woodrow Wilson as President. Why, even all this funereal speech, in solemn tones and deep utterance, looking as if calling mourners to the bench, just pronounced by the Senator from Michigan, is not new. All of us have gone through that performance every now and then when we were filibustering. It is an old thing. I have heard Senators upon this side go through with it even in better form and with greater success and with the possibility of making a greater impression of being in dead earnest about it.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Mississippi yield to the Senator from New Hampshire?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I yield to the Senator, provided the Senator from Pennsylvania does not object. [Laughter.]

Mr. GALLINGER. I should like to ask my good friend the Senator from Mississippi, who is always so interesting and so courteous, if he does not think the Republican Party had an idea at the election in November last?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Why, no. Mr. President, when we went in in 1912 we went in as a mere plurality minority party, as Abraham Lincoln did.

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. WILLIAMS. When we carried the House last time we carried it as a majority party. Now, the Republican Party may have had a new idea that did not fruit. The idea was that they were going to carry the House, but they did not. When I say they have not had a new idea since July, 1912, I mean they have not had a new idea that fruited; they have not had a conception that was consummated, so far as I know, or one recognized by anybody else as being real.

Mr. President, when there is a real condition confronting a parliamentary body, and when there is a real condition confronting the people, all the solemnity of voice in the world can not make it nonexistent and create a fictitious condition. The Senator from Michigan might talk here until he was black in the face, he might talk here until it was his own funeral oration that he had just ceased to pronounce, but he can not convince a man in the United States with ordinary common sense, who has taken even a cursory view of the RECORD very lately, that the Senators who have spoken upon that side were not deliberately consuming time; and they themselves, upon their honors, will not deny it, because I know them both. They are not the sort of men who will deny a fact. I have served with both of them in other bodies than this as well as here. I know their honor, I know their integrity, I know their sincerity, and neither one of them will say that a part of the time used by him was not used solely for the purpose of consuming time.

Mr. President, I am reminded by a Democratic Senator of the fact that we have a program, and perhaps I myself am interfering with it to some extent. A few more sentences, then, and I shall conclude.

The responsibility of the government of this country at this time is upon us. You had it resting on you for twenty-odd years. You never showed us any great courtesy—I mean, in a parliamentary sense. Personally, we have all shown one another every courtesy. There never was a time when you wanted to put through a party program that you did not call attention to the fact that we were filibustering when we were, and sometimes we were. Whether men want to be honest with the people or not, that is one thing in a free Republic that they must be—they have got to be honest with them in the long run.

Now, one truth is, and the country ought to know it, that you have made up your minds and virtually agreed, many of you, to defeat this bill, if you have to talk until the 4th of March. Let the country know it. The other truth is that we have made up our minds to carry this bill through, even though we let you talk, and to save time make you do all the talking, until the 4th of March; and meanwhile we are going to try to stop you talking whenever under the rules we can.

Let us be honest with one another, and let us be honest with the country. What are you going to do? You are going to force every great supply bill over to an extra session, because you will not let the American Senate do what? Vote on this bill—vote; that is all. And now, to prove it, I ask unanimous consent that this day a week hence, so that you will have ample time for all serious and honest argument, there shall be a vote

upon the pending bill and upon all pending amendments. I ask that unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. GALLINGER. Let the roll be called, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 6 o'clock having arrived—

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will renew the request in the morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will stand in recess until 11 o'clock to-morrow morning.

Thereupon (at 6 o'clock p. m. Thursday, January 21, 1915) the Senate took a recess until to-morrow, Friday, January 22, 1915, at 11 o'clock a. m.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

THURSDAY, January 21, 1915.

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Lord, be Thou our Shepherd, and lead us into green pastures and by the side of still waters. Restore our souls, and lead us into the paths of righteousness, that we may be profitable servants; not slothful in business; fervent in spirit, serving the Lord; rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation; continuing instant in prayer; that we be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good; in the name of Him who taught us patience, forbearance, love, peace, and good will. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

### FEDERAL AID TO POST ROADS (H. DOC. NO. 1510).

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I present the report of the Joint Committee on Federal Aid in the Construction of Post Roads, and ask that it be filed and printed.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois presents a report on the subject of aid in the construction of post roads, and asks that it be filed and printed. Is there objection?

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, is that printed automatically under the law?

Mr. MADDEN. I think it is.

Mr. MANN. Printed as a House document.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. What does it carry with it—maps?

Mr. MADDEN. Maps and recommendations and data, covering all the information that we could obtain, from all over the world.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Is this a privileged proposition?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. As I understand, this is the report of the commission that was heretofore appointed by Congress to investigate roads.

Mr. MADDEN. Yes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

### BRIDGE ACROSS NIAGARA RIVER, LEWISTON, N. Y.

Mr. GITTINS. Mr. Speaker, I ask that the bill (S. 6121) to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Niagara River, in the town of Lewiston, in the county of Niagara and State of New York, be laid before the House. It is identical with a House bill reported by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which is on the calendar.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the bill (S. 6121) to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Niagara River, in the town of Lewiston, in the county of Niagara and State of New York.

The bill was read, as follows:

*Be it enacted, etc.,* That the Ontario-Niagara Connecting Bridge Co., a corporation created by the laws of the State of New York, being chapter 420 of the laws of 1914, is hereby authorized to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and necessary approaches thereto across the Niagara River at a point suitable to public interests in the town of Lewiston, in the county of Niagara, State of New York, south of the southern boundary of the bridge and property of the Lewiston Connecting Bridge Co., to some point in Canada, on the west bank of said river, in accordance with the provisions of the act entitled "An act to regulate the construction of bridges over navigable waters," approved March 23, 1906: *Provided*, That the offices of the Fine Arts Commission shall be obtained in connection with the consideration of the plans of said bridge, and that all power cables shall be permitted to cross the said bridge under equal rates for the privilege: *And provided further*, That the Ontario-Niagara Connecting Bridge Co., or its successors or assigns, shall at its own expense make such changes and install such accessories as may be necessary to cross any navigation canal which the United States may construct in that vicinity, and which may interfere with the approaches of the bridge.

Sec. 2. That this act shall become and be null and void if actual construction of the bridge herein authorized be not commenced before

the 31st day of December, in the year 1919, and completed within five years thereafter.

Sec. 3. That the right to alter, amend, or repeal this act is hereby expressly reserved.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. STAFFORD. Reserving the right to object—

Mr. ADAMSON. There can not be any objection. It is privileged.

Mr. STAFFORD. I should like to have the gentleman yield to me at least. When the House bill that I assume is identical in terms was on the Unanimous Consent Calendar some weeks ago, I understood that there was some opposition to it on the part of one of the gentleman's colleagues [Mr. SMITH of New York].

Mr. GITTINS. Yes; I was absent on unanimous-consent day, and because of my absence my colleague asked that the bill go over.

Mr. STAFFORD. I inferred from his statement that he was not only raising an objection in order to accommodate the gentleman from New York [Mr. GITTINS], but also that he had objections to the consideration of the bill; and, as I recall, the report in this case there is serious objection to the putting of another bridge across the Niagara River at this place, it being represented that there are adequate bridge facilities at present for the carriage of power transmission cables, which it is intended that this bridge shall accommodate. Am I right in that understanding?

Mr. GITTINS. No; I think the gentleman is wrong. At the point where it is expected that this bridge will be located there are power-transmission wires strung across the Niagara River from great towers on each side. The War Department has suggested that if these wires are taken down and carried underneath the bridge, other wires of other power companies be carried also under the same bridge on the same terms as the wires of this company, and that provision is in the bill.

Mr. MADDEN. And that no other wires be placed overhead?

Mr. GITTINS. There is no provision in the bill that other wires shall not be placed overhead, but one of the purposes of the bill is to save stringing these wires out in the open, because they are by no means an ornament to the landscape.

Mr. STAFFORD. I wish to inquire of the gentleman whether there is not some opposition to the passage of this bill in its present form?

Mr. GITTINS. Not that I have ever heard.

Mr. STAFFORD. From local interests?

Mr. GITTINS. No; not that I have ever heard.

Mr. ADAMSON. The only suggestion was with reference to preserving the scenic beauty, and we are quite satisfied about that.

Mr. STAFFORD. Is the gentleman quite assured that his colleague [Mr. SMITH of New York] has not some constituents who are opposed to the construction of this bridge?

Mr. GITTINS. He has never said so to me, and I have not had a letter in opposition to the bill from any source.

Mr. STAFFORD. The bill in its present form, as I recall it, provides that they may begin operations within seven years.

Mr. GITTINS. No; they must begin before 1919.

Mr. ADAMSON. Four years.

Mr. STAFFORD. And complete it when?

Mr. GITTINS. Within five years after beginning.

Mr. STAFFORD. What is the idea of giving them the right at the present time to construct this bridge at this very desirable point when they are not to begin operations for so many years?

Mr. GITTINS. It is a big project. They should be given a reasonable time.

Mr. STAFFORD. In the opinion of some of the engineers who reported on this bill they are given an unusually long time, and I think it was their opinion that this is merely a promoter's scheme to obtain a very valuable privilege to cross an important stream.

Mr. GITTINS. There is nothing of the kind about this bill. The gentleman is entirely mistaken. This project is backed by the biggest men in western New York. There is absolutely no opposition to it that I have heard of. The committee investigated it thoroughly, and it has been extensively published in the papers.

Mr. STAFFORD. If it is backed by the big men of western New York, I should not think they would wish to wait four or five years before beginning operations, as this bill provides.

Mr. ADAMSON. Before they begin construction.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the third reading of the Senate bill.

The bill was ordered to a third reading, and was accordingly read the third time and passed.

On motion of Mr. GITTINS, a motion to reconsider the last vote was laid on the table.

By unanimous consent the corresponding House bill (No. 16640) was ordered to lie on the table.

#### ARMY APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 20347) making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, and, pending that motion, I ask unanimous consent that general debate be limited to eight hours to be divided equally—the gentleman from California to control one half of the time and I to control the other half.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia moves that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the Army appropriation bill, and, pending that, asks unanimous consent that debate be limited to eight hours—one half to be controlled by the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN] and the other half by himself. Is there objection?

Mr. TAVENNER. I object to the unanimous consent.

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman from Virginia yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MANN. I understand there has been some agreement between the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] and the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN] in reference to the time for general debate. Objection is made. Is it the intention of the gentleman from Virginia to allow general debate to run for that length of time, and then, when we go into committee again, to move that general debate be closed?

Mr. HAY. My purpose is to go into Committee of the Whole, and after five minutes move that the committee rise.

Mr. MANN. The gentleman can move to close debate when we go into Committee of the Whole to-morrow.

Mr. HAY. But my purpose is to get through with the general debate to-day.

Mr. MANN. I understand.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Speaker, I understand it is the intention of the gentleman from Virginia to be liberal in the discussion of the bill under the five-minute rule.

Mr. TAVENNER. I want to say that I want an hour, because—

Mr. HAY. I call for the regular order.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia moves that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the Army appropriation bill.

The question was taken, and the motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, with Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is now in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, of which the Clerk will read the title.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 20347) making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the first reading of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

Mr. BRYAN. Reserving the right to object, I want to say that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER] wants time, and I understand he can not get the time.

Mr. HAY. I call for the regular order, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER] has notified several that he is anxious to have an hour's time, and several Members are anxious that he shall have it, even to the extent of going on the floor and either get the time or make trouble. [Cries of "Oh!" "Oh!"]

The CHAIRMAN. Whether the gentleman can get time or not will depend upon the committee.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest to the gentleman from Washington, and all concerned, that objecting to a motion to dispense with the first reading of a long bill is not a very good way to get time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia to dispense with the first reading of the bill? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER] requested an hour's time. I told him that we were only to have four hours on a side, and that a good many members of the Committee on Military Affairs desired to speak, and that I had cut their time down



to 20 minutes; but I would put him on the same plane as the members of the committee and give him 20 minutes. I say that because I want the House to understand that I have no disposition to cut any gentleman off. But there are 435 Members of this House.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have spent considerable time investigating this subject. My information is of a different character than will be presented by the members of the committee and I desire an opportunity to present it to the House. I will take the chances of its being worth the amount of time I am requesting.

Mr. HAY. I have no doubt the gentleman has burned midnight oil and has a great deal of information, as have other Members; but we can not always, particularly in the short session of Congress, get all the time we want.

Now, Mr. Chairman, all I want to say for the present is that on page 1760 of the Record there is a table printed in an article which I wrote and which was published in the Sunday Magazine. There is a mistake in that table, and I am informed by the gentleman who got the table up in the War Department that it was a clerical error. I ask unanimous consent to print a table furnished me by the War Department which corrects that error.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record.

Mr. GARDNER. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, I take it that the gentleman is correcting an error on artillery ammunition and raising it to 1,700,000, in accordance with what I pointed out to the gentleman.

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. Is it not true that the table is not prepared by the War Department, but by Gen. Crozier?

Mr. HAY. It was furnished me by Gen. Crozier.

Mr. GARDNER. It is not the War Department's table, but Gen. Crozier's?

Mr. HAY. Field Artillery.

Mr. GARDNER. It is his own table and not the table of the War Department. The War Department a week ago Monday got a resolution—

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I can not yield for a speech.

Mr. GARDNER. I am reserving my right to object; the gentleman has not the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

The following is the table:

	On hand.	Additional provided for by appropriation.	Total provided for.	Total in project.	Required to complete project.	Remarks.
Rifles.....	1,037,000	36,749	1,073,749	600,000		Of these, 347,000 are United States rifles, model of 1893 (Krag); the remainder are model of 1903.
Pistols and revolvers.....	140,392	31,622	172,014	172,378	75,702	Of these, 75,358 are Colt's revolvers, to be replaced.
Sabers.....	68,763	5,000	73,763	41,006	11,006	Of these, 43,763 are old model, curved sabers, to be replaced.
Ball cartridges, caliber .30, models of 1906 and 1898.....	<sup>1</sup> 196,000,000	<sup>2</sup> 45,000,000	241,000,000	196,000,000		
Pistol and revolver cartridges.....	<sup>3</sup> 31,196,227	11,500,000	42,696,227	31,942,600		
Personal equipments (sets).....	476,161	27,839	504,000	504,000		
Horse equipments (sets).....	55,122	3,300	58,322	94,349	36,027	
Machine guns.....	1,236	66	1,302	1,633	331	276 in coast defenses are without packs.
Field batteries, complete, 4 guns each.....	169	46	215	325	110	In addition, there are on hand 20 2.95-inch mountain batteries, to be replaced.
Ammunition trains.....		3	3	63	60	
Harness, wheel (sets).....	2,808	527	3,335	7,500	4,165	
Harness, lead (sets).....	5,412	1,071	6,483	16,000	9,517	
Ammunition for Field Artillery (rounds).....	177,800	402,200	580,000	1,717,000	1,137,000	

<sup>1</sup> 35,000,000 are model of 1898 cartridges.

<sup>2</sup> 45,000,000 are used annually.

<sup>3</sup> Of these, 19,859,327 are for pistol.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of no quorum.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of no quorum, and the Chair will count.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to withdraw the point of order for the time being, but if I do not get an hour's time I am going to make points of order.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 20347, the Army appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the Army appropriation bill, and pending that motion I move that general debate shall continue for four hours, two hours to be controlled by the gentleman from California and two hours by myself.

Mr. KAHN. Can not the gentleman make it eight hours?

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I am willing to give all reasonable time for general debate, but we are informed by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER] that he proposes to filibuster unless he can get one hour's time.

Mr. TAVENNER. I deserve the hour, and that is the reason I ask for it.

Mr. HAY. The gentleman can print his information.

Mr. TAVENNER. I do not propose to print it.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, in order to meet the wishes of gentlemen upon the other side, I move, pending the motion to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, that general debate be confined to seven hours, three hours and a half to be controlled by the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN] and three hours and a half by myself.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, I suggest to the gentleman that he can not include in the motion the control of the time.

Mr. HAY. That is true. On that motion to limit debate, Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Speaker, I desire to offer an amendment to that motion.

The SPEAKER. One moment. The gentleman from Virginia moves that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the Army appropriation bill, and pending that he moves that general debate be limited to seven hours, and on that motion he moves the previous question.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Speaker, I should like to know whether I can offer to amend the gentleman's motion by substituting eight hours for seven hours, with the understanding that I am to have one hour?

The SPEAKER. The gentleman can not. The only way that can be done is to defeat the motion for the previous question.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that there is no quorum present. [Cries of "Oh, no!"] We want that time, and we are going to fight for it.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Washington makes the point of order that there is no quorum present. Evidently there is no quorum present.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

The SPEAKER. The question is on ordering a call of the House.

The question was taken, and the motion was agreed to.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STAFFORD. Was there not a question pending when the gentleman from Washington made the point of order of no quorum?

The SPEAKER. The question had not been put. We had not reached that point.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, the House was not dividing, and I moved a call of the House.

The SPEAKER. That is correct. The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify the absentees, and the Clerk will call the roll.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HAY. Did not the Speaker put the question on the motion to order the previous question?

Mr. MANN. No; the gentleman is mistaken.

Mr. GARNER. Mr. Speaker, the parliamentary situation, as I understand it, is that a call of the House only has been ordered on the point of order that there is no quorum present. There is no question before the House.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I think the Chair put the question.

The SPEAKER. The Chair had not put the question. A call of the House has been ordered. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

Alken	Driscoll	Keister	Price
Ainey	Dunn	Kennedy, Conn.	Ragsdale
Avis	Eagan	Kennedy, Iowa	Rainey
Barchfeld	Eagle	Kennedy, R. I.	Reed
Barkley	Edmonds	Kindel	Reilly, Conn.
Bartholdt	Elder	Kinhead, N. J.	Riordan
Bartlett	Faison	Kirkpatrick	Roberts, Nev.
Beall, Tex.	Falconer	Kitchin	Rupley
Bell, Ga.	Finley	Korbly	Russell
Borland	Flood, Va.	Lafferty	Sabath
Bowdye	Francis	Lee, Ga.	Scott
Brown, W. Va.	French	L'Engle	Scully
Bruckner	Garrett, Tex.	Lewis, Md.	Sells
Brumbaugh	George	Lewis, Pa.	Shreve
Buchanan, Ill.	Gill	Lindbergh	Sims
Burke, Pa.	Glass	Lindquist	Sisson
Burke, Wis.	Godwin, N. C.	Lobeck	Slemp
Calder	Gorman	Loft	Stevens, N. H.
Cantor	Goulden	Logue	Stout
Carew	Graham, Pa.	McClellan	Taggart
Carlin	Griest	MacDonald	Talbot, Md.
Carr	Griffin	Mahan	Taylor, N. Y.
Chandler, N. Y.	Hamill	Maher	Townsend
Clark, Fla.	Hamilton, Mich.	Metz	Underhill
Connolly, Iowa	Hardy	Miller	Vare
Conry	Hart	Morgan, La.	Walters
Copley	Helvering	Morin	White
Curry	Henry	O'Brien	Wilson, Fla.
Dale	Hinebaugh	O'Hair	Wilson, N. Y.
Davenport	Hobson	O'Shaunessy	Winslow
Davis	Hoxworth	Page, N. C.	Witherspoon
Decker	Humphreys, Miss.	Paige, Mass.	Woodruff
Difenderfer	Igoe	Palmer	
Dooling	Johnson, S. C.	Patton, Pa.	
Doremus	Jones	Pou	

The SPEAKER. On this call 287 Members, a quorum, answered to their names.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move to dispense with further proceedings under the call.

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced the ayes seemed to have it.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a division on that.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Washington demands a division on dispensing with further proceedings under the call.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 183, noes 1.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order there is no quorum present.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that that is dilatory.

The SPEAKER. The roll call just ascertained shows the presence of a quorum, and there has been no intervening business. [Applause.] The question is on ordering the previous question.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order of no quorum. Now there has been intervening business.

Mr. GARNER. That is dilatory.

Mr. CRISP. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the motion is dilatory. The roll call just had disclosed the presence of a quorum.

The SPEAKER. The Chair has uniformly refused to rule—

Mr. FOSTER. Upon a vote, I think the gentleman is entitled to know if a quorum is present or not.

The SPEAKER. That is what the Chair has always ruled and always will rule. [After counting.] Two hundred and thirty-nine Members are present, a quorum, and the Doorkeeper will unlock the doors.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] to limit general debate to seven hours.

The question was taken, and the Speaker announced the ayes seemed to have it.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a division. You had just as well get off the lid and let the gentleman from Illinois have his time.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman has a right to demand a division but no right to make remarks about it.

The House divided; and there were—ayes 218, noes 3.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The SPEAKER. The Chair just this instant counted a quorum—ayes 218, noes 3. The motion of the gentleman from Virginia prevails. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Virginia to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 20347.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, now I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the motion is dilatory.

The SPEAKER. There can be no question of the presence of a quorum, because it has been ascertained three times in the last 10 minutes. The ayes have it and the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. GARRETT] will take the chair.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry. Did the Speaker rule that my point of no quorum is out of order?

The SPEAKER. The Chair does, because it has been less than 10 minutes since we had a roll call disclosing a quorum, and then by actual count, and the last time not less than 3 minutes ago, there was a quorum here. [Applause.] The gentleman from Tennessee will take the chair.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 20347, with Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 20347, the title of which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 20347) making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HAY. I am recognized for one hour, I take it?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for one hour.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] and reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, the war now going on in Europe has revived the agitation of our so-called unpreparedness for war. I have never regarded this question as a partisan question. I do not believe that the question of the national defense should be treated as a partisan question. If, as a matter of fact, we are so utterly unprepared for war as some of the agitators upon this subject now tell us, then it must be admitted that the responsibility rests with the Republican Party, with its long lease of power. [Applause on the Democratic side.] However, as a Democrat—aye, Mr. Chairman, as a partisan Democrat—I am unwilling to lay any such charge at the door of the Republican Party. My experience on the Committee on Military Affairs for nearly three terms of Congress, under both Republican and Democratic control, convinces me that the committee has been fair, even to the point of generosity, in order to build up an army according to American ideals. In 1901 a law was passed limiting the strength of the Army to 100,000 men. The Hospital Corps and the Quartermaster Corps are exempt from this limitation. That law has been in operation now for nearly 14 years, and let us see what are the facts.

According to the report of The Adjutant General's Office, it appears that between February, 1901, and June 30, 1914, the largest number of enlisted men in the Army, including all branches, line and staff, at the end of any one month—and the returns are only taken at the end of the month—was 92,877 men on the 30th day of June of last year. The largest Army we have ever had was on the 30th day of last June. [Applause on the Democratic side.] The lowest number was 57,522, on September 30, 1907, and the average number during that period was 74,314 men. It is also shown by the records of this office that the largest number of enlisted men of the line of the Army, including the Philippine Scouts, in service at the end of any one month included in this period was 82,142, on May 31, 1914. The lowest number was 51,561, on September 30, 1907; and the average number was 67,903. Now, Mr. Chairman, I call attention to these figures for the purpose of showing that, notwithstanding the fact that 14 years ago Congress increased the authorized



strength of the Army to 100,000 men, at no period during that time has the authorized strength of the Army been reached. [Applause on the Democratic side.] I call attention to the further significant fact that during this period no Chief Executive, neither President Roosevelt nor President Taft nor President Wilson, has ever asked for the full quota authorized by law. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

I call attention to the further fact that even the quota asked for has never been filled.

Whence, then, Mr. Chairman, comes this cry for a tremendous army in this country? Certainly not from the young manhood of this country, who are seeking to enter the Army at the rate of pay of \$15 a month and a loss to a large extent of their personal liberty.

If, Mr. Chairman, we propose to create a tremendous army in this country, we must do something to invite the private to enter into its service. In order to do this we must either increase the pay to, say, \$50 or \$100 a month, or we must conscript the young men of this country in time of peace. The expense of the one plan would be enormous, while the policy of the other would be odious. [Applause.]

We are told that for the last quarter of a century the nations of Europe engaged in war, including grief-stricken Italy, have spent \$40,000,000,000 preparing for war. This, Mr. Chairman, is about the value of all the farms in the United States. But who is it, upon reflection, laying aside the question of expense, that is willing to see an army of one million or one-half of a million men in this country awaiting in idleness some imaginary conflict? [Applause.]

Ah, but we are told and often reminded of the old adage, "In time of peace prepare for war." I do not know, Mr. Chairman, who was the originator of that idea. Some claim it was the Roman author, Horace, while others assert it was originated by the Father of his Country; but whoever was its author, the fact is that he never left any specific legacy to any nation by which it could determine exactly what preparedness means.

After nearly six months of war in Europe it is apparent to all that neither England, nor France, nor Russia, nor even Germany, understood the problem. What shall we prepare for, for instance? Shall we prepare for a war with England, or a war with Germany, or a war with Japan? Shall we prepare to fight Germany in the event her arms are successful in the pending European conflict, or shall we prepare to fight the allies in the event of their success? Shall we prepare to invade Japan or shall we prepare against an invasion by Japan? These questions, Mr. Chairman, answer themselves to the effect that no one who talks of unpreparedness has ever yet given us any concrete idea upon the subject. [Applause.]

Why, it has been supposed that our isolation was of great value to us. But now it is even suggested that this is a matter of small consequence. Let us see what are the facts. From Liverpool to New York it is a distance of more than 3,500 miles; from Havre it is a distance of more than 3,100 miles; from Bremen the distance is more than 4,200 miles; and from Yokohama to San Francisco it is a distance of more than 4,100 miles. At the rate of 15 miles an hour, which is very much faster than any transport can travel even unmolested, it would take 10 days to go from Liverpool to New York, 9 days from Havre to New York, 12 days from Bremen to New York, and 12 days from Yokohama to San Francisco. The fact must not be overlooked, Mr. Chairman, that in order to prepare these transports, in order to equip them for travel, in order to provide a convoy of war vessels, in order to make all the necessary preparations, it would require weeks and months of effort.

Now, I have not been able to obtain, although I am investigating the subject, the number of transports owned by the great nations of the world. But we do know—and I have the data here before me—how long it took us to transport troops to the Philippine Islands after we had been successful in our war with Spain, and when the sea was absolutely open to us. What are those facts? I read from a letter to me from the Chief of the Quartermaster's Department, Gen. Aleshire:

The largest number of troops shipped from the United States to the Philippine Islands in any one day was 3,089, on November 20, 1899. The largest number of troops shipped to the Philippine Islands for any two consecutive days was 4,537, on November 3 and 4, 1899. The largest number of troops shipped to the Philippine Islands for any four consecutive days was 5,327, on November 20, 21, 22, and 23 of that year. The largest number of troops shipped to the Philippine Islands on any eight consecutive days was 8,281, on November 14 to 21, inclusive, 1899. The largest number of troops shipped in any one month was 14,730, in November, 1899, while the largest number of troops shipped for any three consecutive months was 30,804, in September, October, and November, 1899.

Now, I noticed some time ago that the English Government used 40 transports in order to convey 28,000 troops from Australia during this war. I call attention to the fact that it re-

quired 31 transports to convey 33,000 troops from Canada since this war in Europe began. So it is a fair statement, I believe, to make that one transport will average not exceeding 1,000 officers and men. It would then take, Mr. Chairman, 100 transports to bring into this country 100,000 soldiers, which is practically the strength of our Army, to say nothing of the 120,000 of trained militia that we have. Why, Mr. Chairman, those who talk about our unpreparedness speak as if this country is likely to be invaded as by a thief in the night [applause], while our very isolation itself is proof against burglary on the part of any nation.

Mr. HOBSON rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman from Alabama yield to his colleague [Mr. Hobson]?

Mr. DENT. I will.

Mr. HOBSON. Would the gentleman, for our information, kindly tell us how many United States troops could be concentrated at any one point at this time?

Mr. DENT. Why, Mr. Chairman, the question is not appropriate to the subject which I was discussing. I understand, from the report of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, that possibly we could not concentrate at any one particular point more than 25,000 or 30,000. I am not sure about that as I have not gone into these figures. But we do not need to concentrate any large army in this country; and what is the necessity for concentrating any larger army than that? [Applause.] There might arise some internal trouble which would necessitate the concentration of a considerable force, but our Army is sufficient for that purpose. I am speaking now, however, Mr. Chairman, and I am directing my thoughts at this particular time, against the necessity for a large Army to prevent a foreign invasion. [Applause.] And I think it is absolutely demonstrated by the facts that any larger Army is now unnecessary.

Now, I want to say right here, just to digress for a moment, on account of the question asked by my distinguished colleague from Alabama [Mr. Hobson], that I met the other day an Army officer, a man whom I regard as one of the ablest men in the Engineer Corps. I was talking to him about the resolution offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], and which the Military Committee adopted and reported favorably to the House the other day, relative to the range of the guns on the English ships and the range of the guns on our coast. This officer said that he happened to be dining with an admiral of the Navy, and he said, "Why, that is the most absurd proposition on earth, because no ship will stand off 18 miles in order to shoot at a target that it can not see."

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. DENT. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. Is the gentleman aware of the fact that the Secretary of War has appointed a board to determine that very question?

Mr. DENT. That may be true; but I am simply giving the experience of an admiral in the Navy, and he said the ship would be below the horizon, and unless somebody believes that the world is flat there is no use in shooting from that distance. [Laughter.]

Mr. GARDNER. And does not the admiral know that a great deal of firing is now done when you can not see the object? Of course it is below the horizon. But what was the name of the admiral?

Mr. DENT. This was a personal conversation that I had, not with an admiral, but with an Army officer.

Mr. GARDNER. What is the name of the Army officer?

Mr. DENT. It was Lieut. Col. Judson.

Mr. GARDNER. Former commissioner here?

Mr. DENT. Yes; former District Commissioner here. [Applause.]

Now, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I want to repeat that I believe the Army has been constantly and gradually improved for many, many years past. I am not so sure that there should not be some other changes made. So far as I am concerned, ever since I have been a member of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House I have advocated and voted for a militia pay bill, and I believe it is only a question of time when that law will have to be adopted by Congress. [Applause.] But I do not believe that it is necessary to make any radical changes in our regular military establishment at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. DENT. I would like to have three minutes more, Mr. Chairman.



Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] is recognized for five minutes more.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I have not been among that number who believe that there is any nation on earth willing to precipitate a quarrel with us. On the contrary, I believe that every nation in the world is anxious to seek and obtain our good will. [Applause.] I want to call attention to a fact which I believe those in authority in the balance of the world recognize—that there is a tremendous latent power in this country. We not only have an Army of ninety-odd thousand men and a militia of 120,000 men, but there are 16,000,000 stalwart men between the ages of 18 and 45 in this country as a reserve militia, many of whom now already know how to shoot and how to ride. [Applause.] And if this latent power is once aroused it will never stop short of punishing with the severest penalty any enemy that attacks it. [Applause.]

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the time is likely to come—I am sure it is not impossible; yea, I believe it is highly probable—that the time will come when the good offices of this country, through its present Chief Magistrate, will be called upon to bring about peace in Europe and thereby grant to the world the greatest of human blessings. [Applause.] That the heart and the head of the present Chief Executive of the Nation is sensitive to and capable of affording this benefaction, I believe both friend and foe alike will admit. [Applause.] And may the great God of the universe, who presides over the destinies of men and of nations, speed the day when this consummation so earnestly desired will be happily realized. [Prolonged applause.]

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman yields back the remainder of his time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back three minutes. The gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN] is recognized for an hour.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. SLOAN] and reserve the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California yields 20 minutes and reserves 40.

Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Chairman, this discussion is prompted by several considerations:

First. A friendly interest in the person involved.

Second. Character of our courts-martial as exemplified in this alleged typical and regularly conducted case.

Third. A statement recently published and attributed to the Secretary of War in which he says:

What we need now is a thousand new officers; with intelligent and efficient officers much can be done.

Fourth. Yesterday's European dispatches quote the leading military authority of one of the great belligerent powers as saying:

The \* \* \* are good fighters, but an army without the necessary officers and noncommissioned officers is scarcely an army.

This great military appropriation bill for the fiscal year of 1916 involves one hundred and one millions of the Treasury funds. That sum provides for thousands of purposes, including the necessities, wants, comforts, and luxuries of our national military establishment. For the soldier it includes items for comfort, equipment, discipline, and protection. Hidden away somewhere within its terms an expert might find some small appropriation for the administration of justice before the courts of war, where it has been said "justice is meted out against the unfortunate officer or soldier upon whom a charge is laid."

The relatively meager available records of the war-court trials is a tribute to the discipline of the respondents, or, mayhap, their resignation to the inevitable. There have been but few reviews brought home to the public of these adjudications, which mean loss of rank, sometimes good name, and often means of livelihood.

The case I shall discuss having run the full course from original investigation to the tribunal of final resort and having been directed from Washington and approved throughout by the Department of War, may properly be considered as a fair exemplification of military jurisprudence. We are told it was entirely regular.

A little more than a year ago Fort Terry, lying at the east end of Long Island, with its smart soldiery and frowning guns, one of the points of our national defense, was under the command of Maj. Benjamin M. Koehler. Continued peace had some time before this relaxed rigid discipline; so the standard of fortress life, work, and morals were not par excellence.

Maj. Koehler, with a record which was the fair outcome of a youthful ambition to serve his country, a full course at West

Point, service in many capacities in the United States, and actual service under fire in the Philippines, was selected to command this fort. It was expected that his ability, courage, tact, and experience would improve its condition and elevate its tone.

Suffice to say that during the period of his command the landscape was cleared and beautified, buildings cleaned and brightened, the home arrangements of the officers bettered, and the conduct and appearance of the soldiers improved.

That these changes would not meet universal approval among those whom it personally affected was not to be expected, nor did it occur. He was a devotee to discipline, which he exacted of all, and with almost religious devotion submitted to it himself. His work was not accomplished without admonition, rebuke, and punishment, which, in their effects, extended to the friends of the delinquents. Soldiers and officers in periods of peace have much time on their hands to consider fancied wrongs.

Pleased with the progress of his work, reassured by the commendations of his superior, and secure in the apparent devotion of the vast majority of his officers and men, he was in a paradise of noninformation as to his personal danger when, like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, one day upon his return to the fort, after seeing his brother, Maj. Lewis Koehler, off for his command in Porto Rico, he was arrested, deprived of his side arms, and held to a trial by court-martial. This was his first intimation that any person held or believed that he had committed a wrong or had been guilty of an indiscretion. Maj. Koehler was stunned by the charges presented. With characteristic devotion to duty and implicit reliance on the supposed justice and fairness of those who were to prosecute, and as he thought had been taught to preserve his rights, showed the absurdity of certain charges and the means of absolute defense which he had at hand. These frank statements were made use of by the prosecution to correct its case and, of course, weaken the major's defense.

The trial was had in the form such proceedings usually take. There was a general charge in the following language:

Charge 1. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in violation of the sixty-first Article of War.

Under this there were 17 distinct and separate specifications of fact. Each of these specifications, if established beyond reasonable doubt, would constitute a basis for the charge, which under the military law is a mere legal conclusion.

No two of the specifications where guilt was found had anything legally in common with each other, or with any other, either in point of time, circumstances, or parties involved.

Of these 17 specifications let me state no charge is made of any vile or criminal act consummated on the part of Maj. Koehler. Nor yet was there any charge that any proposition for any such act or attempt was made by the accused. Still further, there was no evidence whatever submitted to support a vile or criminal act consummated or attempted.

The charge contains no allegation of accused being a pervert or of improper habits or propensities.

The specifications related largely and generally to incidental conversations had with officers or men and certain acts, many of which, if clearly established, would and could bear either a harmless or an improper construction. Of course if the malign construction were placed on them it would establish the charge of conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."

In six of these specifications the evidence was so grossly inadequate and flagrantly false that failure to try the accusing witnesses for their perjury and other forms of mendacity is sufficient warrant for Maj. Koehler's complaint and to apprise him of the brand of injustice he received. In these he was acquitted.

My interest in this case arose from the fact that I knew him from the time he took a competitive examination to obtain our Congressman's nomination for West Point; learned of his exemplary conduct at the academy; heard of his creditable graduation; was pleased with his brilliant and gallant career in the Philippines, where he attracted the notice and received the warm commendation of Gen. Lawton. Later his service earned him rapid distinction and promotion. He is one of nine brothers, all of whom are clean, upright, successful men—manufacturers, bankers, grain men, ranchmen—one is my neighbor; three entered the United States military service; one other is a West Point graduate, now with his regiment on the Texas frontier. Another brother, Edgar C. Koehler, a lieutenant in the Philippines, yielded his life in an engagement to an insurrecto's bullet; he lies at Arlington; his grave is a part of that great national shrine where patriots visit and statesmen delight to be heard.

A civil jury imbued with the sole duty of trying the case, after hearing the accuser's testimony, would have placed an



innocent construction on the language and acts of the accused and acquitted him as to many of the specifications, even though the major had not denied them or had not submitted testimony in his own defense. But the major's defense had no such precarious foundation. Every allegation of accusing fact was met squarely by his denial, supported in every specification by clear and strong corroborating testimony, or circumstances, or both.

Out of the 17 specifications he was acquitted on 6, namely, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10. It should be remembered that each of these specifications, if established, constituted a sufficient basis for finding of guilty under the main charge. The consequence of this finding was dismissal from the Army—disgrace, degradation, and loss of means of livelihood.

Each of these specifications charge that which, in civil life, would when measured, not by its gravity but by its consequences, amount to a felony, because banished and excluded from the service is considered by an officer of rank in the Army as equivalent to incarceration of a civilian in the penitentiary. In this the term of punishment is for life. The accused had a right, therefore, morally and legally, to demand that each specification stand upon its own merits and proof. The prosecution certainly had a right to say though it should absolutely fail in proof in 16 of the 17 specifications because of lack of testimony, apparent prejudice, or interested testimony or downright perjury, yet if in the seventeenth two honorable witnesses contradicted the accused, or one corroborated by strong circumstances contradicted him, the prosecution would not fail. This view was right for the prosecution, it was right for the accused, and is in accord with the decisions and practices of all reputable American courts. The view taken by the prosecution reverses this. While the acquittal on several specifications did not aid the accused in weakening the other specifications, conviction on some specifications were held to uphold convictions on other specifications, although the specifications were not connected or related by time, circumstances, or identity of other parties involved.

Thinking that my friendship for the accused might prejudice me in weighing the evidence and reaching a conclusion there was submitted the several specifications upon which guilt was found to Members of this House or the Senate for consideration and opinion, one to each. I shall quote therefrom.

The opinions which I shall quote and my own were based upon the record made at the court-martial and after it had been certified to Washington.

Specification No. 1 charges accused with grasping Capt. Philip H. Worcester in an improper manner.

The evidence revealed that the time and place of the alleged act was in the immediate presence of about 25 persons; yet there was no corroboration from these persons of the testimony of Worcester. Capt. Worcester and Lieut. Smith were both vulgarly dressed as females and dancing the sensuous "hoochi-koochi." They were in like manner rebuked by Maj. Koehler. The major's act was construed by Worcester as improper; was construed by Maj. Koehler and Lieut. Smith as a properly intended rebuke. Similar acts were construed by Lieut. Frick as improper, and on these two specifications where Frick was involved the major was acquitted. Worcester had twice been reprimanded by Maj. Koehler.

Congressman BORLAND, a Member of long service from Missouri, and a lawyer of successful practice, and a law lecturer in one of our universities, examined the evidence submitted under this specification and said:

The sole witness to this charge is Capt. Worcester. His testimony is absolutely uncorroborated except to the extent that the accused was at the party at the time and place named. Under the rules of law this is not corroboration at all, as it shows no more opportunity to commit the crime than is equally consistent with either guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the captain's testimony is specifically denied by the accused as to the main fact. The testimony of the accusing witness is weakened by the circumstances under which the act is alleged to have taken place. One act is said to have been in the supper room, in which there were possibly 25 persons within sight and hearing. The other act is alleged to have taken place in a small room adjoining, in which there were possibly 2 other persons and into which at any moment any one of the 25 persons in the adjoining room might have entered. \* \* \* As to these charges, it seems clear that the finding should be set aside. No affirmation of the conviction can be made on this charge.

Specification No. 5 charges impropriety on the part of the accused in touch and language toward Sergt. Elvin Byers.

Alleged acts and language were said by Byers to have occurred in a small garden adjacent to Maj. Koehler's residence. It was in full view of anyone looking from part of the residence or anyone coming to visit the major and was in actual view of one Pvt. Lones. Accused absolutely denied every condemning statement of Byers. Lones corroborated accused in every particular to which he was cognizant, he being within full view,

though not being close enough to hear what was being said. Accused was further corroborated on important circumstances by Emma Jones. Byers was not supported in any important particular by any witness. Yet Byers was proven and admitted to have spoken to Pvt. Zephy, who was friendly to Koehler, that if he would modify the statement which he had made to Col. Mills, he (Zephy) would be able to obtain a furlough, which he had sought from Capt. Ellis and been refused. Capt. Ellis had told Zephy when the furlough was requested, in substance, he had no use for him because he did not tell the colonel all he knew. These conversations were overheard by Corpl. Towler and not denied. Yet the unsupported word of Byers was accepted as establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations of this specification.

Examination of this specification and all the evidence relating thereto was made by my colleague, Hon. M. P. KINKAID, of Nebraska. Congressman KINKAID was for more than 12 years on the district bench of Nebraska, to which he was elevated from the position of one of the leading practitioners in that part of the State. He has been for 12 years an able and honored Member of this body. I quote briefly from his opinion, rendered after examining the evidence:

Instead of reasonable corroboration, the record furnishes strong contradictions of the testimony of Byers. He is squarely contradicted on every material fact in issue. Not only does the accused make positive denial of the essential parts, but the testimony of both Lones and Emma Jones squarely contradict him as to material, as well as immaterial, circumstances. \* \* \* The testimony has irresistibly made me believe that the conviction has been produced largely by hearsay and suspicion rather than by proper evidence. On the whole, I respectfully submit the evidence falls far short of warranting a conviction on specification No. 5.

Specification 7 related to the improper language and improper acts said to have occurred in the cabin of a boat. Sergt. Moody was proven to have talked with Sergt. Byers, who was concerned in specification No. 5, and in which talk Sergt. Moody said to Byers: "You have got to stick to what we have said; we have got to stick tight." This Moody testified to improper language and acts on the part of the accused in the officers' cabin of a boat within a foot of the captain. The captain neither saw nor heard any of the alleged remarks or acts. The accused denied in detail the statements of Moody, and there was no corroboration whatever of Moody.

This specification and evidence were submitted to the Hon. JOSEPH TAGGART, of Kansas, a Member of this House, and long a leading lawyer in his State before becoming a Member. His examination called forth the following from him:

Mrs. Kate Ewing states positively that she heard Sergt. Byers and Sergt. Moody in conversation, in which Byers expressed regret that he had anything to do with the matter, but urged and encouraged by Sergt. Moody to "stick to what we have said" and "we have got to stick tight" (p. 459). This woman testifies to the lewd conduct of both these sergeants (p. 462). The place charged was a public place, with the door open at all times. The testimony of Mrs. Ewing was not impeached, and, as far as I have read, was not even rebutted. The sergeant to whom the language was addressed neither resented it nor complained of it at the time. It would seem that this might tend to show that he did not regard it as having any sinister meaning.

The conviction on this charge seems to be by the separate, uncorroborated testimony of the witness; but one witness testifies to the shocking language imputed to the major in the last sentence of the specification, and this witness is branded as a lewd and lascivious character by uncontradicted testimony.

That a conviction upon this specification was had passes the comprehension of any lawyer or judge who ever examined a charge and weighed the evidence.

Specification No. 9 relates to alleged improprieties at quartermaster's stable during September, 1913. One Pvt. John W. Barrett testified that the accused committed improprieties in act and language in and about the quartermaster's stables. The testimony of this witness, both as to probability and certainty, is unsatisfactory, and carries little probative force. General and special denial is made by Maj. Koehler, and shows that the acts did not and could not have occurred. This is shown not only by his testimony but by the testimony of a Mr. Fuller and First Lieut. John P. Smith, who contradict the statements of Barrett and are themselves uncontradicted. Sergt. Barrett had been reprimanded by accused in presence of First Lieut. Thomas O. Humphrey. First Lieut. Steese stated that Barrett had been removed as provost sergeant at his, Steese's request. The open, public character of the place itself would make improbable the story of Barrett. He had been removed from position by Maj. Koehler, refused appointment in another case, and reprimanded. Barrett had also been court-martialed and reduced to ranks for gambling with privates under his jurisdiction.

That the testimony of this witness was accepted as a basis for finding of guilty against Maj. Koehler is shocking to the intelligence of any man who ever considered a charge and weighed evidence in support of or against it.



Congressman GEORGE C. SCOTT, of Iowa, a Member of this House, a legal practitioner of long standing, and for several terms a public prosecutor, after examining this specification and evidence, said:

Generally observing witness Barrett, he appears to be a man who has been in the service 9 or 10 years; that he has held rank of sergeant and corporal; that he has been reduced on account of drunkenness and reduced in rank for gambling; that he has been relieved of his position for inefficiency, and again for deceitfulness to his superior. There is also considerable testimony indicating that his reputation for truthfulness and veracity is bad. At one point Barrett testifies that on being requested by the attendant he gave up the moving-picture show seat and left. He is squarely contradicted in this by Lieut. Humphreys. Upon a fair consideration it would seem that Lieut. Humphreys's testimony is the most credible and in all probability true. So, concluding, it is evident that Barrett deliberately lied at this point in his testimony.

Barrett's record taken as a whole, the type of man considered, it is evident that he is not such a man as would fairly appreciate the gravity of the accusations that he makes against Maj. Koehler.

After more than 25 years' active practice of the law and observing courts and the considerations which have moved and controlled them, I have no hesitancy in expressing the opinion that ordinarily the testimony of the prosecution upon this specification when weighed against the evidence in opposition thereto would not be considered sufficiently weighty to justify the conviction before a magistrate of one of the minor offenses.

Specification 11 relates to an alleged episode of impropriety at what was to the fort practically a public telephone station.

The statement of the place, and the time being in or near the middle of the day, would suggest its improbability. The allegation is supported by L. R. Davis, a discharged man. This man said when first consulted by the prosecution that the occurrence was in August, 1912. The specification was based upon that statement. The accused, in his simplicity and with the belief that the facts were sought to be discovered rather than a prosecution conducted, immediately showed to the prosecuting officer that it could not have been at that time, as he was away at a distance from the fort. Then Davis was induced by some cause or person to change the year. It was then fixed at a time when the accused could not so clearly establish his continuous and precise whereabouts. Davis was not corroborated by anyone, save that some time after he had mentioned the fact to Brown, an electrician. Here the court, in direct contravention of all established rules of proper procedure, allowed Brown to relate the story told by Davis. This procedure was forced by a law officer from the Judge Advocate General's office when it would not have been permitted in any civil court in this land. The fact of immediate complaint, of course, would have been proper if the same had been made, but that was not the case here.

Davis was contradicted in full and in detail by Maj. Koehler. He further contradicted himself as to time. He was flatly contradicted by Lieut. Gorham as to time, and Gorham's presence at station, testified to by Davis, was circumstantially contradicted by Sergts. McDonald and Hess, Maj. McAndrew, and Pvt. Keene.

In addition to the impeachment of Davis by witnesses upon important facts, he was directly impeached as to reputation for veracity. Corpl. Dougherty said his reputation for veracity was bad and he would not pay his debts. Lieut. Steese said Davis's reputation for veracity was not good. It was shown by the evidence that he was a slanderer of the reputation of good women.

Davis's reputation was not defended by anybody. The prosecution recognized that he was indefensible.

The judge advocate, in his argument to the jury, said that he did not regard him as a very good soldier, but that his "story and the circumstances seem to indicate that he told the truth in this." Can it be that this is the measure of proof necessary to secure conviction of an act the penalty for which would be the same as for a heinous crime? Is this what is necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence which the law raises in every man's favor and which certainly attaches to a record of gallantry, truthfulness, and faithful service such as has been earned by the accused? Does conviction follow "mere indication"? If so, then the fundamental basis for personal security has been destroyed; the wisdom of centuries set aside without a precedent, authority, or reason.

Senator GEORGE W. NORRIS, of Nebraska, 10 years a Member of this House, many years a judge upon the Nebraska bench, and a prosecuting attorney before that, after examining this specification and evidence supporting it, said:

I am very much surprised that any tribunal could, on the evidence in support of specification No. 11, find Maj. Koehler guilty of the charge therein contained, and I do not see how any reviewing tribunal could review this evidence without being firmly impressed with the grave injustice of finding an officer of the United States Army guilty of such a charge upon the evidence submitted. There is very little evidence, if any, that tends to sustain this charge except the testimony of L. R. Davis; and his testimony is not only absolutely denied by the

positive testimony of Maj. Koehler, but all the established circumstances tend very strongly to disprove every damaging statement that Davis has made. In addition to this, the character witnesses have, it seems to me, practically demonstrated that Davis was absolutely unworthy of belief, and common, ordinary decency and justice should not permit any conviction founded upon his uncorroborated testimony to be sustained.

Specification 12 relates to an alleged act of mild impropriety of the accused in the after cabin of the boat *Nathaniel Greene*, which boat plied between New London and Fort Terry. It was a most public place. Wilson was a deck hand. He says he had never seen accused before. What occurred made no serious impression on his mind, and he never told anyone about it until about the time of investigation. He made many conflicting statements as to the time. At one time alleged by Wilson Koehler was able to show absolutely he had not made the trip at all. As to the other, Koehler was corroborated by Sergt. Herbst, who was in a position to know. In the second statement it could not have been, because the date was subsequent to Wilson's discharge from the service of the *Nathaniel Greene*. Koehler in his complete and detailed denial was supported by the captain of the boat, who said Koehler had always ridden with him in the pilot house; and, further, that Wilson's reputation for veracity was bad. There was no evidence submitted to show how guilt could be predicated upon the evidence in this case. Congressman SCOTT, of Iowa, following his examination of this specification and the evidence thereunder, said:

The witness impresses one who examines his testimony as being one of those individuals who responds easily to suggestions, but lacks entirely that frankness and energy of statement which indicates that the witness speaks truthfully with respect to matters concerning which he has personal knowledge or recollection.

It is submitted that such testimony of such a witness utterly fails to support the charge against the accused by the degree of proof required under the law and the procedure of the court in question. It surely can not be possible that such a preposterous story and such a witness uncorroborated will overcome the testimony of the accused and the reasonable circumstances which he relates.

Specification 13 was certainly a maximum of accusation and was followed by a minimum of proof. The statement of Campbell the witness, after reciting events, was to the effect that the accused had always conducted himself as a gentleman toward him. Campbell placed no bad construction on the words and acts of the accused. Acts themselves were denied in full and detail by the accused and Campbell was not corroborated.

Congressman STEPHENS of Nebraska, after examining specification and evidence, said:

The evidence, therefore, upon which specification No. 13 must rest, even if accepted, seems to me to be ridiculous as a basis for a charge involving the discharge of an Army officer with an honorable service record.

But this charge is not supported by the evidence of any other witness, and is positively denied by the defendant, Maj. Benjamin M. Koehler.

If the other specifications are no better supported by evidence of misconduct than is this one, I am constrained to believe that those responsible for this proceeding could have been better employed in some other service in behalf of the Army.

The same specification and evidence were submitted to the brilliant Senator T. J. WALSH, of Montana, long recognized as one of the ablest lawyers of the West. He said:

The testimony of the witness Campbell concerning the overt act charged is found on page 314 in answer to the question, "Did Maj. Koehler, etc.?" No right-minded person can attach any importance to the first part of the answer, and it is quite apparent that the witness did not. It is to be noted that touching the other acts the witness says "I believe." It seems scarcely credible that if the acts charged ever did take place and they had the significance attached to them in the charge the witness would find his recollection of the occurrence so feeble that he would be required to qualify what he had to say about the matter with the expression "I believe." So it will be noted by the testimony at the bottom of page 318 that he is not quite sure whether at the time he was standing up or sitting down. His answer is qualified in the same way—"Standing up, I believe." So it appears likewise from the testimony given at the bottom of page 317 and the top of page 318 that even the witness himself is not prepared to assert that the acts, on the occurrence of which he casts some doubt by the language in which he tells of them, had the detestable character or significance assigned to them by the charge. It seems unnecessary to canvass the testimony further. It would not support the charge in any court exercising civil jurisdiction, and ought not to be deemed sufficient for conviction in any tribunal, however constituted.

Specification No. 14 alleges an impropriety with Sergt. James T. Ward. This is a case where Ward makes a statement which was flatly contradicted by the accused. Ward is in no wise corroborated either by other witnesses or circumstantially. It is established by the evidence of Harry Reubens, civilian, that because Ward did not obtain a position which he desired the accused to aid him in securing, that he would "get even" with Maj. Koehler, and which from the tone of Ward's statement, Reubens regarded his threat as serious and fraught with intention to injure the major. Reubens and Ward were together a great deal, occupying the same apartment; that Ward selected as a basis of his charge a time when Reubens was not present. Ward complained to Lieut. Humphreys about Maj. Koehler



keeping him out of a job and in that connection using improper language, bordering upon insubordination and disrespect.

Corpl. Hall testified that Ward stated to him that he had enlisted as a single man, and he was in fact married. When Ward was asked on the witness stand as to whether or not he was married when he enlisted, he claimed that to answer would incriminate or degrade him. Ward was in that delicate position where he would be constrained to testify as would please those above him and who had the power to punish.

Ward was discredited by his own conduct upon the stand and his statements made to other witnesses. His enmity was shown by the statements of his associates and superior officer. His story is incredible and unreasonable. The evidence under this specification would not be sufficient to convict a Mississippi negro charged with chicken stealing.

This specification was submitted to a distinguished jurist Senator, who stated, after examining the evidence, there was no basis for the finding of guilt. His written opinion is not at present available.

Specification 15 alleged certain obscene language and familiar acts on the part of the accused. Precisely the same testimony was given to language as was given to familiar acts, yet the finding was not guilty as to the charge of obscene language, but guilty as to the act.

Witness Fairey asserted and Koehler denied. Koehler's denial was supported by direct contradictory evidence and testimony of First Lieut. Smith and Civilian Fuller. If they, or either of them, told the truth, Fairey was a liar. Both of these men were of good reputation. Fairey had importuned Koehler for promotion and was denied. Fairey was a stableman under Barrett, of Specification No. 9. There was the connection with specification 10, in which Pvt. Ensley testified that he also was a stableman under Barrett, and his testimony was so sensational and improbable that a finding of no guilt was entered. The finding of guilt in this specification was without any basic reason or probability, to say nothing of being supported by that evidence which was of so much force that it removed all reasonable doubt of guilt.

On this specification and evidence thereunder, I quote from Congressman ANTHONY, lawyer and editor and of long service in this House, as follows:

I have carefully examined the record of this court-martial and beg leave herewith to submit to you a brief summary of my conclusions thereon, and particularly upon specification No. 15.

After such examination I am convinced that no civil jury in the United States would ever convict a man of such an offense upon the evidence submitted. There appears to be an entire lack of conclusive evidence tending to show the commission of any overt act. There also seems to be an entire absence of any corroborative evidence on any of the specifications. After reading the case the only explanation that I can arrive at as having actuated the court in reaching their verdict was that they were undoubtedly carried away with the atmosphere of guilt which was built up by the large number of specifications. Where a man is charged with an act of this kind the tongue of slander and gossip as it travels invariably increases and magnifies everything until to many otherwise innocent actions there is attributed questionable motives.

This is unquestionably the case in specification No. 15. In analyzing the evidence of Pvt. Fairey—and it is absolutely unsubstantiated and flatly contradicted by the accused—it is seen that it is purely a question of putting a construction upon an action and language which, even if true, would, in ninety-nine cases out of one hundred, be unsusceptible of a meaning which the court evidently placed upon it.

The court undoubtedly was not warranted in making any finding whatsoever against the accused on the charge and the evidence in specification No. 15, and the fact that the court did so find is evidence to my mind that it permitted itself to be carried away under the influence of the general atmosphere of guilt and suspicion which the prosecuting officers of the Government endeavored to build up around the accused.

In my opinion, the motive which unquestionably governed Pvt. Fairey in testifying against the accused was the disappointment caused by the failure of the accused to appoint him a sergeant, for which position the soldier had asked.

All through this case there seems to run a motive, manifested by a majority of the witnesses, to conspire against the accused for revenge for real or fancied wrongs. Testimony from such witnesses should have been more carefully weighed by the court.

Another point that impresses me in a review of this case is that the trial of the case was undoubtedly prejudiced by the unusual publicity which was given it in the metropolitan newspapers, and from the further fact that newspaper interviews from high military authority undoubtedly tended to influence or prejudice the members of the court.

It would seem to me that one in authority should require absolute proof and absolute evidence in order to convict a man of the offense with which the accused was charged. The moment the accused was ordered to trial he was damned, and therefore in reviewing the proceedings of this court-martial it would occur to me that the fact that not a single one of the specifications has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be required in any court of law with which I am familiar, should have great weight.

Congressman BARTON, of Nebraska, auditor of state for Nebraska for two terms, a man of business and affairs, after examining the specification and evidence, said as follows:

I have read the evidence of the witness Fairey, and noted what he said the accused had done, and also the conduct of the witness following

that time up to the time he communicated with Capt. Mayes. The clear and explicit denial of the accused that he did the improper act alleged by Pvt. Fairey to my mind brought a distinct issue and demanded before conviction could be had corroboration of the testimony of Fairey. This is entirely lacking, and, on the contrary, I find First Lieut. Smith corroborating the statement of the accused. The accused is further corroborated by John W. Fuller, a civilian.

I claim no credit for ability for nice legal distinctions, but having had a great deal to do with public and legal affairs generally, and understanding that the military law as well as the criminal law require that the accused be found to have committed the alleged act beyond a reasonable doubt, I am at an entire loss to understand how a finding of guilty under the evidence in specification No. 15 could be made.

If an officer of the rank of major is to be at the absolute mercy of the word of any private, wholly uncorroborated and unsupported, I can not understand how any officer would be safe in his position or would dare exert any discipline.

Specification 16. This specification charges accused with improper familiarity with Sergt. Byers. This is a case where two majors and a sergeant were in a small room together transacting the business of the Government. Each within a few feet from and in full view of each other. Byers affirms acts by accused. Both Maj. Koehler and Maj. Moses positively deny statements, yet the jury found accused guilty. There was no complaint by Byers to anyone, and he was corroborated by no one or by any important circumstance.

Conviction on this count shows how regardless of the rights of the defense the court must have been as measured outside of a court-martial. It further demonstrates how helpless, however innocent the accused was before that body of men, who seemed to lust for his downfall and the destruction of his prospects and honor rather than to find and preserve justice.

This specification I submitted to the senior Senator from Iowa. He is known throughout the United States as one of the leading lawyers in that great body at the other end of the Capitol which has attracted to its membership great lawyers ever since the organization of the Government. Senator CUMMINGS, after reading this specification and the evidence submitted in its support and after sketching the testimony of Sergt. Byers, said:

Against this testimony Maj. Koehler describes in a very clear and logical way the entire progress of the work, denying absolutely the charges of Sergt. Byers. Corroborating Maj. Koehler and squarely contradicting Sergt. Byers, Maj. Moses testifies that when they began the work he sat down at the desk with his list; that Maj. Koehler stood near him and in his plain view the entire time; that they both examined each and every article jointly, inspecting and passing judgment upon them; that Maj. Koehler was within his view and range of vision the entire time; that he stood up all of that time, and that nothing of the nature testified to by Sergt. Byers occurred.

It is impossible to reconcile the testimony of Sergt. Byers and that of Maj. Koehler and Maj. Moses as to the method pursued in performing the work referred to. It is also impossible to reconcile the testimony of Sergt. Byers and Maj. Moses upon the issue as to whether Maj. Koehler squatted down with the sergeant over by the pile and practically performing the entire work of inspection, or as to whether he stood all the time by the desk and performed the work jointly with Maj. Moses.

An examination of all the evidence offered in support of this specification would suggest that one of three hypotheses must be true, either Sergt. Byers speaks the truth or he has willfully falsified the situation or has taken as a basis some slight and trivial act and designedly enlarged upon it until he has developed an entirely false situation.

Upon all of the testimony the problem is presented, is the testimony of this witness sufficient when judged in accordance with the rules governing judicial tribunals to sustain the charge excluding all reasonable doubt?

It seems to me that the record of testimony is entirely insufficient to sustain this charge. In the first place the circumstances related by Sergt. Byers do not present rational conduct. It was broad day; there were three men together, each in plain sight of the others; these men were there for a specific purpose, to do work which was to be accomplished within a few minutes time. The sergeant was a practical stranger to Maj. Koehler. The conduct to which Sergt. Byers testifies, under the circumstances, is utterly irreconcilable with a rational mind.

Second, the testimony of Sergt. Byers is in irreconcilable conflict with that of the other two men, not only with respect to the act charged, but with respect to the method of the progress of the work.

It is a fundamental principle governing all trials involving charges of moral turpitude that the accused is presumed to be innocent; that that presumption continues until the close of the trial; and that the evidence must be such as, when weighed against the evidence offered in opposition thereto, to establish guilt beyond every reasonable doubt.

To convict an officer of the Army of this revolting conduct upon the evidence submitted under specification No. 16 would reverse all rules of law and shock the civilized sense of justice.

Specification No. 17. In this there is charged only improper conversation by the accused with Master Gunner King.

The only improper language related by King was a remark made by accused about King's furlough, then just ending. King in his testimony insisted upon placing an improper significance on the words used, and which was wholly unrelated to the usual and natural use of the words. Moreover, he said he and Koehler rode from New York to New London in a day-coach smoker. Koehler denies this absolutely. He said his only trip was made April 12, 1912, and not May 23, 1912, as testified to by King. That he, Koehler, rode home in a Pullman and King was not with him any part of the trip. He obtained his luncheon on the diner. In this he was corroborated by his sister, who prepared no lunch for him, as she knew he had



come home on a train having a diner and it was their custom to take their luncheon on that diner when making such trip; she, therefore, did not prepare any lunch for him and none was asked for. This certainly would have been done if he had not lunched in the diner.

King admitted that Koehler had denied him a personal letter of indorsement which King wanted very much. Further, Koehler had twice reprimanded him.

If the testimony of King had been established or admitted to be true, it would have been a most trivial basis for the specification. But under the rules of evidence it would not support a charge before an examining magistrate, if uncontradicted, to say nothing about establishing guilt before an impartial jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Congressman J. M. C. SMITH, of Michigan, now three times elected Member of this body, a legal practitioner for more than a quarter of a century, and for four years a public prosecutor, after examining this specification and the evidence thereunder, said:

It will please be observed that, standing alone, this testimony is of the most trivial character.

The specification is supported by one witness alone, who had twice been reprimanded by respondent, a sufficient motive if one is sought.

The material testimony of complainant is specifically denied by respondent, corroborated by the circumstances.

That the good character of a respondent stands with him to the end. That respondent must be considered innocent until proven guilty not only by a preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a fair and reasonable doubt. That the testimony must be considered in the light of his innocence and he is not to prove himself not guilty before he is proven guilty. That the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. That the respondent can not be convicted on the unsupported testimony of one witness's position. Innocence instead of guilt must be inferred or denied when the construction of the language admits of two interpretations. That charges against superior officers must be clearly proven.

May I only add that my honest conviction is that the respondent is not guilty; that this charge or specification is not proven by the prepondering proof, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt; that frequently a man's character is his sole defense; that justice, morality, and good order will best be subserved by an acquittal on this specification; that the complainant shifted the date and so weakened his testimony. Complainant admitted he was twice disciplined by respondent; that there is reason to infer that the charge is founded upon an old grudge; that the respondent is not proven guilty by a preponderance of the proof, while the proof should be clear and convincing and beyond a fair and reasonable doubt.

Maj. Koehler was a necessary and proper witness under each of the 17 specifications. True, his interest in the result of the case must be considered in weighing his testimony. It should be said in his behalf that he was selected as a young man of clean morals, high ideals, physical perfection, and high mental endowment. That he had the opportunities which our great Military Academy, with its history and traditions hanging over it, with its faculty and equipment for its present conduct, with that emulation which arises among cadets, with 17 years' service in the Army, in barracks, fort, field, and battle, under all of which men are made better, stronger, more reliable, and hence more truthful. Especially is this last true where advancement has been gained for honorable service and for special bravery and gallantry where life has been in hazard. It has been well said that for fearless truth, even though to the witness's own hurt, "conduct me to a ripened soldier, with a successful career behind him, with honorable promotion before him." All of these can be said of Maj. Koehler, and no one has attempted to gainsay any of them, either in part or degree.

Into the scale for the determination of each of these specifications Maj. Koehler has thrown the weight of his good name, attested by good, brave, pure men who knew him throughout his career. These men knew the reputation he enjoyed. Moreover a number of them had lived with him and knew his conduct and every-day life. Some of them for years, and among them all some knew him all of his time in the Army. These were men who valued their own reputations and the reputation of the Army as they did their stainless swords.

Lieut. Terry, executive officer at the post, said he knew the accused intimately, officially, and socially, and that he was always gentlemanly, dignified, efficient, and refined. A firm disciplinarian.

Lieut. Smith knew the accused intimately during his whole service at the fort, never saw an ungentlemanly act, never heard him utter an improper or ungentlemanly word.

Lieut. Lee lived in the same tent with him; stated his conduct was always that of a gentleman.

Capt. Patton, next in seniority to Maj. Koehler in the post since 1911, who had been with the accused on distant trips, and occupied adjoining connected rooms, testified as to his constant propriety both in act and language.

Lieut. Humphreys, at the fort from 1909 to 1912, knew accused intimately. Never saw or heard an ungentlemanly or improper act or word by accused.

First Lieut. Steese was with the accused five days in the week for periods of from five minutes to several hours a day and never saw or heard an improper word or act by the accused.

Corpl. James E. Hall served with the accused in the Philippines and was with him in the battles in the island campaigns. The accused was fearless and painstaking and careful of his men; never heard the accused utter a vulgar or obscene word nor conduct himself unbecoming a gentleman.

Pvt. George Kronchonoskie was orderly for the accused at Fort Terry for 17 months, in constant attendance upon him, and found him always a gentleman.

Sergt. John Cashman had just completed 30 years' service and had been stationed for 4 months with accused, examining recruits numbering from 30 to 50 a day, and accused never used an improper word or act in all that experience with its opportunities.

Sergt. William T. Williams had known accused for two and one-half years, and his duties brought him into frequent association with accused at different places, and no word or act of impropriety occurred in his presence.

Sergt. William H. Williams, with special opportunities for meeting or seeing the accused, never saw an improper act or heard a vulgar or obscene word from the accused.

Capt. Proctor, master of the *Nathaniel Greene*, and in whose pilot house the accused had always ridden, had never heard a vile word or saw an improper act on part of the accused.

Sergt. Hoffman, on duty as provost sergeant, saw accused alone every day for a long time; never heard an improper word or saw an act of impropriety by the accused.

Sergt. Hess, for six years color sergeant at Fort Terry, alone with the accused for more than one hundred times, never heard him say anything of a vulgar nature.

Sergt. McDonald, for two years acting sergeant major, at headquarters for a year, was alone with the accused every day and never heard him use vulgar or obscene language or do an ungentlemanly act.

Second Lieut. Gorham, at Fort Terry since August 11 and many times alone with the accused at his office and home, never heard improper language or saw an improper act on his part.

Maj. McAndrew knew accused before he came to the post. Frequently at his home played golf with him; never heard or saw an ungentlemanly word or act.

Maj. Moses knew the accused for 20 years; never knew him to tell an improper story or anything suggesting vulgarity.

Col. Davis, in command of the post, has known the accused since he was a cadet in the Military Academy, had expressed his appreciation of the excellence of the work of the accused at Fort Terry, and attested to his professional efficiency, manliness, courage, and conduct becoming an officer and gentleman.

Col. H. L. Hawthorne has known the accused since 1898; was associated with him intimately; and slept by his side for three months in the Philippines. Never saw the slightest evidence of anything but that of a gentleman and officer of the highest ideals.

Lieut. Col. Peyton C. Marsh has known the accused since 1898; saw him every day while under the command in the Astor battery until December, 1898. Said accused was courteous, free from vulgarity, well disciplined as a soldier, and unquestionably a gentleman.

Lieut. Col. W. L. Kenly has known the accused since June, 1899; was associated with him 3½ years in New York City; during this time lived with him 9 months in an apartment, breakfasted daily, frequently dining together, used a common bathroom. During 15 years of acquaintance never saw a single symptom of anything that was not manly or anything that could not be said of a man of the highest type—a normal manly man, a gentleman in all respects always.

The prosecution in its investigation inquired of about 125 persons in or near Fort Terry. Out of this number it relied upon and presented 16 witnesses upon which the records of this case warrant absolutely the following classification—there were a few other minor witnesses heard, but the testimony of whom was unimportant:

Five witnesses whose reputations for veracity were proven to be "bad," namely, Lieut. Austin G. Frick, Sergt. Edison Kirkman, Pvt. Ensley, Pvt. L. R. Davis, Deck Hand Harry C. Wilson.

Three proven to have testified falsely by at least two contradicting witnesses: Sergt. C. Byers, Sergt. John W. Barrett, Pvt. H. C. Fairley.

Three had been reprimanded by Maj. Koehler—Capt. Phillip Worcester, Lieut. Frick, Gunner Harry E. King.

Two had been court-martialed or reduced in rank at instance of Maj. Koehler, namely, Sergt. John W. Barrett and Corpl. I. W. Spears.



Five were refused favors strongly solicited: Sergt. James T. Ward, Gunner Harry King, Pvt. H. C. Fahey, Corpl. I. N. Spears, and Sergt. Barrett.

Five specially interested in case or at enmity to Maj. Koehler, Capt. Worster, Lieut. Frick, Sergt. Elvin Byers, Sergt. Moody, and Sergt. Ward.

Witness convicted of gambling, John W. Barrett.

Witness in service, under statement of fact, the truth or falsity of which refused to say, as it might degrade or incriminate him, James T. Ward.

Two witnesses, defamers of good women, Lieut. Frick and L. R. Davis.

Witness intoxicated at time of alleged occurrence in specification, Isaac N. Spears.

NOTE.—Of the 16 witnesses in the above classification two remain:

First, Harvey Kernan testified as to the eighth specification, upon which Maj. Koehler was acquitted.

Second, Jacob Campbell was wholly uncorroborated and was trivial throughout.

Perhaps no more severe comment could be made than the fact that upon testimony of the foregoing witnesses conviction was had, and that these witnesses remain at Fort Terry in the service of the Government, to receive the advancement to which they are eligible; and, further, that none of them, so far as I am informed, have been tried for the part they took in this affair.

What an unwitting tribute this war court pays to the courage and discipline of Maj. Koehler in that his alleged indiscretions were with those whom he had refused favor, those whom he had reprimanded, those whom he had punished, and those unfriendly to him.

Further, Maj. Koehler interposed a stainless, brave, and gallant record, with the commendations of his superiors and the praise of his old commander, Gen. Lawton, the American fighting lion of the Philippines, while against him there was practically none who had faced an enemy in battle or been under the baptism of fire.

With this record, the question naturally arises, How was a conviction secured? There was sent from the War Department at Washington a special prosecutor, Capt. Mayes. To the tribunal which tried Maj. Koehler he represented the wish of Washington and centered in his person and dropped from his lips the supposed desires of those in authority. Further, his statement of the law was given weight beyond its deserts.

Further, there is an un-American feature of the court-martial procedure which should be reformed. After the evidence is all in, the accused must assume the burden of the opening argument and discover at haphazard what the important contentions of the prosecution are. The defense has not the advantage of having the issue fairly made by an opening argument of the prosecution, so that it can fairly meet and properly combat the statements of the prosecution both as to analysis of fact and declaration as to the law. After the defense has made its argument the prosecution then makes the closing speech, analyzing the facts and stating the law from its point of view, without opportunity, expectation, or fear of being contradicted. In this the Judge Advocate has the united power and prestige of prosecutor and judge.

Listen, lawyers, how this judge advocate used that privilege and power. He told the jury that one witness was enough to prove an act of the kind charged. He left it as if that was the generally accepted proposition of law. Every one of you know that the rule is to require corroboration of the evidence of the other party. That it is only in exceptional cases where corroboration may be dispensed with in the interest of justice, as where the other party were one of tender years or the place of such seclusion that corroborating evidence would become impossible, or other kindred special circumstances which might relax the rule.

Again, the judge advocate declared that one witness was sufficient in this case, because of the secret nature of the transactions. The record distinctly shows that the only specifications where the facts even partook of secrecy among the 17 were those in which the accused was acquitted; that in the other specifications where the guilt was found the place and time and circumstances marked them as either public or semipublic, with other persons present or within easy access whose appearances would be unheralded. Yet of all the 11 specifications where guilt was found the prosecution did not present two sets of eyes or two sets of ears which saw or heard any act or any word complained of.

Again, the judge advocate said:

When offenses are committed the liability of the person to commit that offense may be established by proof of commission of other offenses.

Every lawyer knows that is an incorrect statement of the law. The scope of this discussion will not permit of extended brief of the law. I submit the following as a statement of the general text:

Subject to certain general exceptions, evidence of other offenses than those involved in the indictment is inadmissible. (See Cyc. 22, p. 450.) Again, among inferences which, except under certain conditions, the law will not permit to be drawn is that a person has done a certain act because he has done a similar act at another time. (Cyc. 17-279.)

In the case of Fields against The Territory of Wyoming the court held:

Evidence of a distinct substantive offense can not be admitted to aid in proving the commission of another offense.

The exceptions are only where two acts are related as between the same persons consecutively or closely related in point of time, neither of which obtain in this case. This, you will recall, was in the closing argument of the prosecution. There was no opportunity for contradiction or correction. The law seems to have been stated by the judge advocate following the motto of Aaron Burr, who is said to have defined the law as "that which can be boldly asserted and plausibly maintained."

But, even to grant the correctness of the statement, it would not apply to this case, because it would require an established case to aid in the proof of one that was under debate, and none of these specifications had been established.

In vain this young man early conceived an ambition to attend West Point, and fitted himself therefor, making an exemplary record in that great institution, where boys are molded into heroic men with purest ideals and loftiest ambitions. To no purpose was his soldierly and effective conduct in fort, at recruiting station, through drill and discipline of years. It mattered not that he deserved and had the good opinion of every officer whose good opinion was worth having, down through the years of service, and received the uniform commendation from his superiors. No advantage to him in the day of his trial was his career in the Philippines under fire and in council where, young as he was, he attracted the attention of the great fighting Lawton, of whom all Americans are proud. Gen. Lawton never did mere lip service, and his pen was not always used in praise. Gen. Lawton, on November 14, 1899, said:

Young and his cavalry, Ballance and his infantry, and Koehler with his mountain battery are deserving of all that can be said of them.

To Americans generally that tribute to Maj. Koehler had but one meaning. It seems by this tribunal to have been given a different construction. The language of Lawton is construed to be oracular. Most men, if the terse statement of Lawton was to be construed, would say "deserving of all that can be said of them" meant "deserving of all the best that can be said of them by the best of them." Maj. Koehler, before that tribunal, was subjected to the reverse construction, "deserving of all the worst that can be said of them by the worst of them."

In the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill which has recently passed this House there was appropriated \$40,000,000, of which \$1,500,000 was set aside for the judiciary. That is for the enforcement of justice among the people affected under national law. I doubt if one-hundredth as much proportionately in this bill is to be used in the cause of justice among our military men. Yet the day will come when justice among our defenders will be given more and better consideration than it has heretofore. This bill provides for protection to our great cities, our private property, and the integrity of our national boundaries. Some of it should be used for the protection of our protectors.

Other bright, clean men are in the Army. If their duty has been performed, delinquents have been refused favors, given reprimands, and have suffered punishment. Other fortress ruff-raff may have been conspiring against honorable officers and, by reason of their numbers and organization, attempted to pave their way to ease and preferment. I hope that no dollar of that which we vote in this bill may be used to aid such a purpose. If some attention is paid hereafter to this branch of our service, the use of this time to-day may not have been in vain, or the cruel and unjust sacrifice of Maj. Koehler have been to the country a total loss.

But justice may not forever sleep. The time may come when this House will be the forum to rectify this manifest wrong.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, a message from the Senate, by Mr. Tulley, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 20241) making appropriations to supply urgent de-



iciencies in appropriations for the fiscal year 1915 and prior years, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the President had approved and signed bills and joint resolutions of the following titles:

On January 12, 1915:

S. J. Res. 58. Joint resolution authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to present the bell of the late U. S. S. *Princeton* to the borough of Princeton, N. J.

(To correct list of January 14, 1914, giving January 11 as date of approval.)

On January 15, 1915:

S. J. Res. 218. Joint resolution to provide for the detail of an officer of the Army for duty with the Panama-California Exposition, San Diego, Cal.

On January 16, 1915:

S. 6039. An act for the coinage of certain gold and silver coins in commemoration of the Panama-Pacific International Exposition, and for other purposes.

On January 20, 1915:

S. 5168. An act for the relief of the King Theological Hall, and authorizing the conveyance of real estate to the Howard University and other grantees.

#### ARMY APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. PARKER] 25 minutes.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I speak on this appropriation bill now before the House. My topic is that we should provide for the national defense and perform the duty imposed upon us by the Constitution by enlarged appropriations. Many propositions have been made which involve change of law, but such change takes time and discussion as to the kind of change that should be made. I urge upon this House action which is already provided for by law and appropriations that will enable us to perform an express injunction of the Constitution.

The Constitution says of Congress in another clause that we must provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia. And the Constitution meant by militia the whole able-bodied free male population of the United States. It did not mean a select militia or national guard, as we now understand the word; it meant what we call the reserve militia of 16,000,000 men who are still enumerated as belonging to that reserve militia and who would have to be the final defense of this country as volunteers in time of war. I urge that arms should be provided which would be at their service if they be called out. It is undisputed that enough of such arms and necessary material is not now on hand and is not pretended to be on hand.

At the outbreak of the War with Spain I was on the Military Affairs Committee, and I asked a gentleman from the Ordnance Department how many rifles we had. He whispered to me as a secret that we had some 300,000 of the old Springfields. It is unnecessary to regard this as a secret now. We know that we have not the old Springfield breech-loading, black-powder rifles with which our volunteers went to Cuba. We know that there were then no Krags on hand except for a small force of some tens of thousands of Regulars. We know that all the better rifles, the magazine rifles, that we have now are those that have been made since then. All this is public knowledge. We tell no secrets and we ask none.

There has been about \$20,300,000 appropriated since that time for the manufacture of magazine small arms.

(Here as in all other places any extension of Mr. PARKER's remarks is printed in small type.)

The appropriation of 1898 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, contained a provision that it shall be applicable to the manufacture of magazine arms recommended for trial by the board recently in session and approved by the Secretary of War. The appropriations for the various years, made in each case for the following fiscal year, were as follows:

1898	\$400,000
1899	800,000
1899 (urgent deficiency)	200,000
1900	1,100,000
1901	1,100,000
1902	1,700,000
1903	1,700,000
1904	1,700,000
1905	1,700,000
1906	1,700,000
1907	1,700,000
1908	1,778,158
1909	1,700,000
1910	1,000,000
1911	750,000
1912	700,000
1913	600,000

Total..... 20,328,158

A rifle cost \$17 in 1899 and it now costs about \$15, so that these appropriations provided about 1,330,000 rifles. If we suppose that in 17 years some 300,000 have been worn out, there would be 1,000,000 left. We manufactured Krags for one-fourth of the time, and we manufactured Springfields for the rest of the time, and any foreigner that looks upon our appropriations knows that we have about 350,000 Krags and 650,000 of the others.

I saw in a statement that was made by the chairman of this committee, and printed on page 1760 of the Record, that my estimate was within 37,000 of the actual amount we have on hand—1,037,000 rifles. Gen. Crozier says that they have 343,000 Krags which are part of those on hand.

What is the use of secrecy? The world knows we have only about a million rifles. I think it would make for peace and harmony and the defense of this country that the whole world should know that instead of having arms for about one-sixteenth of the able-bodied population of the United States we had arms for every man. It only costs \$15 a man, and we can spread it over 10 years at \$1.50 a year.

Silence is good as to secret and new weapons, whether ships of sea or air or of the depths or fort or siege guns. We can not keep an army of a million men at a cost of one thousand million a year. The ultimate strength of our Nation is in the 16,000,000 reserve.

We may well wish the world knew that we had a rifle for every man and artillery to go with them; that our schoolboys were taught to use the rifle; and that larger military schools like West Point were filling our community with educated officers in civil life.

I mention this because I helped the situation somewhat in 1899, and I am sorry to say that I was to blame in not seeing that the improvement was kept up. When I found that we had so few rifles, I induced the Committee on Military Affairs to report \$800,000 instead of \$400,000 for the manufacture of arms, and some laughed and said that the House would never stand for an appropriation above the estimate. Mr. Chairman, we got our \$800,000, and it gave courage to the War Department; they asked for more, and we gradually worked that appropriation up to \$1,700,000, which gave us 100,000 rifles a year. This was kept up for 10 years, but since the year 1909 the amount has been gradually reduced, until instead of \$1,700,000 this bill carries only \$250,000, which will give us only 15,000 rifles, or enough to take care of what go out of commission every year, perhaps hardly enough. Certainly this is not providing for the common defense, and if men ask why we should provide more than our military experts request, I may say in all frankness that when a department finds that it can only have a certain amount of money, and there are men all over that department who depend for their living upon Army organization, that money will be expended preferentially, without looking ahead, in keeping up that organization. It costs on the average a thousand dollars a year a man to keep up the Army.

Mr. Chairman, with that thousand dollars a year we can purchase in 10 years equipment and arms for 100 men, and in addition provide for military schools whose graduates in civil life will be fit officers on a call for volunteers.

The very cheapest way to provide for war is to provide arms and equipment. They are so cheap that the first law passed under the Constitution to provide for arming the militia enacted that every man between 18 and 45 years of age should appear within six months with his own musket or firelock, his own belt and bayonet, cartridges (not less than 24), cartridge box, and knapsack, or if he had a rifle, he could bring instead of a cartridge box and cartridges balls and powder. That put upon every man an expense of \$20 or so. Of course this did not prove a wise requirement, because all men could not afford to comply; the poor did not do so, and only the better off did so. As a result the militia law of 1792 was not very successful. I can not go more into detail, because my time has been cut from 40 minutes to 25 minutes, but during all of the years from 1790 to 1797 the Father of his Country in almost every message was urging that the Congress should provide for arming the militia, and by that he meant every able-bodied freeman in this whole country. He was urging that we should establish manufactures of arms. In two separate messages he said that the best security for the preservation of peace was to be prepared for war. He urged the establishment of the academy at West Point to give us officers. Mr. Adams repeated the same statement about preparation for war; but, nevertheless, little was done. In 1798 an act was passed nominally to provide arms for the States, but it gave only 30,000 stand of arms for the militia. Then came the administration of Thomas Jefferson—he was a Democrat, remember—and when Thomas Jefferson came into the White House as President he said in the first message: "Nor should we now or at any time separate until we can say that we have done everything for the militia which we would do if an enemy were at our door."



Through his messages he urges this course. It is interesting to compare our present condition with that in which the United States found itself during the Napoleonic wars. Year after year our commerce was attacked, our ships were taken, our peace was threatened. Mr. Jefferson, in 1807, said that the moment our peace was threatened he deemed it indispensable to secure a greater provision of those articles of military stores with which our magazines were not furnished. He could not wait for a law. He did not hesitate to authorize engagements adequate to the emergencies. In March, 1808, he advised enlargement of the academy at West Point. In April, 1808, that great Democrat, John Randolph, of Roanoke, offered a bill which provided an annual appropriation to provide arms for the whole body of the militia. It had a blank for the amount to be appropriated annually. It contained a second section allowing the Government to put up manufactories and a third section allowing the arms to be distributed to the States to arm the militia; but when the bill came to be passed the Congress was very careful of its appropriations, and gave only \$200,000. Mr. Randolph said that the bill was useless with \$200,000; that that would not provide for the growth of the militia from year to year by birth, whereas he expected to have at least a million dollars a year in order to arm them all.

But in order to give you the view which should prevail when people talk of peace I will read from one message of Thomas Jefferson. All through these times reference was made to conditions which are like ours, and Mr. Jefferson, on November 8, 1808, said that, considering the extraordinary character of the times in which we live, our attention should unremittently be fixed on the safety of our country; that for a people who are free and who mean to remain so a well-organized and armed militia is their best security, and that it is therefore incumbent upon us at every meeting to revise the condition of the militia and to ask ourselves if it is prepared to repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territory exposed to invasion. He continued, that under the acts of that year respecting arms the difficulty of procuring them from abroad during the present situation and dispositions of Europe induced him to direct his whole efforts to the means of internal supply; that the public factories have therefore been enlarged, additional machineries have been erected, and in proportion as artificers can be found or formed their effect, already more than doubled, may be increased so as to keep pace with the yearly increase of the militia; that the annual sums appropriated by the latter act have been directed to the encouragement of private factories of arms, and contracts have been entered into with individual undertakers to nearly the amount of the first year's appropriation.

Do we need arms now? Washington needed powder and shot in the Revolution and had to send for them to Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where the shot was cast in the New Jersey hills and sent across the Hudson at West Point up to Massachusetts. When the Mexican War took place we did better, because then in proportion to the population we had more graduates of West Point in civil life. When the Civil War came those who remember it, as I do, will remember how our troops had to go forward in batches, armed some with the Henry carbine, some with the Spencer, some with the Remington, some with this, and some with that, mostly old muzzle-loaders, and how we finally had to make enough Springfield muzzle-loaders for the Army. We could not afford to wait to do that now. There was the same trouble on both sides of the line at that time—

Mr. McKENZIE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Only for a short question; my time is limited.

Mr. McKENZIE. How many rifles does the gentleman think we ought to have?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I will tell the gentleman in a moment. I think we ought to have 5,000,000. Really, we ought to have 16,000,000. I will deal now with your question, because I am afraid I will be out of time if I do not. There are other things I want to speak about, but I will now come to that. We once appropriated for 100,000 rifles a year. We can make on two shifts in our Government factories 1,500 a day, or 500,000 a year, and we could make from 750,000 to 820,000 with three shifts working every Sunday. I have the figures here, but I state it in that general way.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I do.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman is speaking of Field Artillery?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Only of the arms, of rifles, nothing more.

Mr. GARDNER. Rifle ammunition?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Of rifles. I said rifles; that these small arms can be made for 500,000 men in our present factories, and we could thus in 10 years get 5,000,000. I do not know what we can do as to ammunition. We ought to have ammunition for these rifles. The cost, as I say, of 500,000 rifles will be \$7,500,000 a year. We ought to have the same amount for ammunition. Every military man states that modern magazine rifles use ammunition very fast. They want 100 rounds in the belt, 120 right by in the combat train, 120 in the ammunition supply train—that makes 340; and they want a like amount in reserve, so it makes 680 rounds. If we supply 600, at a cost of 2½ cents apiece, then for the 500,000 rifles we would have to appropriate \$7,500,000. We need artillery. The reports of the War Department congratulate themselves that they have artillery for 350,000 men. I think that right, Mr. GARDNER, that the Secretary of War, or, rather, the War Department, congratulate themselves that they have field guns now for about 350,000 men.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, on the basis of 3.16 field guns for 1,000 men.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I understand; it may not be enough—

Mr. GARDNER. But according to the last estimate they have not.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. We ought to have manufactured every year enough field guns for at least 500,000 men until we get enough for the Army, and they can not be made in a hurry. If you allow four guns to 1,000 men, or a battery, that battery will cost \$70,000 fully equipped. I think that the tenders and the harness, and so forth, could largely be left to be made during an emergency. The cost of the gun and its carriage for a battery of four guns is estimated at \$20,000, and if for the 500,000 men there will be \$10,000,000 more to be provided every year for field artillery. The cost of the ammunition is large. I understand the provision should be 1,800 rounds per gun. If guns are to be fired all the while the men are in the trenches, the guns being fired over their heads, to keep up an artillery duel the Army is obliged to have ammunition, which can not be made in a hurry. It is a question whether we have sufficient factories to make it. It is certain that the cost of that amount of ammunition amounts to somewhere near \$36,000,000 for 500,000 men.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. If the gentleman will not take up too much of my time.

Mr. GARDNER. Only a moment. Eighteen hundred rounds for the 3-inch guns is the estimate before the war; the estimate since the war of the Chief of Staff is 5,000 rounds for each gun.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. Perhaps, however, all of that artillery is not likely to be fighting from the beginning. If we have sufficient factories, we might get along with smaller stores on hand. Ammunition may spoil in keeping, and I do not know about that; but if we appropriate \$20,000,000 for ammunition, the total of the figures I have given is far below \$50,000,000. With that \$50,000,000, if we try to enlarge the present Army, we would only get 50,000 men, while that sum would arm 5,000,000 men at the end of 10 years. Is it not cheaper to provide arms and ammunition for 500,000 a year and in 10 years have arms and ammunition for 5,000,000 volunteers, which would be needed if they were called into a war? We have no right to refuse it. Are we to be governed in Congress by the views of those who look out for their organization, without thinking of what may come? It is our business to know what the dangers of the country are. It is our business to know what provisions should be made for the millions who would be called upon in case of war.

It is our business to make provision, and I implore this House at least to go back to the provisions that we had in 1909, long after the Spanish War. We then appropriated \$1,200,000 a year for small-arms ammunition. They have reduced the estimate in this bill to \$100,000. We then appropriated \$1,700,000 a year for small arms and their manufacture, and they have reduced that amount to \$250,000.

Mr. McKENZIE. Will the gentleman yield for one more question?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I have only a minute or two more, but I will yield if I can.

We then appropriated less for field guns. They have \$3,000,000 for field guns. It is not one-seventh enough for the field guns needed for the increase of the Army, and which we would have to have in time of war. As to the ammunition, which ought to be \$36,000,000, or at least \$20,000,000, they are appropriating \$2,000,000 for field-gun ammunition.

Now I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.



Mr. McKENZIE. I wish to ask the gentleman if he does not think it would be better policy to construct more plants for the manufacture of ammunition than to spend it all in ammunition?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I agree with the gentleman; but that can not be done under this bill.

Mr. McKENZIE. I understand that.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. We are practical men. You know how hard it would be to pass any amendment to the military laws through this House or through the Senate. We have our opportunity to make some provision in the law to the best of our ability for what we can manufacture. Some might be bought outside.

Mr. DONOHUE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I will.

Mr. DONOHUE. The gentleman is aware that we have some Government workshops where we do manufacture ammunition?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I am; but I do not think we have enough.

Mr. DONOHUE. What does the gentleman think of a policy of so hampering these workshops that they are obliged to work in times of peace three shifts a day?

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I would have them work three shifts a day until we could build more. We need ammunition.

Now, I am only going to say that everybody who has studied the subject agrees—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey has expired.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I only want to say that Mr. Taft and Mr. Root and President Hibben, of Princeton, and others from all quarters, call attention to our danger. [Applause.]

Under the leave to extend his remarks, Mr. PARKER of New Jersey adds the following:

EXTRACTS FROM MESSAGES, DEBATES, ETC.—OPINIONS OF WILLIAM H. TAFT AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

By the Constitution Congress was to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia.

Hamilton wished to discipline a select part of the militia severely. As to the rest he says:

[Federalist, XXIX, Hamilton.]

Little more can properly be aimed at with respect to the people at large than to have them properly armed and equipped, and to see that this be not neglected it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of the year.

[Washington, January 8, 1790.]

Among the many interesting objects which will engage your attention, that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.

A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined, to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite; and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent on others for essential, particularly military, supplies.

[Washington, December 8, 1790.]

The disturbed situation of Europe, and particularly the critical posture of the great maritime powers, while it ought to make us the more thankful for the general peace and security enjoyed by the United States, reminds us at the same time of the circumspection with which it becomes us to preserve these blessings.

The establishment of the militia, of a mint, of standards of weights and measures, of the post office and post roads, are subjects which I presume you will resume, of course, and which are abundantly urged by their own importance.

[Washington, October 25, 1791.]

The first [militia] is certainly an object of primary importance, whether viewed in reference to the national security, to the satisfaction of the community, or to the preservation of order. In connection with this, the establishment of competent magazines and arsenals and the fortification of such places as are peculiarly important and vulnerable naturally present themselves to consideration. The safety of the United States, under divine protection, ought to rest on the basis of systematic and solid arrangements, exposed as little as possible to the hazards of fortuitous circumstances.

[Washington, December 3, 1793.]

I can not recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defense and of exacting from them the fulfillment of their duties toward us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war. The documents which will be presented to you will show the amount and kinds of arms and military stores now in our magazines and arsenals; and yet an addition, even to those supplies, can not, with prudence, be neglected, as it would leave nothing to the uncertainty of procuring a warlike apparatus in the moment of public danger.

Nor can such arrangements, with such objects, be exposed to the censure or jealousy of the warmest friends of republican government. They are incapable of abuse in the hands of the militia, who ought to

possess a pride in being the depository of the force of the Republic and may be trained to a degree of energy equal to every military exigency of the United States. But it is an inquiry which can not be too solemnly pursued, whether the act "more effectually to provide for the national defenses by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States" has organized them so as to produce their full effect; whether your own experience in the several States has not detected some imperfections in the scheme; and whether a material feature in an improvement of it ought not to be to afford an opportunity for the study of those branches of the military art which can scarcely ever be attained by practice alone.

[Washington, November 19, 1794.]

In the arrangements to which the possibility of a similar contingency will naturally draw your attention, it ought not to be forgotten that the militia laws have exhibited such striking defects as could not have been supplied but by the zeal of our citizens. Besides the extraordinary expense and waste, which are not the least of the defects, every appeal to those laws is attended with a doubt on its success.

The devising and establishing of a well-regulated militia would be a genuine source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public gratitude. I therefore entertain a hope that the present session will not pass without carrying to its full energy the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and thus providing, in the language of the Constitution, for calling them forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

[Washington, December 8, 1795.]

With the review of our Army establishment is naturally connected that of the militia. It will merit inquiry, what imperfections in the existing plan further experience may have unfolded. The subject is of so much moment in my estimation as to excite a constant solicitude that the consideration of it may be renewed, until the greatest attainable perfection shall be accomplished. Time is wearing away some advantages for forwarding the object, while none better deserves the persevering attention of the public councils.

[Washington, December 7, 1796.]

Congress have repeatedly, and not without success, directed their attention to the encouragement of manufactures. The object is of the much consequence not to insure a continuance of their efforts in every way which shall appear eligible. As a general rule, manufactures on the public account are inexpedient, but where the state of things in a country leaves little hope that certain branches of manufacture will for a great length of time obtain, when these are of a nature essential to the furnishing and equipping of the public force in time of war, are not establishments for procuring them on public account, to the extent of the ordinary demand for the public service, recommended by strong considerations of national policy as an exception to the general rule? Ought our country to remain in such cases dependent on foreign supply, precarious because liable to be interrupted? If the necessary article should in this mode cost more in time of peace, will not the security and independence thence arising form an ample compensation? Establishments of this sort, commensurate only with the calls of the public service in time of peace, will in time of war easily be extended in proportion to the exigencies of the Government, and may even perhaps be made to yield a surplus for the supply of our citizens at large, so as to mitigate the privations from the interruption of their trade. If adopted, the plan ought to exclude all those branches which are already, or likely soon to be, established in the country, in order that there may be no danger of interference with pursuits of individual industry.

[Washington, December 7, 1796.]

The institution of a military academy is also recommended by cogent reasons. However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for emergencies. The first would impair the energy of its character, but both would hazard its safety or expose it to greater evils when war could not be avoided: besides, that war might often not depend upon its own choice. In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practicing the rules of the military art ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting by proper establishments the knowledge of that art. Whatever argument may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is at once comprehensive and complicated, that it demands much previous study, and that the possession of it in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation. This, therefore, ought to be a serious care of every government, and for this purpose an academy, where a regular course of instruction is given, is an obvious expedient which different nations have successfully employed.

[Washington, September 17, 1796.]

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

[Adams, May 16, 1797.]

With the same view and as a measure which, even in time of universal peace, ought not to be neglected, I recommend to your consideration a revision of the laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia to render that natural and safe defense of the country efficacious.

[Adams, March 19, 1798.]

Under these circumstances I can not forbear to reiterate the recommendations which have been formerly made, and to exhort you to adopt, with promptitude, decision, and unanimity, such measures as the ample resources of the country afford for the protection of our seafaring and commercial citizens; for the defense of any exposed portions of our territory; for replenishing our arsenals and establishing foundries and military manufactories; and to provide such efficient revenue as will be necessary to defray extraordinary expenses, and supply the deficiencies which may be occasioned by depredations on our commerce.



[Adams, December 8, 1798.]

After reciting the captures of our ships by France and the refusal to make redress, Mr. Adams continued:

But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room to infer that we abandon the desires of peace. An efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace.

[Adams, December 3, 1799.]

At a period like the present, when momentous changes are occurring and every hour is preparing new and great events in the political world, when a spirit of war is prevalent in almost every nation with whose affairs the interest of the United States have any connection, unsafe and precarious would be our situation were we to neglect the means of maintaining our just rights. The result of the mission to France is uncertain; but however it may terminate, a steady perseverance in a system of national defense commensurate with our resources and the situation of our country is an obvious dictate of wisdom. For remotely as we are placed from the belligerent nations, and desirous as we are, by doing justice to all, to avoid offense to any, nothing short of the power of repelling aggressions will secure to our country a rational prospect of escaping the calamities of war or national degradation. As to myself, it is my anxious desire to so execute the trust reposed in me as to render the people of the United States prosperous and happy. I rely with entire confidence on your cooperation in objects equally your care, and that our mutual labors will serve to increase and confirm union among our fellow citizens and an unshaken attachment to our Government.

[Adams, November 22, 1800.]

While our best endeavors for the preservation of harmony with all nations will continue to be used, the experience of the world, our own experience, admonishes us of the insecurity of trusting too confidently to their success. We can not, without committing dangerous imprudence, abandon those measures of self-protection which were adapted to our situation, and to which, notwithstanding our pacific policy, the violence and injustice of others may again compel us to resort. \* \* \*

The manufacture of arms within the United States still invites the attention of the National Legislature. At a considerable expense to the public this manufacture has been brought to such a state of maturity as, with continued encouragement, will supersede the necessity of future importations from foreign countries.

[Jefferson, December 8, 1801.]

Nor should we now or at any time separate, until we can say we have done everything for the militia which we could do were an enemy at our door.

[Jefferson, December 3, 1805.]

In the meantime you will consider whether it would not be expedient, for a state of peace as well as of war, so to organize or class the militia as would enable us, on a sudden emergency, to call for the services of the younger portions, unencumbered with the old and those having families. Upward of 300,000 able-bodied men, between the ages of 18 and 26 years, which the last census shows we may now count within our limits, will furnish a competent number for offense in any point where they may be wanted, and will give time for raising regular forces after the necessity of them shall become certain; and the reducing to the early period of life all its active service can not but be desirable to our younger citizens of the present as well as future times, inasmuch as it engages to them in more advanced age a quiet and undisturbed repose in the bosom of their families. I can not, then, but earnestly recommend to your early consideration the expediency of so modifying our militia system as, by separation of the more active part from that which is less so, we may draw from it, when necessary, an efficient corps fit for real and active service, and to be called to it in regular rotation. \* \* \* An immediate prohibition of the exportation of arms and ammunition is also submitted to your determination.

[Jefferson, October 27, 1807.]

The moment our peace was threatened I deemed it indispensable to secure a greater provision of those articles of military stores with which our magazines were not sufficiently furnished. To have awaited a previous special sanction by law would have lost occasions which might not be retrieved. I did not hesitate, therefore, to authorize engagements for such supplements to our existing stock as would render it adequate to the emergencies threatening us; and I trust that the legislature, feeling the same anxiety for the safety of our country, so materially advanced by this precaution, will approve, when done, what they would have seen so important to be done if then assembled.

In February, 1808 (Annals 1881), Mr. Burwell offered a resolution as to the expediency of authorizing the President to procure arms. He suggested that it would be useful to arm the militia; that every man must be impressed with our situation; our commerce attacked in every part of the globe, our peace menaced by the most powerful nations of the world; that, if attacked, arms will be indispensable, necessary to enable us to defend the country, but that if this country is possessed of a sufficient number of arms, we will be perfectly safe against the world.

Mr. Dawson, of the Committee on Military and Naval Establishments, found that the United States then had 130,000 stand of arms, and thought it not necessary to inquire into the means of procuring an additional supply.

Mr. Marion said arms could not be bought except from foreign nations. Mr. Ely (1582) said 130,000 was not half what the United States ought to possess.

April 2, 1808, Congress authorized the President to sell arms to the United States, and Mr. John Randolph of Roanoke proposed a bill which made provision for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia, either by purchase or manufacture, authorized the President to build additional arsenals and manufactories of arms, and provided that all arms be distributed to the several States in proportion to their effective militia.

Mr. Randolph wished \$1,000,000 appropriated, saying that if the militia were armed, it would be a perfect guaranty of free government (2175-2176).

Mr. Ely (2178) thought that we could not spend so much this year. Mr. Lloyd (2179) said the manufacture might be increased. Mr. Macon thought poor men ought not to be forced to provide their own arms. It is said no arms can be got. For God's sake, let us make the attempt ourselves, when we see the whole world is in arms against us.

After several speeches, Mr. Randolph said the way to obtain a supply was to create a demand. You authorized the raising of 6,000 men to be clad, fed, and paid for rusting in idleness, and incapacitated yourself from arming the militia. You have laid out your money in gold lace hats for the one, and you will not give the other bread. You have expended your treasure in gewgaws and military parade, and can not buy arms for the militia.

Mr. Nicholas (2186) said that if arms could be had, he pledged himself to vote money to arm the whole Nation. No people on earth have so much to defend. He thought we could not spend over \$200,000.

Mr. Randolph (2186) was astonished. This sum was as one to ten to the sum voted to the Regulars, while the militia was in proportionate value to that army as one hundred to one.

Five hundred thousand dollars was negative by a small majority, also four hundred and fifty thousand, four hundred thousand, and three hundred thousand, and two hundred thousand was agreed to.

Mr. Randolph said the bill's efficiency had been destroyed; that it was proposed to arm the whole body of the militia with a sum incompetent to keep pace with the annual increase of the militia, which would be as far from being armed in 20 years as they are now, and that \$200,000 for arms a year would hardly make up for wear and tear.

The act was passed April 23, 1808. (See U. S. Stat., C. 65, Laws 1808.)

[Jefferson, March 18, 1808.]

The scale on which the Military Academy at West Point was originally established is become too limited to furnish the number of well-instructed subjects in the different branches of artillery and engineering which the public service calls for. The want of such characters is already sensibly felt and will be increased with the enlargement of our plans of military preparation. The Chief Engineer having been instructed to consider the subject and to propose an augmentation which might render the establishment commensurate with the present circumstances of our country has made the report I now transmit for consideration of Congress.

The idea suggested by him of removing the institution to this place is also worthy of attention. Besides, the advantage of placing it under the immediate eye of the Government, it may render its benefits common to the naval department, and will furnish opportunities of selecting on better information the characters most qualified to fulfill the duties which the public service may call for.

[Jefferson, November 8, 1808.]

Considering the extraordinary character of the times in which we live, our attention should unremittingly be fixed on the safety of our country. For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security. It is, therefore, incumbent on us at every meeting to revise the condition of the militia and to ask ourselves if it is prepared to repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territories exposed to invasion. Some of the States have paid a laudable attention to this object; but every degree of neglect is to be found among others. Congress alone have power to produce a uniform state of preparation in this great organ of defense; the interests which they so deeply feel in their own and their country's security will present this as among the most important objects of their deliberation.

Under the acts of March 11 and April 23, respecting arms, the difficulty of procuring them from abroad during the present situation and dispositions of Europe induced us to direct our whole efforts to the means of internal supply. The public factories have, therefore, been enlarged, additional machineries erected, and in proportion as artificers can be found or formed, their effect, already more than doubled, may be increased so as to keep pace with the yearly increase of the militia. The annual sums appropriated by the latter act have been directed to the encouragement of private factories of arms, and contracts have been entered into with individual undertakers to nearly the amount of the first year's appropriation.

[Madison, December 5, 1810.]

The improvements in quality and quantity made in the manufacture of cannon and small arms, both at the public armories and private factories, warrant additional confidence in the competency of these resources for supplying the public exigencies. \* \* \*

The Corps of Engineers, with the Military Academy, are entitled to the early attention of Congress. The buildings at the seat fixed by law for the present academy are so far in decay as not to afford the necessary accommodations. But a revision of the law is recommended, principally with a view to a more enlarged cultivation and diffusion of the advantages of such institutions, by providing professorships for all the necessary branches of military instruction and by the establishment of an additional academy at the seat of government or elsewhere. The means by which wars, as well for defense as for offense, are now carried on render these schools of the more scientific operations an indispensable part of every adequate system. Even among nations whose large standing armies and frequent wars afford every other opportunity of instruction these establishments are found to be indispensable for the due attainment of the branches of military science which require a regular course of study and experiment. In a government happily without the other opportunities seminaries where the elementary principles of the art of war can be taught without actual war, and without the expense of extensive and standing armies, have the previous advantage of uniting an essential preparation against external danger with a scrupulous regard to internal safety. In no other way, probably, can a provision of equal efficiency for the public defense be made at so little expense or more consistently with the public liberty.

[Madison, November 5, 1811.]

The manufacture of cannon and small arms has proceeded with due success and the stock and resources of all the necessary munitions are adequate to emergencies. It will not be inexpedient, however, for Congress to authorize an enlargement of them.



## MODERN STATESMEN CONCUR.

[From the Washington Post, Saturday, January 9, 1915.]

William H. Taft says:

"We should have an efficient navy and an efficient coast defense. We should have sufficient ammunition, sufficient artillery, and adequate small-arms equipment."

"All of these things were recommended long ago, and we should see that the recommendation is carried out. We have a big ocean to the east of us and a big ocean to the west, and we should make it our duty to see that the integrity of our isolated position is preserved."

"The agitation in Congress at this time is an excellent thing, for it will undoubtedly result in placing the United States on a normal war basis. Nobody cares about appropriations for ammunition and small arms in times of peace, yet that is just the time when we ought to attend to such matters."

[Everybody's, January, 1915, p. 127.]

Theodore Roosevelt says:

"But this is not enough. There should be at least ten times the number of rifles and the quantity of ammunition in the country that there are now. In our high schools and colleges a system of military training, like that which obtains in Switzerland and Australia, should be given. Furthermore, all our young men should be trained in actual field service under war conditions, preferably on the Swiss, but if not the Swiss, then on the Argentinean or Chilean model."

"The Swiss model would probably be better for our people. It would necessitate only four or six months' service shortly after graduation from high school or college, and thereafter only about eight days a year. No man can buy or substitute; no man would be excepted because of his wealth; all would serve in the ranks on precisely the same terms, side by side."

"Under this system the young men would be trained to shoot, to march, to take care of themselves in the open, and to learn those habits of self-reliance and law-abiding obedience which are not only essential to the efficiency of a citizen soldiery, but are no less essential to the efficient performance of civic duties in a free democracy. My own firm belief is that this system would help us in civil quite as much as in military matters. It would increase our social and industrial efficiency. It would help us to habits of order and respect for law."

"This proposal does not represent anything more than carrying out the purpose of the second amendment to the Federal Constitution, which declares that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free nation. The Swiss Army is a well-regulated militia; and therefore it is utterly different from any militia we have ever had. The system of compulsory training and universal service has worked admirably in Switzerland. It has saved the Swiss from war. It has developed their efficiency in peace."

[From the London Spectator, reprinted in the Washington Post, December 18, 1914.]

At least, then, let America set her arms and munition factories to work, so that she may feel that if the need were to come she would not be faced with the worst tragedy that a great and strong nation could be faced with—that of having millions of men at her disposal, but all useless because they have no arms. We shall be accused, no doubt, of talking as if armed mobs made an army. We are fully alive to the fact that they do not. But we will say this: There is one thing essential to the soldier, and that is his rifle. If the rifles are not forthcoming, it is not worth while even to try to make an army. Any nation, however, that has rifles may, at any rate, attempt to defend itself, and who knows that it would not succeed, as Grant and Sherman and Sheridan succeeded, in hammering an army into shape as the war proceeded? Therefore, once again, we would warn the President of the United States and Congress not to trust to a chapter of accidents, but to see to it that if America is to defend herself she shall be in a position to do the work."

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman reserves 14 minutes.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] is recognized for one hour.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I desire to be interrupted at the end of 30 minutes.

So much has been said by a great many persons and newspapers in our country about our unpreparedness for trouble that I want to talk to the Members of the House to-day for a very short time about our preparedness for war. I want to deal as largely as possible with facts and figures as they have appeared in the hearings taken before the Committee on Military Affairs. I want to say in all frankness that I am not one of those who believe that our country ought not to be perfectly defended. I have voted for two battleships for our Navy whenever the opportunity arose. I have voted to keep our Army in good condition at all times. It can not be said that I am at all opposed to the establishments as we now have them. But I want to appeal to the good sense of this House at the present time. I want to say that I do not believe that we should at this time go out of our way to appropriate unusual sums for either our Military or Naval Establishments, and the reason I say that is this: That according to my judgment there never was a time in our history when there was so little likelihood of trouble with any foreign foe. And why do I say that? It is because all of the principal nations of the world are now engaged in troubles of their own, which are occupying all their time, and even if we wanted to go to war the worst kind, where would we pick the nation with which to do it? We would have difficulty, we would have a considerable difficulty, in

finding a nation at this time to go to war with us. Germany, France, England, Russia, and Japan are the only countries that could possibly hope to enter into a contest with us under any circumstances. They are now engaged in the greatest war of any time, in the greatest war of all history. Their resources are being exhausted. Their national finances are being strained to the uttermost in their own fights. Their industries are being destroyed; they are being crippled commercially, industrially, and agriculturally. Why, there is not a chance of our getting into trouble for the next few years, because it takes money to carry on great wars, and any nation that gets into trouble with us will have a great war on its hands, as we all know. Now, they are spending money to-day, these great nations, at the rate of about \$60,000,000 a day. Where are they going to get the money with which to finance a war with us within the next few years? They can not do it, and will not do it.

I mention these facts to show you the improbability of war and the utter lack of reason for our becoming excited at such a time about the danger of a foreign war. But it is claimed that, on the principle that all things are possible, we have no defenses. Now, let us see what some of these people who are afraid of war claim. Let us examine what their claims really are. The first claim is that we have no Navy; that we might be wiped off the face of the earth because our Navy is relatively small; that it is not well equipped; that our coast defenses are not in good condition; that our small arms and reserve ammunition therefor are not sufficient; that our field artillery is not sufficient; and that, lastly, we have neither the necessary officers nor men.

I want to take those questions up in order, but before doing it I want to make one or two suggestions that occur to me about where we are going to get an enemy to attack us. Assume that this proposed war is imminent and that Germany should wish to get into trouble with us; do you not think she would have a great deal of trouble in landing an army on these shores? In the first place, our Navy has got to be wiped off the face of the seas in order to permit Germany to get her navy over here; and she has to come over here to fight us. Then she has got to take her navy to act as an escort to the transports that bring her soldiers over here to attack us—first destroy our Navy and then take her navy away from home, because she would not want to allow those troops to come over here without being protected.

Now, what would happen? Have you any doubt but that almost every other nation in Europe would jump upon Germany 15 minutes after she got her navy out of her own waters?

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. McKELLAR. Not now. First she has to destroy our Navy, and then she has to destroy our mines, and then she has to destroy our coast defenses. Now, let us see what sort of trouble, in the first place, she would have with our Navy.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. Not now. I regret I can not. In 1897, gentlemen, we had a Navy on which we expended \$33,000,000 annually. In the following year—1898—the year of the War with Spain, we expended \$148,000,000 on our Navy. A great deal of that money went into the purchase of ships and transports.

Mr. DONOHUE. Now will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. Not now. They say we are not prepared. We gave a fairly good account of ourselves in the war of 1898. Our Navy seems to have been able to protect our country fairly well.

Mr. KEATING rose.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. I will yield in a few moments.

Mr. KEATING. A point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. KEATING. I think the speech of the gentleman is very interesting, and we ought to have a quorum here to hear it. I therefore make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. KEATING] makes the point that there is no quorum present. The Chair will count. [After counting.] Eighty-six gentlemen are present—not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

Adamson	Bartlett	Brumbaugh	Callaway
Ainey	Beall, Tex.	Burgess	Candler, Miss.
Austin	Bell, Ga.	Burke, Pa.	Cantor
Avis	Borland	Butler	Carr
Barchfeld	Bowdie	Byrnes, S. C.	Cary
Bartholdt	Bruckner	Calder	Clancy



Clark, Fla.	Goldfogle	Lewis, Pa.	Rucker
Claypool	Gorman	Lindquist	Rupley
Connelly, Kans.	Goulden	Lloyd	Russell
Conry	Graham, Pa.	Lobeck	Sabath
Copley	Griest	Logue	Scott
Crampton	Griffin	McGuire, Okla.	Scully
Crosser	Hamill	MacDonald	Seldomridge
Dale	Hamilton, Mich.	Madden	Sells
Davenport	Hart	Mahan	Shreve
Davis	Hayden	Maher	Small
Dickinson	Hayes	Metz	Smith, Md.
Difenderfer	Henry	Miller	Sparkman
Doelling	Hinebaugh	Morgan, La.	Stanley
Doremus	Hobson	Morin	Stevens, N. H.
Dunn	Hoxworth	Neeley, Kans.	Stout
Elder	Hughes, W. Va.	O'Brien	Taggart
Estopinal	Johnson, S. C.	Oglesby	Talbot, Md.
Faison	Keister	O'Shaunessy	Taylor, Colo.
Falconer	Kennedy, Conn.	Page, N. C.	Taylor, N. Y.
Ferris	Kennedy, Iowa	Paige, Mass.	Townsend
Fitzgerald	Kennedy, R. I.	Patton, Pa.	Tuttle
FitzHenry	Kent	Peters	Watkins
Flood, Va.	Kiess, Pa.	Peterson	Whitacre
Frear	Kinkad, N. J.	Plumley	Wilson, Fla.
French	Kitchin	Post	Wilson, N. Y.
Gardner	Knowland, J. R.	Price	Winslow
Garrett, Tex.	Korby	Reed	Witherspoon
George	Lee, Ga.	Reilly, Conn.	Woodruff
Gerry	L'Engle	Riordan	Young, Tex.
Glass	Lever	Roberts, Nev.	
Godwin, N. C.	Lewis, Md.	Rothermel	

The committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee having under consideration the Army appropriation bill (H. R. 20347), finding itself without a quorum, he caused the roll to be called, whereupon 278 Members answered to their names, and he presented the names of the absentees to be printed in the Journal and Record.

The SPEAKER. A quorum is present. The committee will resume its session.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] has the floor.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Will the gentleman from Tennessee yield to me one moment?

Mr. McKELLAR. Certainly.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I merely desire to state to the committee that it is the desire and expectation of the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs to conclude this debate to-day. It could have been concluded by 7 o'clock if the roll calls had not intervened.

It is absolutely necessary that we push these supply bills as fast as possible, and one day of general debate for a bill of this kind is all that we can afford to give to it and attend to the other business of the House. I hope the Members of the House are prepared to stay here to-night and finish this bill. The hour at which we will get away to-night will depend upon whether or not we will have to spend the afternoon in calling the roll to get a quorum or allow the general debate to continue. [Applause.]

Mr. MANN. Will the gentleman from Tennessee yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. Certainly.

Mr. MANN. I quite agree with what the gentleman from Alabama has said. I hope the committee will stay in session until it is able to conclude the general debate, although I do not know whether I shall be able to be here this evening myself. If I am not, I think I am entitled to a short leave of absence.

If we are going to avoid the necessity of an extra session of Congress, it is necessary that we do the business of the House and the country before the 4th of March. It is always to be expected that there will be some gentlemen in the House who, as the short session draws to a close, will, for personal advantage to themselves, attempt to hold up the rest of the House, and the House must meet that situation. I do not criticize the gentlemen who do that, but it is the duty of the rest of the House to do the business, and to stay long enough to do it, and I hope we shall be able to get through the appropriation bills—I know we will if we stay here and attend to business—so that no one can charge the House with having delayed business in order to cause an extra session of Congress. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR] has eight minutes remaining.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to make a short statement, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Tennessee yield to the gentleman from Illinois for that purpose?

Mr. McKELLAR. Let the gentleman wait a few moments. I will yield to him later on.

Mr. Chairman, when I was interrupted awhile ago I was discussing the preparedness of our Navy to protect our country.

Mr. DONOHUE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, I have been very much interested in the picture that the gentleman has been drawing of the difficulties and disasters that Germany would experience in case she should attack our shores. Will the gentleman picture to us what might possibly happen in case Great Britain or Japan or both in alliance should attack us?

Mr. McKELLAR. I shall be glad to do that in just one moment.

As I stated before, the appropriations for our entire Navy in 1897 amounted to \$33,000,000. We fought a war, and a very successful one, and that department cost us during that war, including all the ships and auxiliaries that we bought, only \$148,000,000. From that day down to the present good hour we have been constantly increasing the size and efficiency of our Navy, and properly so in my judgment. Why, we now appropriate annually about \$150,000,000 for our Navy, just ordinarily, and as much as we spent on our Navy the year of the Spanish War. Since 1899 we have spent for our Navy the enormous sum of over \$1,800,000,000. And since the recent war has destroyed a number of German ships, I think I can say without fear of successful contradiction that the United States Navy is the second largest navy on the seas to-day. [Applause.] And if this country ever comes to a war with any nation, England or any other, our Navy will not only be able to protect our own country but will remove every other Navy from the face of all the seas. [Applause.] Such is my confidence in the ability and the efficiency of our Navy to-day. Under these circumstances it seems to me idle to talk about a foreign foe invading our shores or to talk about our not having a proper naval defense.

I have discussed the possible German effort to invade us. What about the only other two nations that might undertake it? Great Britain, of course, has a larger navy than we have. She has a larger use for a navy than we have. She has possessions all over the world to protect and look after. She has enemies all over the world. She has enemies at her own doors, and I venture to say that even with the enormous navy that England has, were she to get into a war with this country she could not remove enough of that navy to American waters to cope successfully with the American Navy. She would not dare remove all or even any great portion of her navy away from European waters.

But what could she do? She could not land any forces on American soil. She would have to undertake to bring them through Canada. And I want to call your attention to the fact that in ordinary times of peace England is in the same condition that we are. She has no compulsory military service. She has no immense standing army. Her army and her military service are along the same lines that we have ours. My recollection is that in times of peace she ordinarily has about 150,000 men, even with all of her colonies to police and look after and defend, while the United States has about 85,000. Our commercial interests and our racial kinship are so interwoven with England that it is almost impossible to conceive that we would ever get into a war with that country; and right here I want to predict that if ever England undertakes to engage in a war with us, there can be but one result, and that is that she will lose every vestige of her property on the American Continent. She will lose Canada just as certainly as she undertakes it, and nobody knows it any better than England, and England is not going to undertake it.

But what are we going to do with Japan, say the militarists? Well, it is true that Japan offers the only possibility of a war. She is 8,000 miles away. When we had a war over there it took us three months to convoy 30,000 troops to the Philippine Islands. How long would it take Japan to land a hostile force on our soil? Where would the great American Navy—much larger than that of Japan—be while she was doing it? Where would she get a naval base? Where would she plant her troops? Where would she have a line of communication? Why, gentlemen, when you come to look at it in the light of reason, there is not a particle of chance, there is not the remotest possibility of Japan undertaking to fight that war. Oh, they say, she may take the Philippine Islands. I want to say that I earnestly hope that the present bill for the independence of the Philippine Islands will soon pass, and in a few years we may stand by our cherished ideals with the fixed purpose that has always actuated our people to grant to those islands absolute and perfect independence. [Applause.] I want to say, further, that when they do it, we have absolutely obliterated every possibility of war with Japan, because no nation will undertake to bring an army 8,000 miles across the sea.

Mr. KAHN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. Certainly.



Mr. KAHN. Of course the gentleman is placing Japan twice as far away from the mainland as Japan really is.

Mr. McKELLAR. I am talking about our continent.

Mr. KAHN. It is only about 6,000 miles from here to the Philippines and about 4,000 miles to Japan. But that is a matter of geography. Does the gentleman recall the fact that in 1898 this country became involved in war with an apparently decadent country, and that it was that country that declared war upon us. She handed the American minister his passports.

Mr. McKELLAR. I understand that; and when that war was declared we were not within 500—no; not within 1,000—percent as well prepared for war as we are to-day.

Mr. KAHN. Does not that fact convince my friend that we ought to be prepared for any emergency that may confront us?

Mr. McKELLAR. The fact convinces me that the policy the United States insists on to-day is a rational, reasonable, excellent policy of slowly building up our defenses without any undue excitement in the light of reason, and it is the very best policy, and I am going to stand by it.

I will say to the gentleman that the mere fact that other nations are at war is no reason why we should be thrown off our base; no reason why we should become hysterical and undertake, as some gentlemen would do, to fasten an immense standing army on our people without any reasonable expectation of having a use for that army.

Now, I want to read, if the gentleman will permit me, to show you how far this hysteria has gone, what a recent Chief of Staff of our Army has recommended. A more remarkable recommendation I have never seen, in view of the facts. Listen to this:

Careful consideration of our needs would indicate the advisability and necessity to have at all times available at home, and in addition to the necessities in our foreign possessions, in the first line of our Military Establishment, a mobile force of at least 500,000 thoroughly trained and thoroughly equipped fighting men, with adequate supplies for the operation of this force for a period of six months.

And he continues:

This is the conclusion that seems to have been reached by all those who have given careful consideration to this question. It is also agreed that we should have as a second line a thoroughly equipped and trained force of Organized Militia of not less than 300,000 men, properly prepared as to its staff and armament, with stores and supplies for its operation for a like period of six months.

This was put in the report of the Chief of Staff of the Army last fall. Eight hundred thousand men, 700,000 additional men, with supplies for six months! To do what? In the name of God, where could we find an enemy for that kind of an army to fight to-day?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. I will be glad to.

Mr. SAUNDERS. That is to assure us of our safety, to protect us against any nation. Will the gentleman translate into dollars and cents what that force would cost?

Mr. McKELLAR. I am coming to that. The average cost is a million dollars per thousand men, and the very lowest cost of increased taxation to the people of this country, if that recommendation of the Chief of Staff was carried out, would be \$700,000,000.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Then the idea of our military guardians is that, in order that the country may be reasonably safe, our military budget should carry \$700,000,000 a year and that we can not get safety short of that?

Mr. McKELLAR. According to the Chief of Staff, and possibly some scared ones will agree with him, that the only way we can get adequate military protection is for the immediate establishment of an additional 700,000 men and supplies for six months.

When I read that I wondered who we were going to fight and what country the Chief of Staff was afraid of. Is he afraid of Mexico? Is he afraid of Haiti—or what nation is he afraid of? All the great nations are at war. But he wants not only 700,000 additional men, but also six months' provisions for an additional 700,000 men. What does he want them for? I can not imagine. I do not believe there is a man in this House, whatever views he might have about the Army or the Navy, would give his consent to such a proposition as that.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. Yes.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Does not the gentleman think that we ought to have a commission of lunacy on that officer?

Mr. McKELLAR. This report, which is so large a part of the support of our friend from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] for his insinuations, is not concurred in by our Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison. Secretary Garrison makes no such recommendations, and he is, in my judgment, one of the greatest Secretaries of War we have ever had. The difference in the recommendations of the then Chief of Staff and that of this dis-

tinguished, able, and alert Secretary of War is just 675,000 men. Such a difference is a mammoth condemnation of Gen. Wotherspoon's recommendation on this subject and robs it of any effect it should have.

Oh, I would not say anything unkind about any officer of our Army; but I do say, with all frankness and candor and without any ill feeling against any person on earth, that there ought to be a provision in the law somewhere where such foolish statements might be required to be censored and kept out of the public prints.

I might say here that my idea of an army is that it should be well trained, well governed, well equipped, and that there should be the strictest discipline. I have no sympathy with those Army officers who hunt the public press and give out these inaccurate and misleading statements to the newspapers.

I do not believe that any other well-informed officer in the Army has any such views. Certainly, no others—not even Gen. Wood—have gone half so far.

What our then Chief of Staff would do with these men after he got them I do not know. He does not impart in his communication the secret of what nation he is going to fight. Of course, it could not be one of the great nations, because they are already engaged in war, and I have a suspicion that they would not agree to fight us at this time. This establishment, if adopted by Congress at this time, would cost the American Government over a thousand million of dollars and probably two thousand millions of dollars. I have read the recommendations of this Chief of Staff and am a little in doubt about what he really means. It is perfectly apparent that he was very badly scared when he wrote it. There ought to be some regulation prohibiting the publication of these kinds of reports. I do not mean that any man's fancies should be suppressed, but there ought to be some board or other power constituted in the Army that should censor such articles and not inflict them on a suffering public.

The Chief of Staff who held that position when I first came here was constantly insisting upon a larger Army and the building up of reserves which would give us a military strength of about 450,000 men. He also wanted 1,292 pieces of field artillery and more ammunition. We are rapidly getting these field guns and ammunition, but we have not yet agreed to the increase in the Army. The fact that such an army would cost several hundred millions of dollars seems not to have been taken into account by our then Chief of Staff. But that Chief of Staff was modest in his demands in comparison with his immediate successor. And when the rule is transgressed to the extent that some of them have transgressed it recently there ought to be a way of disciplining such officers and dismissing them from the service without honor. There is nothing about our Army that authorizes such beliefs as those expressed by our late Chief of Staff.

I come now to our second defense. The statement was made by one of these militarists—and I do not remember whether they are officers or not—that Germany, France, or England could send an army over here, land on our shores, and take New York, Boston, and all the coast cities at any time. I do not know whether you gentlemen are familiar with our Coast Artillery service. We have a great number of forts up and down our coasts. We have 19,000 men properly officered in charge of that military service. Gen. Weaver, a capable and, as it appears to me, a most sensible officer, who knows what he is talking about, appeared before the committee, and his testimony has been taken on all of these subjects. I want to tell you what he said about our Coast Artillery service. He said that our forts are in a condition to defend our country. He said that a hostile force could not come into any of our harbors. He was asked especially about New York. He said that a hostile ship could never get by Sandy Hook or Fort Hamilton or Fort Wadsworth, that such a thing would be a physical impossibility. Then some gentleman came at him with this proposition, which has been heralded a great deal in the newspapers lately, and asked him whether or not the coast guns were not of shorter range than the great guns of the dreadnoughts of Great Britain. He said they were, but by a simple elevation of the aim of the guns from 15 degrees to 25 degrees that could be cured, and was going to be cured, and that the reach would be the same. Then he went on to explain that our shore guns are an absolute protection against the guns of any ship, for this reason: Ships are not made for the purpose of firing against forts, and no commander of a naval vessel is permitted to do so under the rules of naval warfare. Why? Because the forts, by reason of greater ability to get aim, will have the ships at a disadvantage. Gen. Weaver went on further to explain that there is no possibility of our forts being attacked by ships at sea. Gentlemen all know that a ship at sea is a perfect target



for a land force. On the other hand, it is almost impossible for those on the ship to take aim at a fort so as to do the fort any damage. In the words of Gen. Weaver, "If you went down the Potomac River to the sea, along which river we have a number of forts, and even if you knew where they were and you were looking for them, you could never find them."

I want here to quote Gen. Weaver and Gen. Crozier on this subject. Gen. Weaver testified as follows:

Therefore guns afloat, caliber for caliber, higher powered guns than those in our fortifications. But there is this to be said, the projectiles we use are heavier than the projectiles used on board warships. And it should also be said that our range-finding system is very much more accurate. If a little more elevation could be given by our carriages to our guns, we would get ranges equal to those of guns afloat, and, in my opinion, we would be able to meet a naval enemy in a shore and ship combat on fairly equal terms, our accurate range-finding system and better system of fire control offsetting the flatter trajectories of their guns. It therefore reduces to the question of our ability to give a little greater elevation to our guns; this is a mechanical detail which I believe the ordnance experts can accomplish satisfactorily. . . . I will explain what I mean about that. The guns aboard battleships have a maximum angle of fire of about 12° to 15°. With this elevation their high powered guns have a certain range. At present our carriages give our fort guns about the same elevation; that is, from 12° to 15°. If we could increase the elevation of our guns to, say, 25°, that would offset the advantage in range they now have in their favor. (Hearings, p. 615.)

In this connection I could not do better than to quote the evidence of Gen. Crozier on this subject as follows:

Mr. AVIS. Would not such guns, with such a range as that, less than the range of the guns on shipboard, be absolutely ineffective against any ships which might be attacking our coast?

Gen. CROZIER. No; I think not. You must remember that the coast gun has several very distinct advantages. In the first place, a ship is a very plain target. It is right out there on the water and you can see it very distinctly. The coast gun is behind fortifications, and with a very little art a fortification can be quite well concealed, so that it is impossible to pick it out. For instance, there are a lot of them on the river below Washington, and as you go down the river on a boat I do not think you can find them at all, even if you knew where to look for them. Not only that, but the fortification itself is not a vulnerable target as the ship is out on the water. It does not do a ship much good unless it can hit the gun itself or hit the interior crest of the parapet right under the gun, where some dangerous fragments might be sent down to the emplacement. There are one or two other points of advantage as between guns ashore and guns afloat. With regard to the effectiveness of the firing, the field firing, the coast firing, the naval firing, and all other kinds—the most troublesome sort of inaccuracy is through misjudgment of the range. On shore we have very accurate methods of determining the range of a ship or object on the water which we can plainly see. We use methods very similar to the surveyor's methods. Those methods involve a base line of considerable length. On board ship they can not use those methods, because the longest base line they can get is the length of the ship, and the length of the ship is not always presented at the target, so that they are driven to a much more inaccurate method of getting the range.

Then the ship itself is a vulnerable target almost anywhere. You are likely to damage it if you hit it almost anywhere. But if you hit a fortification anywhere, if you hit any part of the fortification, except the gun itself, or the parts I have already indicated, you do not do much damage.

Take these things together, the instructions always given to naval officers are that they must not put their guns up against fortifications. Their ships are built to fight one another; they are not built to fight fortifications, and therefore with a range greater than the range of our guns they would have only the slightest chance of hitting them.

Mr. AVIS. What I had more particularly in mind is this: Suppose a fleet attempted to bombard New York, what protection could our guns with a much less range give the city of New York as against vessels of a greater range?

Gen. CROZIER. We have the outlying fortifications at Sandy Hook, which is 17 miles from the Battery, and it would be impossible for anybody to get by Sandy Hook without encountering the fire of the guns of those fortifications.

Mr. AVIS. Is there any way in which they can bombard New York and be beyond the range of the fortifications?

Gen. CROZIER. If they could get by Sandy Hook they would then come in conflict with the fire of the guns of Fort Wadsworth and Fort Hamilton. There is a place near Rockaway Beach, where there is fairly deep water close to the shore, and I think vessels might get in there, and thus they would be out of the range of everything, except our mortars at Sandy Hook, which would cover the water and make it untenable. And even if that were not the case, the only thing they could do would be to throw projectiles into the outskirts of Brooklyn.

Mr. AVIS. Is that the case with any other city in the United States?

Gen. CROZIER. No; I think that San Francisco is even better protected than New York, and at Boston they have some fortified outlying island, so that they have very good protection there.

Gen. Weaver was asked about the ammunition, and a great hue and cry had been made that we have not enough ammunition for this purpose to last an hour, but Gen. Weaver made no request for additional reserve ammunition. Mr. Chairman, there is an army board that fixes the amount of ammunition that these guns should have in reserve, and they have fixed in continental United States upon the amount that they should have, which is enough to shoot all of the guns for one hour. The reason for that is this: That in continental United States they can move their ammunition from one fort to another. It is absolutely ridiculous, according to their views—and they are experts and know what they are talking about—to think that all of our forts would be attacked at one time, and that the guns would all have to be fired at one time. In our island possessions the amount of reserve ammunition is for two hours' firing. This is because of greater difficulty in transporting it from one fort to another.

When we look at this statement in the newspapers that our guns have just enough reserve ammunition to be fired for one hour, it seems very peculiar; but when you apply the reason of the experts, these men who know their business, it is perfectly apparent the experts are right. Gen. Weaver was asked about every feature of his system of coast defenses, and he said they were all right and that there was nothing necessary except to have a few more officers and a few more men, even in time of war. Under those circumstances are not these scare headlines which we see in the newspapers about our unpreparedness for war ridiculous? Bear in mind that to deliver a hostile force over here you have to obliterate the Navy of the United States, and I believe it to be the best Navy in the world, and you have to pass by our submarines and our mines planted in every harbor, and then have to pass by our coast defenses, which in the minds of the experts are the best in the world. Do any of you have any fears? Look down in your hearts and see if any of you have any fears that we are going to be attacked by a hostile force when we are in that shape. He was asked about San Francisco Harbor, and he said it was even better defended than New York City, and our Pacific coast as well as our Atlantic coast.

But they come back and say, We have not even enough rifles. Let us see what we have to say about that. We had experts testify upon that subject. These gentlemen know their business. Their testimony was taken down. We have in all 1,100,000 rifles, and my friend from New Jersey [Mr. PARKER] said that our rifle factory was not running full time, and that we ought to fix it so that it would run full time. If my friend had examined the hearings, it would have been perfectly apparent to him why they are not running full time. It is because they have already gotten all of the reserve rifles that they want, and they are just adding about 30,000 a year, a nominal number, in order to keep this Government plant going. There is no necessity for any more. We have rifles for over a million men, and we have an Army of over 85,000, with 120,000 of militia.

What about the small-arms ammunition? We have the full amount of small-arms ammunition required by our expert Army board. I should have said also that we have all of the pistols necessary and that our pistol factories are running in the same way, and we have all of the sabers and other kinds of equipment that are necessary. We have the full amount of ammunition for small arms, 195,000,000 rounds, as much as the board has estimated, but we are still running our ammunition factory along these lines.

That brings us to one other matter that I want to talk about, because there has been a great deal said about it. Great stress has been laid by gentlemen upon the fact that we have not enough field artillery. Did you gentlemen ever stop to think how much we have expended for field artillery? I think the Committee on Military Affairs spent about \$3,000,000 last year, and we have \$2,900,000 for this year—all that they can possibly use. Other committees also appropriate for this purpose. They could not make any more if we were to spend more money. The department has reduced the amount required for this year by \$100,000 because we can not use the money. What is the use of appropriating money for this purpose if we can not use it? I want to say to you that a former Chief of Staff recommended it was necessary for us to have 1,202 pieces of field artillery. Well, we have been building it up regularly, and I say to you that I have never seen a more patriotic body of men on either side of this House than the gentlemen who compose the Committee on Military Affairs, irrespective of party. Now, I want to say further that we have appropriated practically everything for this purpose that has been asked; and, by the way, we have not been slow about it. Twelve hundred and ninety-two pieces now that our board says is necessary, and when this appropriation is through we will have 860 pieces already of field artillery—

Mr. SHERWOOD. Of what caliber?

Mr. McKELLAR. They are 6-inch for the most part, and, by the way—

Mr. KAHN. Three-inch guns. Some of the howitzers are 6-inch.

Mr. McKELLAR. I made a mistake there. By the way, that question arose whether we ought not to have 16-inch field guns, like those new ones they have in the German Army. Why, says Gen. Crozier, what could you do with them? What forts have we got to hammer down? He said the others we have got are manufactured to fit our needs and our necessities; that there are no forts in Canada, none in Mexico, that we have got to break down in order to get in there, and that they are wholly unnecessary. And if you will read the testimony you will find that what he said is actually so. Now, they say



we have not got enough ammunition for the field artillery. We have been appropriating for the ammunition for the field artillery in the same way we have been appropriating for the field artillery itself. We have already an accumulation of 50 per cent, and that is rapidly accumulating every day, every year, right straight along. Why this fright on the part of some citizens—

Mr. SHERWOOD. What amount of money has been appropriated for this useless ammunition up to this time?

Mr. McKELLAR. I have not figured it out independently, but it is simply an enormous sum, but we have done what our experts have told us and we are gradually building up, and in a period of six years we will have every particle of the ammunition, all of the field guns, all of the equipment that our experts say that we ought to have.

I want to say another thing about our Army appropriations. In 1897 we appropriated for our Army \$25,000,000. In 1899, one year after the war, we appropriated about \$100,000,000, and we have been appropriating about \$100,000,000 ever since. We have appropriated in the last 10 years over a thousand million dollars for our Army alone for the purpose of our defense. Under those circumstances how can it be truthfully said by anybody having knowledge of the facts that this country is not prepared to defend herself against any foe? Well, they say we ought to have a larger standing army. You heard what I read from the report of the Chief of Staff a few moments ago. Now, gentlemen, let us see what we are going to draw on. We first have a well-trained standing army of 85,000 men. About 50,000 of those men constitute the mobile army. Nineteen thousand constitute the Coast Artillery. We have 9,000 men in the Philippines. We have 2,000 men at Panama. We have about 8,000 men in Hawaii. We have some men at the Military College. We have some men stationed here and there and we have a mobile army well seasoned, well trained, and well drilled of about 50,000. In addition to that we have a splendid militia of about 120,000 men. After 1915 there will be an annual number who go out of the service and who can be called into service at any time—trained soldiers—of about 15,000 men. There will be about 18,000 men who go out annually from the militia service, showing what a large reserve we have from these sources. In addition to that we have about 26,000 graduates from military institutions in this country every year, and this will give you an idea of what our military resources are and what we have to depend on in the event of trouble with any foreign foe.

I want to say one further word, if you will permit me, and it shows that I am no enemy of a proper army. There is one trouble we have always had in time of war, and that is in reference to officers. We have never had a list of reserve officers. We are going to remedy that. On yesterday the Committee on Military Affairs of the House reported out a bill that means that we will have a reserve officer corps in this country. It means the establishment, under the general auspices of the State and the Federal Governments, in each State of a military training college out of which 100 students will be graduated every year. It is put under the authority and control of a commission from the Federal Government. That will make it an effective system in which young officers of between 23 and 30 years will be graduated in every State in the Union, and they will be taken from every county in the State.

Now, the two governments take these young men, they give them this course, and the only requirement they have put on them is this, that they have to agree in writing to serve the United States Government whenever they are called upon within a period of seven years. That will be building up in seven years a reserve force of Army officers of about 30,000 men when these colleges are in operation. Our experts say that in the event of war we would not need over about 22,000 to 25,000 of these officers. So from these institutions, at a comparatively small cost, less than it costs to increase our standing army by 4,000 men, a comparatively small amount, we will have a body of well-trained reserve officers which will give us protection along that line.

Mr. CLINE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKELLAR. Yes.

Mr. CLINE. I understand the gentleman counts on 26,000 men released from the private military schools of the country?

Mr. McKELLAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLINE. Is there any relationship existing between those and the Federal Government that they can be counted on as a reserve force?

Mr. McKELLAR. None whatever; but we have recently passed in this House and in this Congress one of the most effective volunteer bills that has ever been enacted into law in this country, and they are all subject to duty, every one of them.

Mr. CLINE. The gentleman is depending upon them as part of the resources to be gotten into the Army?

Mr. McKELLAR. Yes; and, remember, there are 26,000 of them graduated every year, and when these 48 training schools are established in each State in the Union we will have not a reserve of 33,000 merely, but in 14 years that will be doubled and in 20 years it will be tripled, and within the best age they can serve their country under the volunteer law which we have.

Mr. Chairman, if there ever was a time and if there ever was a nation that should not lose its head over an imaginative war situation, now is the time and America is the Nation. When nearly all of the civilized world is at war, with practically all of the great nations at each other's throats in a death struggle, now of all times the United States should throw its every energy not into building up unusual war armaments, but into the building up of its commerce, extending its trade, reaching out for new business, and taking to itself the profits of being a peaceful Nation. Untold riches are ours if we but go out and seek them. Instead of appropriating vast sums for larger naval and military establishments, to my mind we should appropriate larger sums for furnishing our country ships whereby our producers and business men can sell their products abroad. We should have a larger number of Government agents in foreign countries to look after our business affairs and aid our merchants in selling their wares in these foreign countries. We should spend our money in advertising in foreign countries and in building up trade alliances. We should establish banking houses wherever we can in foreign countries so as to be better able to serve our citizens doing business abroad. We should be generous in our treatment of foreigners everywhere so that we might, as is our duty, fall heir to the trade and commerce that our European friends are throwing away by reason of their wars upon one another. There never was a time in our history when there was less necessity for greatly enlarging either our Army or our Navy.

Mr. SHACKLEFORD. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. McKELLAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHACKLEFORD. How large an increase of expenditure will that involve?

Mr. McKELLAR. Three million eight hundred and forty thousand dollars a year.

Mr. SHACKLEFORD. To start with?

Mr. McKELLAR. Yes, sir. And it will educate, outside of the question of giving them a training—it will give to 15,000 boys a year in this country the best education that can possibly be obtained. Outside of its military features, as an educational measure it has every merit to commend it, in my judgment.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Is it not true that never since the adoption of the Federal Constitution has any country declared war first against the United States?

Mr. McKELLAR. It is entirely true. No country ever has and, in my judgment, never will, if it knows what is good for it.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Do you know of any officer of the Army with as much gray matter in his cerebrum as a gray goose who can see any danger anywhere now?

Mr. McKELLAR. Well, I would not like to put it that way, but I will say I think he must resort to his imagination if under the present existing conditions he can see any trouble ahead for the Nation. I believe that for at least 25 years after this awful European war has been closed America will be absolutely free from any possibility of war made on us by a first-class power. But if it should not, you gentlemen need not have the slightest fear but that with the splendid Army we have, controlled as it is by splendidly trained officers, and with the volunteers upon which we have always relied, we will be amply protected and able to protect ourselves against any foe that comes against us.

Gentlemen, I have already taken up entirely too much time. I thank you very, very much. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields 10 minutes.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. QUIN] is recognized for one hour. [Applause.]

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Chairman, all of this discussion and newspaper agitation favoring a great standing army in this country is a matter that ought to concern every Member of Congress.

As a member of the Military Affairs Committee of this House I have given the subject much thought. I was amazed at the speech made on this floor in the early days of this session by the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER].



I know the gentleman is an honest, patriotic man, and for that very reason I was surprised at his utterances touching the unpreparedness of the United States for war.

He seems to think that every other nation of this earth is going to engage in war at the same time against us, and proceeds to say that we are practically defenseless. I can understand why the special interests of this country are having headlines in many of the metropolitan newspapers, endeavoring to frighten the American people and create a false idea that we need a great standing Army in this Republic.

They make profits out of all the equipment for soldiers and war. They make enormous profits out of battleships and all of the necessary equipment. I can understand why the generals and admirals proclaim the necessity for a great army and the greatest lot of battleships the world ever saw.

The more Army and naval officers you have the greater the danger of this country being plunged into war.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know why the gentleman from Massachusetts is so much disturbed that he appeared before the Naval Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee surrounded by newspaper reporters, and told these great committees organized by this body that this Republic is virtually defenseless by both land and sea.

We were all delighted to have our good friend appear before the committee and give us the benefit of his views. He failed to give us any information at all, as the committee was well acquainted with all of the information imparted by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

From my viewpoint all that the gentleman had on his mind was a commission of inquiry to ascertain if we are prepared for war.

It strikes me there is an obsession or hysteria that has overcome some few of our citizens that imaginary foes will invade our country.

Mr. Chairman, I maintain that we have no enemies who would dream of overrunning our land with armed forces, and it would be impossible for any three or four nations combined to successfully invade the United States. We have no enemies, and as long as Uncle Sam attends to his own business we are not likely to be involved with any country where it would be necessary to resort to arms to maintain our national peace, honor, dignity, and commerce. [Applause.]

Surely, I am against a great standing Army. I am unalterably opposed to compulsory military service in this country in time of peace. Gentlemen, this Republic was never intended to be the drill ground of great armies, and you shall never strap a soldier on the back of the farmer and laboring man, and make a military despotism of this Republic, as long as the people keep informed and vote their sentiments at the ballot box. [Applause.]

These farmers, these laboring people, and all other taxpayers of America have the right to know where all of this money goes to that you have been appropriating yearly for the Army and the Navy. Since the day war was declared against Spain in 1898, this country has yearly squandered great sums of money, both on the Army and Navy. Mr. Speaker, in 1897 the Army of the United States was composed of 2,179 officers, 25,353 enlisted men and petty officers, making a total of 27,532; and the sum of \$48,950,268 was expended for the entire military establishment in the year 1897.

Unfortunately war was declared against Spain by the United States, and from that fatal day till now the militarists of this country have been reaching their hands deep into the pockets of the people.

In 1897 there were 11,750 petty officers and enlisted men and 62 midshipmen in the United States Navy, and during the year 1897 the sum of \$33,661,467.81 was expended on the Naval Establishment.

In the year 1910 the United States Army had 4,273 officers, 70,893 enlisted men and petty officers, making a total of 75,166, and in that year the huge sum of \$155,911,706 was expended on the Military Establishment of this country.

In that selfsame year the Navy of the United States had 47,500 petty officers and enlisted men and 292 midshipmen, and officers to the number of 2,896, and there was expended that year—1910—for the Naval Establishment \$133,555,552.88.

In the year 1914 the Army of the United States had 4,701 officers and 87,781 enlisted men and petty officers, making a total of 92,482, and for the support of the Army that year there was appropriated \$92,076,145.51, and the total amount appropriated for the Military Establishment for 1914 was \$165,646,297.77.

In 1914 the United States Navy had 52,667 petty officers and enlisted men, with 3,821 officers, and there was appropriated

for the Naval Establishment in the year 1914 the sum of \$140,736,536.35.

You see, the aggregate sum for both the Army and Navy last year was \$306,382,834.12, a sum of money staggering to the imagination. Gentlemen, this is not all. In that same year of 1910 you paid out of the pockets of the people to veterans, in the form of pensions, the stupendous sum of \$159,974,056.08; and last year you appropriated in pensions \$172,408,518.29.

For the Military and Naval Establishments and pensions for the year 1914 there was appropriated \$478,791,352.41.

From 1901 to 1914, inclusive, there has been expended on the Military Establishment the sum of \$1,942,931,915.77, and for the same period there has been expended on the Naval Establishment \$1,595,609,107.94.

The aggregate amount expended for both the Army and Naval Establishments for that period is \$3,538,541,023.71. What caused the vast increase in the Army and Navy, and the great sums of money spent on each annually? I have given you the figures for 1897 and the figures for 1910.

Can any man in the United States explain why we needed to spend any more for this purpose in 1910 than we spent in 1897? We were then at peace with all of the nations of the world, and still you had this great Army and Navy, the special interests howling for more.

If the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] contends that this country is unprepared for war, I ask him in the name of the great hosts of toilers of America what went with the \$3,538,541,023.71? What is going to be done with the \$146,223,332.07 for 1915, and the \$175,962,773.81 for 1916 appropriated for the Military Establishment?

What will become of the \$144,417,453.53 appropriated for the Navy for 1915? Do you not think the American people are now taxed to the very limit to maintain the present Army, Navy, and pension rolls? [Applause.] Some say that the pension roll is decreasing. Let us see about that. In the year 1914 you paid in pensions to veterans and their widows of the War of 1812 the sum of \$27,532.40; for the Indian wars, \$560,247.40; for the Mexican War, \$1,060,529.74; for the Civil War, \$163,777,551.53; for the Spanish-American War, when you did not have 350 men killed and wounded in battle, the sum of \$3,907,509.53; and for the Regular Army Establishment, \$3,475,147.69, making a total of \$172,408,518.29 actually paid out of the pockets of the people for pensions last year.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Will the gentleman permit a correction?

Mr. QUIN. I will.

Mr. SHERWOOD. The number killed in the Spanish War was 247, according to the official records of the War Office.

Mr. QUIN. I am glad the gentleman has corrected me, because I thought possibly there had been a hundred more than that injured. But since that short war those veterans have drawn over \$46,000,000 in pensions from this Government, and they are still hungry at the trough, and there has been an increase of one-quarter of a million dollars since 1913. God pity the people! [Applause.]

Do you not know that this Spanish-American War pension list is going to grow as fast as the other pensions decrease?

What advocate of increased pensions for the veterans of the Civil War 10 years ago, when \$132,915,921.30 was paid out for pensions on account of that war, would have dreamed that as late as 1914 the sum of \$163,377,551.53 would go out of the Treasury on account of the pensions for that war, which ended 50 years ago?

It is not unreasonable to assume that you will pay Civil War pensions for 120 years after 1865, and the same assumption will follow as to the Spanish-American War.

Mr. CLINE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIN. I will.

Mr. CLINE. I would like to ask a question for information. How does the gentleman connect the expenses for the Spanish-American War and the Civil War with our unpreparedness? I see that the gentleman is discussing that proposition.

Mr. QUIN. I think that we are prepared to fight the world. I do not believe in going and buckling down and fastening the people of this country with ball and chain. [Applause.] And I tell you that what we are paying out in pensions for Navy and Army purposes is such a burden that it aggregates, lacking a few thousand dollars, one-half a billion dollars annually now; and with some of these alarmists howling for more money for Navy and Army purposes, and as we know that the pensioners are never going to cease to come to the trough, it will be bound to increase. It is a question of the burden that the taxpayers of this country will rebel against that I propose to argue. We know that the Spanish-American War pensions are going to increase, because they have increased every year since the war



started up until now, and this year there is an increase over last year.

Mr. CLINE. I take it that the gentleman is not in favor of civil pensions?

Mr. QUIN. I certainly never favor a man getting a pension unless wounded in battle or for disease contracted in the Army service. I do not think this Government owes a pension to a man simply because he followed the flag for a little while. He may be patriotic, but he owes patriotism to his country. Of course if he is distressed by wounds or disease contracted in the Army, his Government should provide for him. But the wealthy, the able-bodied, the strong are grabbing for pensions, and this Congress gives pensions to them.

Mr. BRYAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUIN. Just for a question.

Mr. BRYAN. You have been yielded an hour. Will you agree to yield 20 minutes of your time to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER]?

Mr. QUIN. I am sorry I can not do it. I promised the chairman to yield back my unused time.

Mr. BRYAN. You will save a lot of time by it.

Mr. QUIN. I can not help that. I never made a contract in my life that I did not stand by.

It has been over 100 years since the War of 1812, and this Government is still paying pensions on account of service in that war, for you know \$27,532.40 was paid for that purpose last year.

As long as young women hardly out of their teens will marry old veterans on the brink of the grave there is no chance for the pension rolls to make any appreciable decrease.

As you increase your standing army and navy, so will increase your pension rolls from the Regular Establishment. As proof of this, exercise common sense. But I will cite you actual figures from the report of the Commissioner of Pensions.

In 1904 the sum of \$2,287,924.99 was paid out in pensions for the Regular Establishment, and for this identical purpose in the year 1914 the sum of \$3,475,147.69 was paid out of the Public Treasury. It follows, as the night follows the day, that as you increase the Army and Navy not only will there be a rapid increase in the expense of maintaining them, but the pension rolls will increase by leaps and bounds.

This Government has pensioners living in every civilized country of the world, and since this imperialistic idea took charge of our statesmen the Philippine Islands, many thousands of miles out in the Pacific Ocean, are a constant drain on the citizens of our country, maintaining a quasi-military government over that swarthy-complexioned people.

It is this same imperialistic and military spirit that is now endeavoring to build up a great standing army in this Republic. They know if they once get it started that it will grow and become a fixture, and could never be overthrown except through the forces of a revolution.

The first excuse that element had for increasing the Army was the Spanish-American War, in 1898, and gradually year by year the Army and Navy have grown in such proportions that they now feel safe in demanding a great increase all at once.

This Government has paid to veterans and their widows of the Civil War alone the stupendous sum of \$4,457,974.496, and there is a crowd in Congress now endeavoring to have that roll increased by giving all the officers of the Union Army from 1861 to 1865 the pay of retired officers, which would increase the pension rolls several millions of dollars annually.

The taxpayers have groaned and sweated under this weary burden for a long time. Will they stand the increased burden that must inevitably follow the great increases in the Army and Navy?

There is a proposition on foot to add 25,000 enlisted men and 1,000 officers to the Army in addition to what we already have. There are those who advocate raising the Army to 800,000 men during these times of peace in this Republic.

In the light of all history and in the line of good common sense, what nation of this earth could have any motive or desire to invade this country, and where is the nation that would be fool enough to try it? What are these militarists and alarmists talking so much about? It strikes me that it is worse than foolishness and tommy-rot to try to frighten the American people into the idea that this Government should be run on the plan of a monarchy and build up a military and naval aristocracy, at which the people would rebel when the burden became too heavy to tote.

The alarmists proclaim from the housetops that we will be attacked by Germany, England, Russia, or Japan. Do not these militarists know that the people of the United States are reading for themselves? I submit, Mr. Chairman, there is not a well-informed schoolboy 18 years old in this country but that

knows the United States has a Navy second to none, except Great Britain. There is not a man of any degree of intelligence but knows all of the countries now engaged in the European war are exhausting all of their resources, including soldiers and sailors, in the great conflict that is now in progress.

When that war is over some of those nations will have practically no navy, and their armies will be decimated, the treasuries of their Governments and the pockets of their people will be empty, with a great war debt hanging over the people, and the land filled with maimed soldiers, grief-stricken, pauperized widows and orphans, groaning under a great burden of taxation.

Sir, it will be at least 50 years before any of those nations would ever dream of war again. Yet we are told by a few military alarmists and those great interests that make big money out of big armies and navies that the United States is not prepared for war.

I contend this Government is prepared to meet any emergency. Whom should we be prepared to war with? The nations now at war have their hands full and would not court war with this country even if they thought they could overrun the United States.

As long as we have a representative Government there never will be any danger of any nation on this globe catching Uncle Sam unprepared to defend himself.

In order to maintain a representative Government in the United States, we must beware of the militarists and a big standing army.

Sirs, who believes that the present war in Europe would be in progress to-day if it had not been for the big standing armies in those countries? The very fact that some of them were so much overprepared for war, with some of their generals and soldiers impatiently scenting the battle from afar, is the real reason why there is not peace in Europe to-day. It is my prediction that if our people are ever plunged into a war with any other country, it will be done by some general or admiral. [Applause.]

The War with Spain was indeed unfortunate.

Our people are patriotic and courageous, and when they rally to the colors, be it said to their credit, they never ask what the war is about. Volunteers responded in every State of this Union to fight for the flag of the United States in the struggle that kept most of our troops in camp during the Spanish-American War.

A great mistake, in my judgment, was made as a result of that war, and I designate this mistake as the "acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States." What a pity that when Admiral Dewey fired his last shot in Manila Bay he did not say good-bye and sail away. [Applause.]

The Government of the United States paid Spain \$20,000,000 for that white elephant, and our people are being taxed for many millions of dollars yearly to keep soldiers in those islands and prevent the Filipino people from exercising the rights of a free and independent people.

That unfortunate possession is a millstone around the neck of our Republic, and has been the chief argument of the militarists for a great Navy and a big Army.

May God speed the day when the American Congress will give the Filipino people independence and withdraw from the islands forever. There is too much greed and selfishness in this country. All last summer many Congressmen on the Republican side of the aisle were howling themselves hoarse because President Wilson followed a peace policy in the Mexican trouble.

Those gentlemen and certain interested metropolitan newspapers were criticizing, cartooning, and condemning the President, the Secretary of State, and the Democracy of Congress because war was not declared and an invading army sent by our Government into the Republic of Mexico.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. One was sent there.

Mr. QUIN. I have always thought the President pursued the proper and honorable course in all his dealings with Mexico.

Sirs, the real truth is that those parties who were so anxious to plunge the United States into war with Mexico really wanted our soldiers to come out of that conflict with Mexican soil on their muskets. [Applause.] Woe be unto the man that would throw this country into war for booty, plunder, land, and profits. Is it possible that the Government of the United States is not above that low ideal of barbarism?

A few years ago all of the advocates of big armaments and great standing armies based their excuse for exploiting and plundering the people on the promise that these powerful, expensive agencies of terror, death, and destruction would prevent war and maintain peace. Now, when they see all of the preparedness of Europe is evidence to the world that great navies and big standing armies do not maintain peace but bring on war, with all of its attendant horrors, this crowd must look



about for a new argument, a new excuse to fool the people into standing still, to be further robbed by excessive taxation for great armaments and powerful standing armies.

What is the name of the new horse they have jumped on and are now riding with whip and spur to fool us? Unpreparedness for war [applause], when every thinking man knows there is not a nation in all of the world that desires a war with this country, and I hope there is not a man in our Republic that courts war with any other nation.

These alarmists and advocates of the proposition of covering the deep sea with battleships and the land with soldiers at the expense of the people to make big fortunes for a few individuals, trusts, and corporations have been bellowing about the great navies of Germany and Japan.

Every expert knows that Germany is not in the same class as to naval equipment with the United States. Germany, the great hell-roaring demon that these alarmists say is going to come over to these shores and beat hell out of this country! [Laughter.] They all know that poor little Japan is not a menace to us.

These alarmists can not get away with such arguments. I give you the exact sum in dollars spent by both Germany and the United States on their Naval Establishments each year from 1904 to 1913, inclusive:

	United States.	Germany.
1904.....	\$103,633,115.40	\$50,544,000
1905.....	115,420,997.75	49,110,300
1906.....	104,508,719.83	54,918,000
1907.....	99,693,298.32	58,344,300

You will notice that the Germans never spend any cents. It is always even money. [Laughter.]

This Government has been expending these enormous sums for the Navy, while the Germans have been spending such relatively small sums, and still they hold up the German Navy as such a great terror to this country!

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Mississippi yield to the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. QUIN. Yes; I yield.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Would it not be advisable to put in right there the difference between the pay of the Germans' enlisted men in the navy and the men in the Navy of the United States in order to account for the difference?

Mr. QUIN. I have not the time to do that; but I can not believe, for instance, that if the Germans could spend only \$50,544,000 and we should spend \$103,000,000 in one year that there could be enough difference in the cost for Germany to have a great navy that is a terror to us unless somebody has been stealing from us. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. But does the gentleman know what the facts are as to the pay received in the German Navy?

Mr. QUIN. I must proceed. I will answer you under the five-minute rule when we get to that. [Laughter.]

Now, how much did we spend in 1908? I say the figures here submitted are exact and authentic:

	United States.	Germany.
1908.....	\$129,974,371.95	\$69,133,500
1909.....	139,216,545.02	80,737,626
1910.....	133,555,552.88	95,047,820
1911.....	127,026,100.00	103,302,773
1912.....	126,405,509.24	107,178,480

And so it runs down until we get just before the war started over there in Germany, and you know they have been preparing for war ever since the Kaiser went on the throne. We know that they are prepared for war all the time. I will show you what they spent when war was right in sight—when they could see the white of the eye of the enemy.

In 1913 we spent \$123,151,538.76. Germany spent in 1913, \$109,989,096.

Mr. Sisson. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. QUIN. I will.

Mr. Sisson. Does the gentleman include in his figures for the German Navy the entire expense of Germany on the naval establishment?

Mr. QUIN. Yes; the entire expense on the navy establishment, taken from Statistik für Staat, published in Berlin.

[Laughter.] And I am confident no German would contradict that and no American would deny it.

Mr. Sisson. I would state to the gentleman that I am simply surprised at the comparatively small sums expended by Germany, as compared with the large sums that we have expended for 1913. I wish to ask the gentleman this further question: The difference in the compensation of the German and of the American sailor would not account for that enormous difference, would it?

Mr. QUIN. Oh, no.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. But, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman said he did not know what the difference was.

Mr. QUIN. The gentleman from Michigan misquotes me. He evidently does not understand my statement.

Mr. Sisson. With respect to the American figures, I will say that only about one-fourth or one-fifth of the amounts indicated there is included in the pay of officers' and men's salaries in the Navy of the United States; therefore the amount paid by the United States Government and the amount paid by Germany does not account for the great difference, as was suggested by the gentleman on the other side a moment ago.

Mr. QUIN. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Sisson] is correct; and, if the figures are honest, it would seem that we have expended too much money on the Navy of the United States. Unless our money has been squandered in an illegitimate way, our Navy is bound to be greater than the German Navy. There can not be any such discrepancy in the honest expenditures. Our Navy is bound to be superior to the German Navy, if Uncle Sam has been given a square deal.

Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Mississippi yield to the gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. QUIN. Yes.

Mr. CLINE. Let me ask the gentleman this question: Is it not true that the Germans have a conscription law to reinforce their army and their navy, which the alarmists in this country want to see adopted here? It does not cost anything for that volunteer service.

Mr. QUIN. It costs a great deal for these battleships, to put them on the sea. That is what I am talking about. I am not talking about the standing army, where they go out and make slaves of human beings. I am talking about the expenditures for the navy.

Now, Japan's expenditure is so much less that it would be a joke to make the comparison. The experts all know that our Government had a Navy superior to that of Germany even before the Germans lost any of their fleet in the war, and by the time the submarines and little torpedo boats get through their work Great Britain will be second to the United States. All of those countries engaged in war are keeping their dreadnaughts, their big battleships, securely concealed to keep the submarines from destroying them. That war has been waging ever since last August, and you have never yet had the news of any great sea battle.

Mr. Chairman, are battleships built to inspire fear in time of peace and duck into a safe place in time of war? Is it a game of hide and seek with these palaces on the seas?

Every harbor touching the United States could be securely mined by our Government inside of a very few days. We have the best guns in the world in our forts and as fine marksmen as ever drew a bead. We have plenty of factories, both Government and privately owned, to make all the powder and guns we could use.

We have an Army of men and officers of 92,482, besides the Philippine Scouts, and a National Guard of 120,000, and 15,000,000 strong, patriotic, courageous men in private life to answer the call of this Government to arms at any time the flag needs them.

Gentlemen, does this look like we are unprepared for war? If there is a man on this floor that doubts the ability, the endurance, or valor of the volunteer soldier of America, let him stand up right now and give his reason. The record of the volunteer soldiers at Bunker Hill, Ticonderoga, and Brandywine stands as an indisputable argument in behalf of the volunteers.

If you doubt the volunteer, go with me through Andrew Jackson's campaign in the War of 1812 against Great Britain. Watch him as he shatters the flower of the Regular Army of Great Britain in the Battle of New Orleans.

Follow the American Volunteers in the struggle between the Republic of Texas and Mexico in 1836. Watch him suffer martyrdom at the Alamo and Goliad; see him under the leadership of old Sam Houston at San Jacinto slaughter and route the Mexican Army, capture Santa Anna, and scatter Mexican blood and garlic all over Texas. [Laughter and applause.]



Ten years later, in 1846, the Government of the United States was forced to invade Mexico, and as absolute proof that the volunteer who had recently left his plow in the State of Mississippi and elsewhere in this Union was as good a soldier as ever fought on any battlefield; watch him at Buena Vista, where he marched into the very jaws of death and won victory for American arms and glory for the flag of this Republic.

Gentlemen of the House, if you are not satisfied with the record of our volunteer soldiers in those fierce conflicts, go with me to the battlefields of the Civil War, from 1861 to 1865.

Those of the Confederate Government that were fighting in that conflict were all raw, untrained volunteer soldiers, except a few officers. The greater portion of the Army of the Union were untrained volunteers from the vocations of private life. Watch them in every engagement. See them at Franklin, Chickamauga, Atlanta, and Shiloh. Watch them at Vicksburg, Manassas, Bull Run, and Gettysburg, when they could see the white of the eye of the enemy as they fought. Is there a man that doubts the volunteer soldier of this country?

It took all of the North, East, West, and part of the South of this Nation, and a large portion of Europe, four long years to overcome a few hundred thousand volunteers fighting for the Stars and Bars, principle, honor, and fireside. [Applause.]

Do you not believe our citizens are as brawny and courageous now as they were during that conflict? The advocates of the great standing army say we are bound to have trained and seasoned soldiers. Do you not know that the farmers and laboring people of this country are seasoned all the time? [Laughter.] It is nothing for them to work all day in the rain. They are expert marksmen. They can shoot a squirrel out of the top of the tallest tree in the woods, and never fail to bring down the bird on the wing. [Applause.] Surely no man doubts the valor and patriotism of this great class of citizenship that constitutes the real backbone of this Republic. [Applause.]

The farmers and the laboring men have fought all the battles of this country, and they are still ready to defend her against all foes. I am here pleading for them now, for you know they pay the taxes. I know they are taxed till they can not stand any more, and I know they do not want the Army increased.

If there is anything that is more obnoxious than excessive taxation, it is the tread and presence of a great standing army. It does not harmonize with liberty, independence, and free government. Yea; great standing armies have been the undoing of nearly all the nations of the earth. [Applause.]

History proves that whenever military power gets in the ascendancy it overthrows the civil government, establishes an autocracy of tyranny, and oppresses the people.

It is the experience of all the ages that military authorities have contempt for the plain people who toil. Yea; the generals and admirals think the plain working classes of this country sink. They look upon us as cattle.

In this piping time of peace the gentleman from Massachusetts is willing to spend \$750,000,000 annually on the Army and Navy. May the Lord God of hosts keep us from the peril and oppression of such a burden as that type of statesmen would impose on the people! [Applause.]

A big, strong army would build up a government of plutocracy. It would impoverish the people and deaden patriotism. Instead of a government of brotherly love and the rights of man, you would have a military despotism.

Compulsory military service would soon be demanded and enforced in times of peace—a consummation devoutly to be despised.

What would the mothers of the boys of this country think of us if they thought we would legislate in such a way that their sons would be compelled to give a term of their best young manhood in the Army? What would the people, the taxpayers, think of us? What will the lovers of high ideals and free government think of us if we go backward and make this Republic the synonym of big armaments and military autocracy?

Mr. Chairman, I shall fight against any increase of the Army in the committee, on the floor of this House, and everywhere else. The special-privilege class and the chauvinistic jingo shall not drive their golden chariot over the plain people of this country. They shall not make of our Government an establishment of tyrannical militarism, bending the backs of our laboring people with the burden of taxation and forcing them to be quasi slaves and devotees at the shrine of the bloody god of war.

Instead of my country's flag standing for oppression, death, and destruction, as some would have it, I pray that this flag shall always be the symbol of peace and good will, bearing this happy sentiment to a free, prosperous, and happy people. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman reserves 15 minutes. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. ANTHONY] is recognized for one hour.

Mr. ANTHONY. Mr. Chairman, it is not my purpose to discuss at length the bill before the House. I do want to say, however, that in my opinion every possible need of the military establishment has been provided for in the measure before us, both for the present and for reasonable future requirements. I do regret, however, that the committee did not undertake to present to the House the question of whether or not we should have an increase in our present Regular Army. As one member of the committee, I believe that such an increase is needed at this time. I do not believe it is needed because of any fear of future war, but I do believe that the present needs of our standing Army, under the present policy of the War Department, require a reasonable increase in the present establishment, in order that our military posts may have proper garrisons, and that the country at large may have a national police force of proper size.

In the last year or two, under the policy of the present administration, as well as under the last one, large forces have been placed in Hawaii and in Panama. It is contemplated to put from 10,000 to 12,000 men ultimately in Hawaii, and from 5,000 to 10,000 in Panama. When this is done—and it will very soon be brought about—it will leave a mobile army in this country of less than 25,000 men, not sufficient for the purposes of providing an adequate mobile army for this country. Therefore I think that now is the time when this House should have considered a reasonable increase in the military establishment. Secretary of War Garrison has asked that it may be increased by 25,000 men. Undoubtedly the other legislative body, when this bill reaches it, will make some provision for such an increase. I believe that increase should be granted, but not in the way in which the Secretary of War asks it. He asks for a flat increase of 25,000 enlisted men and a thousand officers. I believe that increase should be granted, but it should be an increase in organizations as well as an increase in the men.

The theory of our Army is that it should be a small, well-trained body of men in time of peace, with a large number of highly trained, efficient officers, under whom a comparatively small standing army can be expanded easily in time of war to such an army as will meet our requirements. In order to do that, to make it capable of such expansion, we must have the proper organizations already existing. I believe the mobile forces in this country should be increased in this bill by not less than 15 regiments of infantry, 5 regiments of field artillery, and 5 regiments of cavalry, with all necessary officers and equipment.

Now, although an advocate of that reasonable increase in the Army, I want to say to the House that I am in no sense a military alarmist. I have no sympathy whatever with some of the statements that have been made to our committee and to the public as to the necessity of our maintaining an army of half a million men, and I want the House to bear in mind that all of the enormous figures that have been given to the public in regard to the requirements of the Army are based upon what these alarmists claim is the necessity of an army of half a million men in this country. I agree with those who say that they do not believe we will ever be called upon, ever confronted with the necessity of having to put an army of half a million men in the field in this country, especially to oppose a foreign foe. In the first place, that argument for any possibility of an army of half a million men and the necessity for it is predicated upon the probable destruction of our Navy by a foreign foe, which is an improbability; and, in the second place, it is figured upon the theory that we will have to use it to confront an equal number of men who might be landed upon our shores. In my opinion it is a physical impossibility for any foreign foe ever to land such an army upon our shores. A few months ago there was a Chief of Staff of our Army who published a sensational magazine article, in which a statement was made that is typical of some of the wild, sensational statements that have been made and will be made during this debate in regard to the needs of the military establishment. In that magazine article this Chief of Staff made the statement that if our Army should ever go into an engagement with a foreign foe, that all of the ammunition we have on hand would be expended in half an hour's time. Upon analysis, that kind of a statement is utterly ridiculous. He reaches his conclusion on the supposition that every cannon and every soldier we have would all be brought into action at the same time. It is highly improbable that every man we have would ever be brought into one such enormous



engagement and highly improbable that every gun and every round of ammunition would be expended in such a time.

Mr. McKELLAR. We would have to be attacked from east and west and in all our island possessions in order for any condition like that to exist, would we not?

Mr. ANTHONY. In order to sustain Gen. Wotherspoon's argument every gun in every coast fortification and every field-piece of every battery of every regiment, wheresoever it might be, would have to be in action all at one time in order to expend that amount of ammunition. So I feel I am perfectly safe in saying that that kind of a statement is absolutely absurd and not worthy of the attention of this House.

I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN] the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas yields 55 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN].

Mr. KAHN. And I reserve that time.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, I desire recognition in my own right.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for one hour. Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, this question of national defense is a most fascinating one to anyone who is a lover of history and who delights to dwell upon the philosophical deductions that may be made from time to time, each in his own way, from the events and lessons of history as he reads them and as he understands them. The temptation to anyone discussing this question to try to delve down into some of these lessons of history and to substantiate the general contention that perhaps in many respects the country is not altogether prepared for war is almost irresistible. But I appreciate the temper of the House and, I hope, in some sense the fitness of the occasion, and I shall ask for your more detailed consideration of some observations I may have to offer if you will do me the kindness to read at your leisure what I may put into the RECORD.

We who think that the country is not altogether prepared—and, mind, I hope you understand I am speaking from the viewpoint of moderation and not as an extremist or an alarmist—those of us who think the country is not altogether quite prepared for war have to face two kinds of arguments, broadly speaking, made by two kinds of people. One is made by people who say that there never will be another war; another is made by people who say that while war may come, if it does it will find us prepared for it.

I think the first of these arguments is the hardest to meet, because, with all respect to the intelligence, the high order of learning that generally characterizes the most prominent proponents of that argument, I do not think they read correctly the lessons of history. If there is any one thing true of the lessons of history as the average man may study them, it is that through the mighty succession of events that have come down the ages the same old thread of self-interest may be discerned always and everywhere in the doings of men and in the doings of nations.

Sometimes that self-interest appears to be enlightened, sometimes it appears to be of a progressive enlightened character, but, with or without the adjective "enlightened," it is always "self-interest."

One of the phases of the argument made by our friends along this line, that we shall never have another war, is predicated on an altogether too optimistic expectation of the millennium. With all honesty of purpose, sincerity, and patriotism, they speculate on the dawn of that happy era when nations shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. They forget that the nation that has most practically beaten its swords into plowshares and its spears into pruning hooks and has best taken advantage of these new tools to gather up riches for itself has fashioned these plowshares and pruning hooks so that they can be taken at once back to the forge and beaten once more into the old swords and spears in time of need. [Applause.]

There is no such thing as something for nothing. A civilization that is worth living for is worth dying for. But when people arrive at a superior stage of civilization, exemplified externally by social and commercial development which makes for the jealousy of other nations, then if they will not die for their civilization they may rest assured they will die with it. [Applause.]

I think we ought to bear in mind, too, the fact that we are building here in this generation not for ourselves alone. We ought not to pass only superficially on the questions that sometimes possess tremendous potentialities. We are laying the foundations for the future, and we are bequeathing a legacy of some kind or another to our children, whether it may be for good or for evil. Some man who reads the pages of history a few

generations from now will be able to see more clearly than we do that what we did in the House to-day perhaps was the reason why our children's children of 75 years from now, it may be, either enjoy the most abundant prosperity or else are plagued with one of the most awful misfortunes ever told.

We are always, consciously or unconsciously, seeking the interest of our children and in just such propositions as that of safeguarding the country in the national defense.

I would not be presumptuous enough to pose before you as in any sense the authorized interpreter of the utterances on this floor of the distinguished leader of the minority, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN], but I believe that he had something of that kind in his mind when a few weeks ago in this Chamber in speaking on the measure for Philippine independence he pointed out to us the remarkable strategic position this country had acquired in the Pacific Ocean, and how resolutely and how jealously we should guard the advantage we have secured in that great western sea, because some day our children might rise up and call us blessed because we had secured that advantage for them, or might regret in unspeakable humiliation because this very year we might have given it away.

Those who say we are never to have any more war do not seem to read the lessons of history in a very discerning way, it seems to me. It is easy to talk peace, but in the old and oft-quoted language of Patrick Henry, "Men may cry 'Peace, peace!' but there is no peace." How many men in this last summer anywhere in Christendom who were following at that time the recent unusual demonstrations of our international peace advocates would have dared to foretell the awful war that is now raging in Europe? How many men in July would have dared to venture the prophecy that within a month the most awful war in history would be raging across the sea? No man. How many men to-day, in the light of all that we have read about the war, can agree as to the true cause of it?

That is one of the reasons why it seems to me that while we may talk about peace as an assured proposition of the future—that is, the proposition that nations will beat their swords into plow shares and their spears into pruning hooks—we ought still, as prudent men, to set our house in order lest the millennium do not come after all.

The other argument we have to meet is that, if war does come, we will be prepared for it. That is born of a true instinct of patriotism. It rings true to the good old-fashioned self-possession and ease and confidence that we hope always will in a proper degree distinguish our American people; but I am afraid, if we come to analyze it very closely, we might reasonably suspect it was born of a little bit of overconfidence. Somehow, in this land of ours, we American boys grow up with a good deal of pseudo patriotism that finds its vent now and then in carrying imaginary chips around on our shoulders. We Americans are rather volatile. That is one of the characteristics that people of other lands point out about us. We are inclined to swagger a little bit and bluster a bit. It is harmless and perhaps meaningless, and it grows out of the buoyancy and effervescence of the spirit of a young Nation that never has been whipped, but it breeds an overconfidence. One hundred and thirty-seven years of boyish racket in celebrating one hundred and thirty-seven Fourths of July have somehow got our minds to ringing to the inharmonious tune that we can "lick all creation." We do not stop to analyze it much, but we carry that notion in our minds.

Then, too, in this land of ours, with all respect to the good, old-fashioned, honest, and deep-seated patriotism that does lie in the hearts of all our people, we have a kind of noise that might be termed "music-hall patriotism." We love to cheer the flag in a musical show. We love to make a great ado about standing up in a theater when the national anthem is being played. We do a lot of these pretty, spectacular, picturesque, and rather ostentatious things at these times and satisfy ourselves that they are really the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual patriotism. And then, to-morrow, when the sheriff's deputy comes around with a little piece of paper that says he wants us to sit for two hours on a jury in a municipal court, we put up a job on him because it looks as if the fish would bite. [Laughter and applause.] We have a good deal of "music-hall patriotism" in this country, which we must not mistake for the real, the genuine, the very true thing.

The fact is—and this is not said in any spirit of criticism, for we are all counseling together for the same purpose and with the same honest intent, whatever the variance of our notions about it—the fact is that this country has never yet fought a first-class power when that first-class power was in a position to put up a first-class fight. That is a lesson of history I think that some of our friends do not now take the



pains closely to study and from which they do not draw the proper conclusions.

I do not believe in militarism any more than the rest of the country does; but when I see some of our friends promoting the idea that anything in the way of unusual preparation for national defense means an armed camp and militarism and conscription and all that kind of thing, I think the gentlemen are only setting up men of straw, to be battered down again with their own logic. Nobody wants to do anything of that kind. I do not believe in militarism [applause], but I do think we ought to take reasonable, sensible, well-considered, well-deliberated, prudent counsel with one another and make all proper preparation for national defense against those countries that apparently still do believe in militarism. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the beginning, I would like to dwell on some of the details of this subject that instinctively occur to one who has loved to study this question, but I hope that I may still keep within the limits of prudence and respect your time and patience.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Certainly.

Mr. MOORE. The gentleman is a student of history, and he has given us some history in his speech. I suppose the gentleman would like us to be so prepared at least that what happened in 1814, when this Capital was in the hands of the British, might not occur again?

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. I would, most certainly. I was interested in what a gentleman said on the floor of the House just a few moments ago, when he discussed with the most elegant unconcern—very honestly, but, I think, not with altogether certain preparation about the fact itself—the improbability of our being invaded from Canada. I live in a valley where there have been two invasions of redcoats within a few generations—1777 and 1814. And I know whereof I speak, because a great-granddad of mine lost a part of his hair to a very accommodating Indian on the occasion of one of those excursions that came down from the north.

Mr. MOORE. Does the gentleman know whether we are any better prepared, relatively speaking, down the Chesapeake Bay than we were in 1814?

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. I am not prepared to speak about particular conditions in any locality; but I must also suggest that I have now to "defend" the whole country in 20 minutes, and I will have to be going along.

Much might be said and volumes written about the question of large and small armies, and about munitions of war, and all that kind of thing, but doubtless a great deal of that part of the subject of national defense will be discussed under the five-minute rule. I want to speak to you now, however, with more particularity about another phase of it.

We have heard a great deal about the necessity for building up a large reserve of men trained to some extent in the duties of the soldier that can follow the usual employments of peace in time of peace but that can be instantly available at the call to the colors in time of war. We are told that if we adopt such a policy as a part of our scheme for national defense we will in large measure do away with the necessity for the maintenance of a large standing army, always the very proper nightmare of a people bred to the ideals and the institutions of our republican form of government.

And, in pursuance of that idea, various schemes have been planned, and one is being tried out by the War Department now, in the hope that the period of enlistment in the Regular Army and the terms and conditions of that enlistment may be so adjusted that a great number of young men will be induced to enter the Army for a comparatively short term of service, quickly absorb pretty much all the essentials of military discipline and efficiency needful for the purposes of such a reserve, and then be returned to take up civil employments of various kinds, all the while ready, however, to rejoin the colors as trained soldiers at their country's call.

By this method, we are told, we shall not only escape the burden and the dangers of maintaining anything like a large standing army, with its always accompanying mischievous possibilities of militarism, but we shall escape the necessity for conscription, and will not divert our young men from the paths they should pursue in the normal course of developing themselves in self-supporting industry, in home building, and all the pursuits of peace that make a nation truly great.

There is much to be said for this idea. I have very great doubt, however, as to how much can be said for any plan that has yet been tried under it or is presently proposed for trial. The genius of the American people is decidedly opposed to the military life, the limitations of individual opportunity, the restraint and the constraint that go with it. Our people not only

never will serve in the Army in time of peace under compulsion, but they are not anxious, as a rule, to serve in the Regular Army at all. And for the very particular class of young men whom it is hoped to secure for this reserve to be made up of graduates of the Regular Army, the Regular Army itself has few attractions.

Moreover, the various forms of governmental oversight of the individual citizen, the intimate scrutiny by police espionage of the daily walk and conversation of the individual citizen, his comings in and goings out, that are characteristic of some European nations are lacking in this free land of ours. Public sentiment in this country never will consent to such a secret service régime sleuthing for the Government to keep track of the doings of its people. It is, to my mind, therefore, plainly impracticable for the Government ever to be in position to summon and compel the attendance at the colors of any considerable number of men who at one time may have served an enlistment in the Regular Army, under the condition that for a certain period thereafter they were to be enrolled in a reserve and liable at any time to a call to the colors. The country is too large, covers too vast an extent of geography, and our American habits of personal independence in travel and sojourn are too free ever to make it possible to keep chained to the demands of a card-system reserve here in Washington thousands and thousands of men that may be scattered from one end of America to the other, or even in foreign lands.

No American citizen has to show any gendarme any papers of any kind to travel from or to his home town in this country, and no American citizen ever will.

And without some plan equivalent to some degree of police surveillance of this character it is doubtful whether the best-laid scheme for a military reserve of this kind will ever work.

I want to venture the suggestion that the very heart and center of this question of a military reserve in a "trained citizenry" never will be satisfactorily reached until the 48 States of this Union consent to surrender, each for itself, its exclusive jurisdiction over its quota of the so-called National Guard, and what is now in effect a mere localized militia in those States comes under the sole and exclusive authority, control, and support of the United States Government at Washington, just as the Regular Army is to-day. Then, and not until then, will the institution that is now in reality only a collection of localized militia, with widely varying standards of equipment, training, morale, discipline, and personnel—and only one thing in common, and that patriotic, good intentions—become in fact a National Guard. Then, and only then, will this collection of splendid young men, for the time being all too much the victims of misapplied energy, misapplied money, and misapplied State pride, become in truth a National Guard that is all and singly just what its name implies, and is prepared, detail for detail, to do just the kind of service that we are now vainly trying to prepare for through the attempt to organize an Army reserve. [Applause.]

I understand, I think, something of the objections that will be instantly raised to this proposition. Indeed, it is not a new proposition for that matter. It has been discussed for years, in one way or another, among Regular Army men and among militiamen, and among a few civilians in general. But, so far as I know, the proposition, out and out and bald as I have put it here, has not, in recent years at least, been advanced on the floor of this House. And I advance it now, conscious, of course, that nothing that this House can do at this time or is likely to do at this time can be the means of bringing about the turning over to the National Government of the so-called National Guard. The movement, when it begins, must come from the States themselves, because the States themselves now control their own militia under one of the most jealously guarded clauses of the Federal Constitution.

And I believe the States ought to begin the movement at once, because it is manifestly in the interest of their own people so to do, as I shall try to show. It is true that the Federal Government has from time to time, through the passage of helpful laws, found the way to cooperate with the States in the maintenance of this militia force, and has even to a certain extent imposed upon the militia, through the consent of the States, something of its own demands in the way of a standard of military efficiency. But, do the best it may, under any circumstances, with the constitutional conditions as they now exist and the claims and assertions of right made by the States under them, the Federal Government can only work through the States in a vague, indefinite, and indirect way, after all, and must perforce be content with the best it can accomplish for our citizen soldiery under such adverse conditions by what is often only the clumsiest of circumlocution.



To-day the several States in the Union are annually contributing about \$6,000,000 and the Federal Government, in round numbers, \$7,500,000 for the support of the militia. Who doubts that incalculably better results could be had if this same total could be expended under the supreme control of the National Government according to its own standards of military training?

Now, all of this is not to the discredit of the militia, or National Guard, as it is erroneously called. The splendid young men that to-day make up the rank and file of this organization, or collection of independent organizations—for that is all it actually is when the final reckoning is had—are simply laboring in and under conditions which shaped themselves generations ago, and are for the most part doing the best they can against the many and various obstacles to better results that those conditions imposed. I honestly believe for the most part they would welcome a change in authority that would permit them to fit themselves more capably for a more efficient service than the Constitution will now let them perform, or that they could perform if it did let them.

I served in the National Guard for 12 years, and in the course of that time not only had experience in various capacities from that of a private to responsible command rank, but also had very good opportunities for observing in something like intimate detail the results of National Guard experiences in States other than my own. I am very glad to accept as a general proposition the idea that the rank and file of the various militia organizations throughout the land are composed of an excellent quality of young citizenship, the very kind of men that would be most likely to compose a great part of any volunteer army that could be assembled in time of war. Sprinkled among them are many officers of maturer years, men that have given much of the activities of a lifetime, apart from their private business concerns, to the careful study of the duties of a soldier and of military science in general. Both officers and men, for the most part, perform their service in the militia at a very considerable personal sacrifice of time, energy, and often of money. Many of them, of course, are attracted to the ranks in the first place by the instinctive enthusiasm of a young imagination that is always stirred by a distant view of the soldier's life and experiences. Some of them get tired of the realities of militia experiences and gradually drop out. Others, either from actual love of the experience or often from a deep-seated patriotic impulse to be useful in the real training of a real citizen soldiery as a preparation for national defense, continue in the militia service for years and give the best of their time and talents, properly so to be bestowed, to earnest and zealous endeavor to raise the standard of efficiency of the organization.

When I first went into the National Guard nearly 30 years ago it is true that it was more or less of a military organization in a superficial sense only. In many localities it was maintained as something of an exclusive social institution, lavished money on dandified uniforms that were anything but practical equipment for camp or battle field, devoted its time to acquiring proficiency in fancy drills and evolutions that may be a pretty martial display on times of public ceremonial perhaps, but had little connection with the stern duties of a real soldier in a real war. Such a thing as learning the practical lessons of practical camps, the instruction of the soldier in the details of his duty as a soldier in the field, the encouragement of proficiency in marksmanship, and all the thousand and one things that make military science a science indeed—those things were but slighted if, in many cases, they were even grudgingly attempted. All over the land, as a matter of fact, the animating purpose of the militia was organizing for outdoor pastime at time of parade and muster, or stealing the livery of Mars for the fascination of Venus when the only call to arms was the fiddler's appeal to "Swing partners" and "All hands 'round."

But in the course of a few years all this began to change. The spirit of progress, of a better appreciation of the purpose of a true national guard, began to be felt in the ranks, and here and there officers and men began the laborious task of reorganizing and standardizing the State Militia, groping somewhat clumsily, to be sure, but always honestly and eagerly after the pattern of the Regular Army. At first, as I well remember, and as many men of like experience in other States can testify, these attempts to transform the militia plaything into a practical military institution were stoutly resisted. They were resisted at home, too, by politicians and State influences of one kind and another that either could see no purpose in making the militia a very real military institution or else were loth to see a popular plaything that gave rank and exalted title to a few

favorite sons and pleasure to the people transformed into a practical organization that meant business and not pastime.

But the heaven was at work, and it began to leaven the whole lump. Little by little political and social opposition was overcome or withdrawn, little by little the State legislatures were induced to come to the rescue with more sensible laws and more liberal appropriations, and little by little the Federal Government itself was induced to go into partnership with the States in the maintenance of the militia under certain conditions that, it was hoped, might eventually make the militia a veritable national guard in every sense.

This state of change was under way in some parts of the country when the War with Spain broke out. At that time there were already some States in which the standard of the militia had been raised very high, indeed, both in qualifications of men and officers and in equipment and matériel. In others the change was well under way, while in others it is but truth to say the heaven had scarcely begun to work, if at all.

I will not undertake to dwell upon the melancholy experience of the various militia organizations that helped to make up the Volunteer Army in the War with Spain. It would take too long even briefly to sketch them. They are a part of the history of those eventful months, not altogether a very glorious part, to be sure, but a serious part, and a very solemn part to many men that now lie sleeping under the sod and to thousands of others that were returned to the arts of peace broken in health forever. Their experience in the days of '98 was a sad one, for the most part, perhaps a humiliating one in some respects, but it demonstrated once more that "they also serve who only stand and wait." It made a little chapter in American history the real details of which in all their wretched exposé of miserable makeshifts and incompetency, in all their needless sacrifice of the lives and health of brave and loyal young men, have never been fully written, and I for one hope never will be.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, we saw the militia system of this country break down in the War with Spain 17 years ago this spring, just as it had always broken down before in every war this country has ever had with a foreign foe. [Applause.] Recruits representing 48 varying standards and degrees of military efficiency and equipment can not be hastily thrown into one army at one time in time of war and make an effectual fighting unit. The proposition is contrary to every element of common sense, and our history has always proved it so.

But the experience of '98 taught a lesson and sounded a warning. After the war was over and the Volunteer Army was disbanded and the various State militia organizations were under way again in their own proper form and locality the work of reconstituting this force of citizen soldiery was redoubled. State and Federal Governments became more actively interested, more money was appropriated for the purpose, the General Government took an ever-increasing interest in the project and sent more details of Regular Army officers to the various States to conduct courses of instruction for the militia-men, and in one way and another, by the aid of law and example, the militia began to come nearer and nearer its proper status as a true national guard. That movement for the betterment of militia conditions is still under way.

And yet, for all that, I sincerely believe the work has about reached the point where further progress of anything like a substantial character is well-nigh impossible or impracticable until the States themselves consent to turn over to the Federal Government the control of the so-called National Guard.

Under existing conditions some States are able to provide sufficient money for a citizen soldiery that is attaining something like the Regular Army standard of efficiency and equipment, and some are not. In some States conditions, political or otherwise, are heartily in sympathy with the efforts of the militia to develop such a standard, and in others they are not wholly so. In all States it is found that the development of such a standard requires such a character of fitness in the recruit and such expenditure of time and energy on his part as more or less seriously to interfere with his ability to earn a living in his usual employment unless there can be some supplemental recompense in wages from some source. This means that in some States discipline is rigorous, in others lax; in some States the standard of efficiency is already high for a citizen soldiery and always going a little bit higher, and in others it is difficult to show anything like very substantial improvement along most lines.

The whole matter, it seems to me, in this particular sums itself up in the very apparent proposition that, with the control of the National Guard distributed among 48 localized State authorities, there can be no practical standardization of any of the requirements for efficiency in the soldier himself and no



standardization of the equipment and material that is designed both to give him an opportunity to learn to be a soldier and fight like a soldier after he is one; and all this notwithstanding the earnest, honest, tireless efforts of a great body of loyal and patriotic officers of the State governments, of truly sympathetic and devoted Regular Army officers, and other men in military and civil authority all over the land. The cause has made progress, but it is reaching its limit, for reasons that I have tried to make plain in this brief sketch, and which have doubtless come under the observation, if not within the actual experience, of many of the gentlemen in this House.

It is not necessary here to go into the history of the militia as an institution of the several States, the causes which brought it into being and made it one time useful to the States themselves. It is sufficient to say, I think, that whatever may have been the justification in need for the militia as a State institution at one time in our history, that need exists no longer, if this Union actually is the kind of a Government that we are to-day teaching our sons and daughters that it is, and if all of us—the people of each and every State—have not now and never shall have again any reason for defending our several States against each other.

The only conceivable need for organizations of armed men in any State to-day is for possible service within its boundaries in the maintenance of law and order, the simple and ordinary functions of a simple and ordinary police force or constabulary, a force that at no time is likely to require any very considerable part of the military training, equipment, or material that is now annually expended upon the militia of the States, which militia, by the way, is rarely used for the maintenance of law and order in the States, for the very simple reason that in all but the most unusual instances the regular police force itself is competent for the task.

Not only do the States themselves stand in no need of the militia as presently constituted as a localized police force, but when the National Government needs an army to support its Regular Establishment in time of war it must call for volunteers, because under the Constitution the militia as such can not serve in all the capacities open to a volunteer army. So that it is rather difficult to show just what public service the so-called National Guard does or can perform under present conditions, except in a desultory and all too haphazard manner to train a few men for commissions or warrants in a possible volunteer army and fit a few more men for creditable service in its ranks; and then have to be mustered out of the militia and into the Volunteer Army in order to perform the service for which it has been training.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that a large part of this problem of providing an efficient military reserve among our people, of providing a citizenry trained in the art of war to a very practical extent, can be solved when the so-called National Guard is a very national guard indeed, because it is no longer an assembly of irregular and unharmonized units emanating from 48 varying conditions and circumstances and limitations in 48 States, but is solely a national force, recruited, maintained, trained, equipped, and disciplined by the United States Government alone under Federal laws and out of the Federal Treasury.

In closing I want to point out very briefly several benefits that are now sought in some kind of a plan for an Army reserve that I believe can be realized or approximated to a very great degree under such a national guard.

I have already suggested the attainment of standardization and uniformity all over the country in all that goes to make a trained citizen soldier and to equip him for his duty.

Let me add that, in my opinion, more men and, in some respects, a larger proportion of very desirable young men will be attracted to the ranks when it is understood that the service is to be Uncle Sam's service in reality and not a State makeshift, when it is a matter of fact that service in such a national guard is actually a service in the Federal reserve Army and carries with it the importance and responsibility of such national service. The certainty of maintenance in the service, the certainty of proper instruction, equipment, care, and consideration in the service, the certainty of a proper allowance of pay for time actually spent in actual military duty, and the elimination forever of all the elements of mere pretense and show, all the caprice of local politics, all the ridiculous make-believe of absurd rank and meaningless titles, will give the young soldier a conscious pride in being a real unit in a real volunteer army that may be called to the defense of his country.

I have said that more men and in some respects a larger proportion of very desirable young men will be attracted to the National Guard by such a change as I have suggested. The test might easily be made. While the States now have exclusive authority over their own militia there is nothing to prevent

the Federal Government from establishing its own national guard right alongside a State organization, drawing from the State recruiting source. I do not believe it would be necessary to continue such an experiment very long in order to determine which of the two services proved the most attractive to the young men of that region.

What can be made of the militia when Uncle Sam does have absolute control over it may be seen at any time right here in Washington in the splendidly efficient organization known as the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

Such a national guard as I have outlined would be, in very truth, a volunteer army always in the making from generation to generation, and still always with a considerable nucleus of well-trained and more or less experienced men around which any number of recruits could assemble at any call to war. And being no longer a mere State militia, but an actual Federal reserve army, there would no longer be the necessity that exists to-day and has always existed for raising a separate volunteer army under Federal law in time of war and then permitting the State militia organizations to disband and be mustered into it. We would have but one volunteer organization under one law, and have that ready for business all the time.

Back of all this, Mr. Chairman, we shall be able to get rid of another factor that is now proving to be such a stumbling block in attempting to work out any plan for the formation of an Army reserve under present conditions in this country—the difficulty I spoke of at the beginning of my remarks—the practical improbability of ever getting together again at the call to arms of any considerable part of the men that some years before may have entered the Regular Army with the promise at enlistment that they would rally to the colors at any time after they had passed into the reserve.

A national guard standardized under Federal authority and control, as I have indicated, may still be maintained in its several units in all the various States; that is to say, the Federal Government would raise and maintain its Vermont quota for the national guard in the State of Vermont where the men live and follow their usual employments. Their armories would be in that State, their recruiting done in that State, and as the men that had served through their period of enlistment passed out of the ranks and back to civil life most of them, as a matter of fact, would remain in the very place where they were recruited, and where at immediate call as reservists they could rally again to the colors.

Not only that, but another element would be injected into this reserve army, an element sentimental, to be sure, but a very compelling one for all that. Such a national guard so territorialized, as it would have to be, recruiting its several units from the same source every time and sending its reservists back to the source from which they came, would have stimulated to the highest degree that great asset of the soldier in all countries and in all wars—local pride in the traditions and history of a local military organization—a factor in military discipline and morale that is superior to all laws and higher than all officers. [Applause.]

If the States would ever consent to such a plan for the reorganization of the National Guard, Mr. Chairman, they would have surrendered a constitutional prerogative, to be sure, but a constitutional prerogative that to-day is of doubtful use to them and of very certain well nigh needless expense. But even with such surrender they would be participating just the same in the development of the trained citizenry of the land that is always its bulwark in time of war's emergency. "Each for all and all for each," their brave sons would go out from their own State as of yore, officered in large part by their own kinsmen; their organizations would bear designations and carry flags that told all the world from whence they came and bore witness to the Commonwealth's noble contribution and precious sacrifice to the national defense. And, what is even better than all the best of such motherly pride, every State would have the satisfaction of feeling that her volunteer heroes would go out to war with a training and an equipment and under a skilled oversight by expert officers in command that would, for the first time in the history of the land since the mournful days of Valley Forge, give the militiamen of the United States something like an equal chance with the enemy.

We may talk as we will about preparation for national defense in one form and another, the fact still will remain that as long as we maintain a citizen soldiery organized as State militia, sentiment and pride will send that State militia wholly or in part to the front at every call for volunteers in time of war. And it never yet has been in proper shape to go to war, and it has always had a more or less melancholy experience by reason of its unpreparedness in every war we ever had.



Noble sacrifices of patriotic lives in time of war make glorious pages in a country's history.

Needless and preventable sacrifice of patriotic lives, no matter if victory does finally come limping in, makes pages of heart-breaking regret that no glory can blot out, sorrow that is felt at every fireside in the land where Rachel sits weeping for her children and refusing to be comforted because they are not.

It is this very same militia we have been talking about, Mr. Chairman, that, together with the little standing Army that we have, must take the first shock of a war for national defense, act as a stop-gap, a forlorn hope, and sacrifice precious lives for months maybe, until this great American giant awakes, sees that the war his dreams told him would never come has come at last, and begins to make the serious preparation for self-defense that we ought to make to-day. [Applause.]

I yield back the remainder of my time to the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back 30 minutes. Before the Chair recognizes any other gentleman, the Chair desires to make a statement in regard to time. We are liable to get into some confusion and difficulty here on account of the fact that there is to be seven hours of time, to be divided equally between the two sides. The Chair assumes it is the purpose to have that time equally divided on the two sides. Under the general rules each gentleman who obtains the floor is entitled to recognition for an hour. The Chair simply calls attention to the fact now, in the hope that some agreement can be made and the difficulty obviated. There have been three gentlemen recognized on the majority side and three gentlemen recognized on the minority side, each for an hour. There have been used 2 hours and 5 minutes on the majority side and there have been used 1 hour and 21 minutes on the minority side of the Chamber. That will leave time, but it will be very difficult to divide it equally now unless some arrangement is made.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I ask for recognition. I think I can solve the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I yield half an hour to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] and half an hour to the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN].

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I think I had 10 minutes reserved, and I desire to yield that 10 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee yields 10 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY], and the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. QUIN] notified the Chair that he desired to yield his remaining time, 15 minutes, to the gentleman from Virginia. The Chair does not see the gentleman from Mississippi on the floor just now, but without objection, that will be ordered. Also, the gentleman from Virginia has half an hour in his own right. That clears the matter up, and we can now proceed.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 50 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER].

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] said one thing this morning that impressed me. He said that of all the people who are talking about unpreparedness for war not one tells us how to be prepared. Of course not, because there are eight different committees in the House and Senate that have jurisdiction of that question. How can they lay out an intelligent program? What I ask for is a commission appointed by the President and the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to make those very recommendations as to preparedness which no sensible man would undertake to make in default of proper information.

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND ASIATIC EXCLUSION.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Monroe doctrine stands like a flaming sword notifying Europe that she will not be permitted to colonize South America or Mexico. Do you suppose that that flaming sword is going to be effective against impoverished nations teeming with population unless we have something substantial in the way of military power with which to back it up? You might just as well expect a hungry hyena to respect the defenselessness of an unprotected bone. Moreover, we have looked the proudest nation of Asia square in the eyes and we have said to those fighting Japanese, "We will have none of you here. We don't want you within our borders." The Japanese Government professes friendship for America, you say. True enough; but suppose that some fine day the people of Japan should wake up and say to their Government, "We demand from the people of the United States the same treatment which they give to other nations." The Japanese will never be so unreasonable, you think. Won't they? How do you know? In these days the wisest man can't look very far

into the millstone of the future. After all, is it so very unreasonable from the Japanese point of view, I wonder?

We don't know whether or not the Japanese are going to demand the same treatment as other nations for their people who desire to come to this country. But suppose they do make the demand. What is our answer going to be? Shall we let them in as if they were Europeans? Shall we grant them naturalization? Never by my vote, I hope, nor will I arbitrate that question, either; nor will the American people arbitrate that question any more than they will arbitrate the Monroe doctrine. Ask any Member from the Pacific coast whether he will vote to arbitrate the question of Mongolian exclusion. Just ask him and see what he says. As to this philosophy of an international government based on the brotherhood of man, that may come in the sweet by and by, when Californians have learned to intermarry with Chinese and Mississippians have begun to select negroes for their wives.

#### TWO GENTLEMEN OF VIRGINIA.

Three years ago this Committee on Military Affairs carried through the House of Representatives a bill reducing the Army of the United States; and there stands the gentleman who did it—the chairman of this committee. Fortunately the Senate did not pass that bill. I have not forgotten the gentleman's words; neither have I forgotten the words of a certain other gentleman from Virginia, who once upon a time spoke to another resolution of the same sort. Here is that other resolution:

*Resolved*, That the Military and Naval Establishments ought to be reduced.

Listen to what that other gentleman from Virginia said:

With respect to war, we have, thank God, in the Atlantic a fosse wide and deep enough to keep off any immediate danger to our territory. The belligerents know as well as we feel that war is out of the question.

A good many of you have been saying exactly that same thing which that other gentleman from Virginia said. Do you know who he was? He was John Randolph, and what I have just read you came from his utterances in this House on March 22, 1810.

Yet two years afterwards the War of 1812 broke out, the impassable fosse was crossed by a hostile army, and before the war was over the British soldiers had applied the torch to the very Chamber where Randolph made his mad appeal to the mad vanity of his countrymen. "We can lick all creation," "Every thing ready for the drop of the hat," "Trained citizenry leaping to arms"—all the well-known jargon appears in the annals, including the familiar argument that foreign nations would wear each other out and would have no strength left to challenge us.

#### Great Britain—

Says the Revolutionary veteran, Potter, in opposing the militia bill on March 20, 1810—

Great Britain has no men to spare to send here to invade our territory; and if she had, she would know better than to do it. And if France was ever so much disposed to send an army into this country, it would be in vain. She could not send them.

#### ABSOLUTELY UNPREPARED, AS USUAL.

Dawson, of Virginia, on December 13, 1811, arose in his place in this House and solemnly uttered this ghastly folly:

I feel myself authorized to state that we have all the necessaries, all the implements, all the munitions necessary for a three years' close war against any force which any power can send to this continent.

Contrast that with Dolly Madison's account a little later of our rout at Bladensburg and the burning of the White House by Ross, the British general.

#### Alas—

She wrote—

I can descry only groups of military wandering in all directions, as if there was a lack of arms or of spirit to fight for their own fireside.

Make no mistake, there was nothing the matter with those Pennsylvania and Virginia and Maryland militiamen whom Mistress Dolly saw, except that they had not been trained for war.

Six weeks before war was declared John C. Calhoun on May 6, 1812, told Congress:

So far from being unprepared, sir, I believe that in four weeks from the time that a declaration of war is heard on our frontiers the whole of upper and a part of lower Canada will be in our possession.

History does not record that conquest of Canada; but it records the fact that 100 days after Calhoun spoke Detroit was in the hands of the British, mostly because less than 1,000 of the trained citizenry of Ohio and Michigan sprang to the standard of Gen. Hull. Thomas Jefferson, who had written to Duane that—

The acquisition of Canada so far as Quebec will be a mere matter of marching—conveniently called this disaster "the detestable treason of Hull."



## WHY NOT SUMMON GEN. WOTHERSPOON?

Ten weeks ago Maj. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, until recently Chief of Staff of the United States Army, wrote a solemn warning to the Secretary of War in which he gave it as his opinion that the United States is short 405,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 11,210,752 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 1,982 field artillery pieces. Even with unlimited appropriations it must take several years to supply that deficiency. Gen. Wotherspoon's estimate is far higher than any ever before made in the United States; but it is founded on a knowledge of facts which the present European war has developed. Why has he not been summoned as a witness before the Military Committee, I make bold to ask? Twice publicly and once by letter I have asked Chairman HAY to summon Gen. Wotherspoon, and three times Chairman HAY has refused. In my opinion it is unmitigated folly to make up this Army bill without questioning the very witness whose testimony would be of the greatest value.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Certainly.

Mr. McKELLAR. Is there any other military expert in the country who has ever agreed to any of the figures given by Gen. Wotherspoon in his report?

Mr. GARDNER. So far as I know, there is only one who has disagreed and that is Gen. Crozier.

## THE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS.

Now, some gentleman this morning—I think it was the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT]—said that we did not need a standing army of even half a million, much less a million, men. That is the same man of straw which President Wilson set up. Who has said anything about the necessity of a large standing army? I should like to know. Gen. Wotherspoon based his estimates on a standing army of 205,000 men. Any statement to the contrary is simply the exaggeration of persons who seek to throw dust into the eyes of the public so as to obscure the issue. Gen. Wotherspoon estimated that at the outbreak of hostilities with a great nation we ought to have a foundation of 205,000 Regulars, the total available force to be 800,000 men. His view is that we ought to have in this country about 600,000 trained militiamen or national guardsmen and reservists.

In other words, Gen. Wotherspoon feels that when war breaks out this country must be able to draw at once on 600,000 civilians who have had some military training. Adding this number of civilians to the 205,000 Regulars, we arrive at the general's estimate of an army of about 800,000 men.

Now, based on an army of 800,000 men in the early part of a war—that is, before new troops can be trained—800,000 men of more or less military experience, he estimates that an accumulation of certain kinds of munitions of war is imperatively necessary before war breaks out. On page 12 of his report as Chief of Staff United States Army, you will find Gen. Wotherspoon's figures showing what he thinks we ought to have, and likewise his figures showing what as a matter of fact we actually have got. I shall print a table prepared from his figures in connection with this speech.

## RIFLE AMMUNITION.

For instance, he estimates that before war breaks out we ought to accumulate 646,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. Now, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] in his table this morning gives 196,000,000 rounds only as the total amount of rifle ammunition which we need to accumulate. Chairman HAY's figures are Gen. Crozier's figures. They are his personal figures, but the other officers in the War Department do not agree with Gen. Crozier. Those are not the War Department figures, never have been the War Department figures, and if Gen. Crozier gave those figures to your chairman and let him believe that they were the War Department figures, he did very wrong.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, in justice to Gen. Crozier I desire to say that he has always stated that those were his figures, and that a great many Army officers did not agree with him.

Mr. GARDNER. Did he not go further than that?

Mr. HAY. He may have gone further.

Mr. GARDNER. If the gentleman will observe his own remarks this morning, he will find that he spoke of those as the War Department figures. However, the gentleman and I agree, and Gen. Crozier admits that those are not the War Department figures. I will tell you directly what the War Department figures are. I want to put this in the Record.

I think the committee ought to understand—

This is the statement of Gen. Crozier during the recent hearings—

that most officers think that what we have is not enough. I believe that there are other things that are so much more pressing that I do not feel uneasy about this class of military supplies.

That is the only defense for the figures in the table of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY]. The General Staff of the Army has reckoned that we need 513,430,640 rifle cartridges, not to mention some sixty million additional, if our coast-defense force is armed as Infantry. This estimate has been approved by the War Department. Gen. Wotherspoon places the figure at 646,000,000. How much have we actually got? On the 1st of July next we shall have in stock 241,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The testimony of Gen. Crozier is that it would take the entire capacity of the country, public and private, eight months to manufacture 200,000,000. In order to get the proper supply which the General Board believes that we ought to have when war begins we should have to wait pretty nearly a year after war had broken out.

## FIELD ARTILLERY.

Now we come down to the next item, field guns. This chart which I exhibit here shows what we have. And, mind you, we have not one single one of those giant guns to our name. You have been reading about the 42-centimeter howitzers, you have been reading about the 315-millimeter guns, and about the 9-inch guns which Gen. French has. How many of those titanic cannon do you suppose we have? Not one single, solitary one. No movable artillery bigger than a 6-inch gun in our entire military establishment and only 32 of those 6-inch howitzers. We are experimenting in drafting plans for two different sizes of bigger guns. My friends, when you look through the hearings you find that we have been doing nothing but experimenting and drafting and estimating and reporting for many a year. This remark applies to submarines and air craft just as much as it does to giant field artillery. Imagine the United States being always in the experimental stage.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. I want to ask the gentleman about the quantity of rifle ammunition. How long does Gen. Wotherspoon estimate that the 646,000,000 rounds would last?

Mr. GARDNER. That is the accumulation necessary prior to the outbreak of the war. Now, as to how long it will last, that is a very difficult question to answer. If ammunition is fired at the rate it was fired at El Caney, it will last a long time. If it should be fired at the rate our troops fired in China, it will soon be exhausted. We have not very good estimates as to the length of time it would take to exhaust rifle ammunition.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Have you any estimates at all?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. HAY. Will the gentleman allow me to give him the information that we have accumulated as far as we can?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. HAY. The last great war was the Russo-Japanese. For the first six months of that war the Japanese fired 97 rounds per man, and the Russians fired 56 rounds per man. That information comes from a study of that war by the general staff of the British Army.

Mr. GARDNER. Of course Gen. Wotherspoon does not agree with the gentleman, and neither does the General Staff of the United States Army. In the attack on the Forbidden City in Peking a few years ago our troops emptied their belts in 40 minutes, which means that 100 rounds of rifle ammunition per man were fired away in less than three-quarters of an hour. On the other hand, at El Caney our troops in five hours only used up 16 rounds per man.

I am very glad that the gentleman has brought forward the Russo-Japanese War as a basis for comparison. I myself intend to instance that war for a like purpose in connection with my statements as to artillery and artillery ammunition.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Surely; but I have only a few minutes.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York. Is that the estimate of cartridges for 650,000 rifles?

Mr. GARDNER. That is the estimate for 642,541 rifles, according to the report of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York. On the basis of an Army of 800,000 men?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; 205,000 Regulars and the rest reserves and militia. I can not give you the exact figures, but I will put them in the Record.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. I have only 50 minutes, and I can not yield unless the gentleman has something upon this point.

Mr. HOWARD. I simply want to ask the gentleman how long will it take to fire 240,000,000 rounds?

Mr. GARDNER. I have just answered that question. I said it was impossible to judge; it depends upon whether we meet



conditions of warfare where there is a great deal of infantry fire or not.

#### FIELD ARTILLERY.

Now I come to the Field Artillery. Here is what Gen. Wotherspoon estimates that we need: Two thousands eight hundred and thirty-four artillery pieces. We have on hand and in process of manufacture only 852 pieces of artillery. Gen. Wood testified before the fortifications committee last year that the entire capacity of this country, working night and day, is 500 guns in one year.

Gen. Wotherspoon has estimated that we must accumulate 2,834 guns before war breaks out, while the General Staff of the United States Army puts the figure at 1,292 guns. How does this difference arise? Why is it that the General Staff presents one estimate and the Chief of the General Staff quite another? The reason is that the General Staff made its estimate before the European war, and it calculated about three guns to every thousand men in the field army. The war has demonstrated that European armies count on about five guns to a thousand men. On that basis of five guns to every thousand men and on the basis of an army of 800,000 instead of an army of 500,000, the number of guns requisite is increased from 1,292 to 2,834. Russia, by the way, had 6,000 guns a year ago, Germany 5,000 guns, and France 4,800 guns.

Now let us see about the Russo-Japanese War, of which the chairman spoke. How many guns do you suppose Russia had at the Battle of Mukden on the firing line? Twelve hundred and four guns Russia had on the firing line in that one battle alone. How many guns do you suppose that Japan had at the Battle of Mukden? Nine hundred and ninety-two guns. Twice as many as we can turn out in the course of a year with the Government arsenals running full blast and every other private concern in the country running as well. All these figures can be found in the evidence of Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, former Chief of Staff, United States Army, on December 4, 1913, before the Military Affairs Committee, and December 9, 1913, before the fortifications committee.

#### ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

We come now to the question of field-gun ammunition. Gen. Wotherspoon reports that we ought to accumulate 11,000,000 rounds. That seems a large amount. What is the reason for it? The General Staff before the European war estimated that we ought to accumulate 1,713,240 rounds. We have only got on hand and under manufacture 580,000 rounds. But why did Gen. Wotherspoon estimate our necessity at 11,000,000 rounds? Because of the reports from the European war. We are told that the Germans have as a reserve for each gun as many rounds as the gun will fire before becoming worthless. That amounts to about 5,000 rounds for each field gun. Very likely that is why Gen. Wotherspoon estimates 5,000 rounds for each gun instead of 1,800 rounds, which is the estimate made by the General Staff before the war. However, we should know his reasons more definitely if the committee had not refused to summon him.

Probably another reason why Gen. Wotherspoon raised his estimate to 5,000 rounds is that the report of one of our officers in Europe—Lieut. Hunsaker, I think—shows, so I am told, that a certain French battery whose operations he recently noted fired between 500 and 600 shots per gun for four days in succession. Yet the extreme output possible for the United States arsenals is only 1,800 rounds a day. At the rate of that French battery three or four guns could shoot away ammunition as fast as we could supply it.

But suppose we take Gen. Wood's old estimate before the European war of 200 rounds per day for each gun. Even then do you realize that eight guns could shoot away ammunition as fast as Uncle Sam could turn it out, working night and day? Five hundred and eighty thousand rounds for our Artillery ammunition supply! Why, Russia, in one battle alone, the Battle of Mukden, fired away 250,000 rounds—one-half of all that we have got in the whole country on hand and in the making. Yet orators say that we are prepared for war.

#### ARE WE BETTER PREPARED THAN EVER BEFORE?

Some of the gentlemen who oppose any expenditure of money on preparations for our national defense console themselves by the comforting thought that we are better prepared than ever before in our history. Better armed? Perhaps. More secure? Certainly not.

It may be true—in fact, it is true—that we have more reserve artillery, more reserve rifles, and more reserve ammunition than formerly; but how does that fact alone dispose of the question of our security?

Our reserves in material of war may be quite sufficient if we never pick a quarrel with any enemy more dangerous than Huerta and if we never fight a battle more bloody than the

Battle of Vera Cruz in the Second Mexican War. But suppose we should meet a real enemy. The other great nations have been striding forward by furlongs, while we have been crawling along by inches, so far as military progress is concerned. Do you think that the modest increase in our reserve war material justifies the assertion that we are better prepared than ever before?

When he armed himself with a sharp umbrella Tweedledee was satisfied that he was fitter to fight than at any time of his life. So he was, for up to that time he had used his bare fists, and now he had an umbrella; but meanwhile Tweedledum had gotten himself a sword. "There's only one sword, you know," Tweedledum said to his brother; "but you can have the umbrella; it's quite as sharp." Fortunately for Tweedledee the monstrous crow prevented the battle.

#### AIR CRAFT.

After all, I am not so sure that we are better armed than we used to be. If a man is going blind, he is not better armed just because he gets a more accurate rifle. That is just what is happening to our Army. It is going blind. It has no eyes with which to see the enemy. "In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind." So says the General Board of the Navy, and that observation applies to the Army just as much.

Capt. Bristol, head of the air service of the Navy, has compiled some mighty interesting figures which he gave us in his testimony. On July 1, 1914, it appears that France had 1,400 aeroplanes and 22 dirigibles; Russia had 800 aeroplanes and 18 dirigibles, and the other great nations followed suit.

Since the aeroplane was an American invention, perhaps you think that we lead the world in aeroplanes. Well, we do not. We have 11 of them in the Army and 12 in the Navy. None of them are armored. Not more than 2 are of the same type, so it is said.

As to dirigibles, we have not a single solitary specimen, either of the Zeppelin or of any other type. What is more, we are not likely to have any Zeppelins until the American people get upon their hind legs and holler so that the Government deaf-mutes can hear. Zeppelins cost money. Each Zeppelin costs pretty nearly a cool million of dollars, and there is a deal of pretty spending in a million of dollars. Waste it on a gas balloon, indeed! No, thank you; we will be our own gas balloons and we will save that money for increased pay where the votes grow thickest. This bill gives the Army air service the magnificent sum of \$300,000 this year. I hope that our airmen will feel duly grateful, but they can not buy half a Zeppelin with the whole of the money.

#### MORE SOLDIERS FOR THE TRENCHES.

When all is said and done, Mr. Chairman, we finally come down to certain facts: Ammunition and field guns are vital enough, but the first thing to be done is to get more men and a better organization. We do not need a big Regular Army, but we need a Regular Army a good deal bigger than we have now. Gen. Wotherspoon's estimate of 205,000 is worth examining.

I do not say that Gen. Wotherspoon is right in asking for 205,000 men. Very likely he is right, but what we need is a commission to examine into this whole question, a commission which will summon young officers and young enlisted men and say to them, "How long do you think it takes to make a good artilleryman? How long do you think it takes to make a good infantryman?" That is what I want—to find out what the younger men think about things. We ought not to base our views entirely on what these graybeards think. It stands to reason that each one of them is pretty nearly bound to defend his own department. Take, for instance, Gen. Crozier. He has been for 13 years sitting in his chair as the head of the Bureau of Ordnance. I should like to find out what the younger officers of the Bureau of Ordnance think.

#### THE NAVY FIRST OF ALL.

Our first line of defense, of course, must be the Navy. That stands to reason. If I had \$200,000,000 extra to spend to-day on the Nation's defense, I should probably spend about \$160,000,000 of it on the Navy.

But the battle fleet may be defeated or it may be engaged in defending the Panama Canal at the very moment when a hostile base is being established 2,000 miles away—that is, supposing the enemy is England, because no other nation is strong enough on the ocean to divide its fleet. If once the enemy lands and establishes a base, nothing can stop him except long lines of infantrymen in trenches.

How long a battle front do you think that our entire field Army, Regulars and Militia, could cover? On the old Civil War basis of 5,000 men to the mile, our men, if all the militia were



to turn up, could cover the paltry distance of 30 miles. We have in our militia—or National Guard, as it is called—120,000 men. Of this number last year 23,000 failed to present themselves for annual inspection. Thirty-one thousand absented themselves from the annual encampment, and 44,000 of those armed with rifles—and only 111,000 are armed with rifles—44,000 never appeared on the rifle range from one year's end to the other. Talk about drawing on the citizenry and their leaping to arms! Let me tell you, gentlemen, that 16 of the States of this Union failed to supply their quota of troops in the Spanish War. Some of them only failed by a few men, but 16 of the States of this Union did not supply the entire quota which they were called upon to supply.

Now, do not tell me that an army of 200,000 Regulars is undemocratic and is likely to oppress the people. That is all demagogic rubbish. Two hundred thousand men can not oppress a country of a hundred million population. That would mean that 1 soldier could terrorize 500 people. Why, it is folly to suggest such a thing, even if the rank and file of the United States Army were willing to go into the oppressing business, which would not be the case. If anyone thinks that 1 armed soldier can terrorize 500 Americans—men, women, and children—let him now speak or forever hereafter hold his peace.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF HUMILITY.

O you preachers of the doctrine of national humility, if any one of you for a moment thinks that the people of this country agree with you that we ought to be undefended, I should be glad to have you accompany me on my speaking tour in March and debate the question with me on the same platform. A few minutes observation of your audiences would convince you of your mistake. I know what I am talking about, for I have already tried several experiments in that line. I am not eloquent. I have not even the sublime gift of the gab. Hitherto I have never been able to make an audience applaud me more than a small fraction of a small second. Hitherto I never in my life felt the glowing consciousness that an audience wanted me to continue. But on this question of the national defense I have got my audiences going as if I were William Jennings Bryan talking prohibition to a convention of patent medicine dealers. Never before in my life have I had applause as if my audience were paid a dollar a clap, and I confess I like the new sensation. So I just give fair warning that if any one of you pacific Members of Congress wants to challenge me to a joint debate in the month of March before any audience—black, white, yellow, or pink—I am at your service, and you will not have to give me any gate receipts or honorarium or any other of the 57 different varieties of high-brow pickings, either.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

[From the New York Herald, Sunday, January 17, 1915.]

"NO MILLION ARMY IN NIGHT," SAYS SECRETARY GARRISON—WAR SECRETARY REPLIES TO MR. BRYAN WITH POWERFUL PLEA FOR MOBILE FORCE—"NO ALARM, BUT UNPREPAREDNESS IS DANGEROUS," HE TELLS REPUBLICAN CLUB—NEEDS 350,000 MORE MEN FOR FIRST EMERGENCY.

With the assertion that a volunteer army raised in the United States in existing conditions would be nothing more than a rabble and a mob, Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, at a luncheon in the Republican Club yesterday answered the declaration of William J. Bryan, Secretary of State, that if the President called at nightfall for an army of 1,000,000 they would be ready the following morning.

Although Mr. Garrison did not at any time mention the name of the Secretary of State, his earnest plea for the upbuilding of an efficient Army reserve, the extension of military training into the universities, colleges, and military schools of the country, and the maintenance of a Navy that will be nearly as possible unconquerable was accepted by his auditors as a direct answer to Mr. Bryan's address before the Bar Association at Baltimore, Md., on December 8.

The other speakers at the luncheon were Henry L. Stimson, formerly Secretary of War; the Rev. John Haynes Holmes, an advocate of international peace; and Col. William Cary Sanger, formerly Assistant Secretary of War.

"The Army has no business in politics, and politics has no business in the Army," said Mr. Garrison, the subject of whose address was "The military needs of our country." He continued:

"There is no topic that can have a more vital importance to the people of the country than this one. What is it specifically that we should consider? All government of necessity is founded upon force. There was never a time in the history of our country when we were so well situated to sit back and give calm, deliberate consideration to this question.

#### "PREPAREDNESS A VITAL ISSUE.

"We have now a clear atmosphere in which to study the subject of national preparedness and then quietly, persistently, but very vigorously to carry out the program that could be and should be evolved. It is a subject that goes to the vital core of your national life.

"We Americans are a very proud people, unaggressive, coveting nothing that other people have. We think we are a peaceable people within our own confines, yet the Army of the United States has been used one hundred times putting down insurrection or riot within our own borders.

"This is not militarism that I suggest. I don't think there is a man in the country who could look you straight in the face and term it militarism. But certain things are settled in this country forever. The separation of church and State, for instance, in this country is settled forever. The civil power is forever in this country above the military, except in time of war.

"And it is in these circumstances that I come before you with all the earnestness there is in me to tell you that you must keep on considering this subject gravely and carefully and fully until you have provided for an adequate common defense.

"There is no occasion for alarm. There is no occasion for hysteria. Yet it is true that, after all the provision necessary for the proper defense of our coast line and territorial possessions have been made, there is left in the United States Army less than 25,000 men to form a mobile force, a force that may be sent from place to place to meet an invading force.

"The people are not alone to blame for this. The Federal Government has not done its part in carrying out the program that has been laid down by the Army Board. The Federal Government is from 10,000 to 12,000 men short of the necessity for supplying the required coast defense.

#### "REGIMENTS NOW ONLY SKELETONS.

"The militia of the country has not done more than 40 per cent of its part in carrying out that program. All of the regiments in the mobile Army of the United States are skeletonized; that is, we have in them 820 men, whereas, under war footing, they should be composed of 1,063 men. What we must understand is that the wastes of war are so great that we must have reserves.

"A great standing army is not necessary unless you are unwise enough to fail to take the other precautions that are absolutely necessary and essential. This is not the time to start some grand new scheme or system that will be investigated and under discussion so long that we will never attain it."

Mr. Garrison outlined his recent recommendations that 25,000 additional men be enlisted for service in the Army, and then continued:

"We need now 1,000 new officers, and they must be efficient officers. We have on paper 118,000 national guardsmen and 9,000 officers. Yet the National Guard is still far from what it should be. The fault is not with the National Guard. The fault is with you who have never given the subject 15 minutes' intelligent thought unless it was forced on you.

"We have not honored the national guardsmen and looked upon them as men doing a patriotic duty, but we have regarded them as men who went into the service to wear a uniform and as much gold lace as they could, and to have the girls look at them. It is time we changed our attitude.

"We have got to have material. We must have infinitely more rifles than we have men; we must have infinitely more artillery than we have, and have to have infinitely more of the other reserves that can not be made overnight.

#### "MUST ENLIGHTEN THE PUBLIC.

"Back of our Army and the National Guard comes the great unformed and uninformed public of the United States. They must be taught to look upon the Army and the militia in a different light. Until you realize the Army of the United States is a public servant you have not begun to get the proper conception of the purposes or the accomplishments of the Army.

"We have an idea in this country that when a man becomes an American citizen, either by birth or by adoption, he develops into a sort of superman. You think that things don't happen to him as they happen to other allied peoples over the world. The man is not different. Because we have blundered through four or five wars we seem to think that we are possessed of a God-given inherent knowledge of the subject of war. Well, we are not.

"I believe it would be a wonderful thing if in the United States we could have the truth told in all our schools. Why should we shrink from that? I am not in favor at this time of doing anything compulsory. I don't think we'll have to do anything compulsory. You couldn't compel the American people to do anything unless you got them to thinking about it, and if we get them thinking about it they will do it themselves."

Here Mr. Garrison outlined the establishment of a reserve army after the manner suggested by him in his recent department report, by the utilization of discharged soldiers and Army officers who have resigned from the service for one cause or another. "What I want in this country," he continued, "is to be able to get a specific number of men at a specific place in a specific unit when they are needed.

"There is another thing we want. We want the universities, the colleges, and the military schools to study this subject and teach it, so that we may have, when we want them, men that are trained and are disciplined as they should be. For a first emergency in this country we would want 350,000 men more than there are men in the standing army and the National Guard to-day. When we get them they would be, in present conditions, a rabble and a mob, utterly useless unless we have got enough efficient officers to mold them into an efficient force."

#### SPEECH CALLS FOR CONGRATULATIONS.

During all of his speech Mr. Garrison was interrupted by applause, and for half an hour after the speaking ended he was forced to remain in the dining room receiving the congratulations of the club members.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE,  
Washington City, February 2, 1904.

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER,  
House of Representatives.

SIR: Referring to your letter of the 28th ultimo, received the 30th, in which you inquire what States or Territories in 1898 failed to furnish their quota of troops under the first call until after the second call was issued; what States or Territories failed to furnish their entire quota under the second call; whether any States or Territories failed to furnish, sooner or later, any part of their quota under the first call; and what were the dates of the two calls, respectively, I am directed by the Secretary of War to advise you as follows:

Under the authority conferred upon him by the joint resolution of April 20 and the act of April 22, 1898, the President issued a proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling for volunteers to the number of 125,000 men, to be apportioned, as far as practicable, among the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, according to population.

May 25, 1898, the President issued a proclamation calling for an additional force of 75,000 men.

I inclose herewith a table showing the quotas originally assigned to each of the States and Territories under the two calls for volunteers referred to above, also the total number of officers and men accounted for on the muster-out rolls of organizations from the respective States and Territories in service during the War with Spain.



It is impracticable to determine how many of these men were furnished under the first call and how many were furnished under the second call. Many of the men who were furnished under the later call were assigned to organizations already in service under the first call, and it can not, therefore, be assumed that all the members of a particular organization were furnished under the earlier call because that organization was furnished under that call. The number of men furnished under the second call who served in organizations furnished under the first call can not be definitely determined without an examination of the records of many thousand men.

Very respectfully,

F. C. AINSWORTH,  
Chief Record and Pension Office.

Table showing quotas originally assigned to and troops furnished by the several States and Territories during the War with Spain.

States and Territories.	Quotas originally assigned.			Total number accounted for on muster-out rolls.
	Call of April 23, 1898.	Call of May 25, 1898.	Total.	
Alabama.....	2,500	1,500	4,000	4,022
Arkansas.....	2,025	1,215	3,240	2,836
California.....	3,257	1,942	5,199	5,819
Colorado.....	1,324	795	2,119	1,437
Connecticut.....	1,607	965	2,572	3,251
Delaware.....	341	204	545	1,028
District of Columbia.....	449	270	719	990
Florida.....	750	450	1,200	1,350
Georgia.....	3,174	1,905	5,079	4,383
Idaho.....	239	139	378	728
Illinois.....	8,048	4,829	12,877	13,647
Indiana.....	4,302	2,581	6,883	7,423
Iowa.....	3,772	2,264	6,036	5,694
Kansas.....	2,787	1,672	4,459	5,024
Kentucky.....	3,408	2,045	5,453	5,614
Louisiana.....	1,940	1,164	3,104	2,916
Maine.....	1,256	753	2,009	1,893
Maryland.....	1,942	1,165	3,107	2,711
Massachusetts.....	4,721	2,834	7,555	7,113
Michigan.....	4,360	2,622	6,981	6,841
Minnesota.....	2,873	1,723	4,596	5,380
Mississippi.....	2,157	1,295	3,452	3,161
Missouri.....	5,411	3,246	8,657	8,410
Montana.....	537	313	850	1,132
Nebraska.....	2,411	1,448	3,859	4,046
Nevada.....	141	82	223	522
New Hampshire.....	752	452	1,204	1,369
New Jersey.....	2,962	1,778	4,740	5,501
New York.....	12,514	7,508	20,022	20,864
North Carolina.....	2,584	1,551	4,135	3,961
North Dakota.....	473	276	749	719
Ohio.....	7,248	4,348	11,596	14,255
Oregon.....	829	498	1,327	1,570
Pennsylvania.....	10,769	6,462	17,231	17,448
Rhode Island.....	710	426	1,136	1,654
South Carolina.....	1,850	1,110	2,960	2,618
South Dakota.....	766	449	1,215	1,134
Tennessee.....	3,060	1,836	4,896	6,266
Texas.....	4,229	2,538	6,767	6,765
Utah.....	434	255	689	578
Vermont.....	634	379	1,013	1,044
Virginia.....	2,787	1,672	4,459	5,223
Washington.....	1,178	708	1,886	1,854
West Virginia.....	1,389	834	2,223	2,694
Wisconsin.....	3,274	1,965	5,239	5,453
Wyoming.....	235	138	373	476
Arizona.....				
New Mexico.....				
Oklahoma.....				
Indian Territory.....				
Total.....	125,256	75,000	200,256	210,137

<sup>1</sup> This does not include general officers and staff and United States Volunteers.

#### ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., November 15, 1914.

To the PRESIDENT.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this department during the past year:

The reports of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Coast Artillery; the reports of the heads of bureaus of the War Department; the reports of the Superintendent of the Military Academy, of the governor of Porto Rico, of the governor of the Panama Canal, of the commissioners of the four military parks, all of which accompany this report, give in abundant detail all of the transactions and recommendations in their respective spheres. I have reached the conclusion that it is useless repetition to follow the practice of repeating in my report the details so much more fully dealt with in the respective reports above referred to.

In these reports there are certain things of great interest and importance which should be specially noted, among them—

That the health of the Army has been exceptionally good. The last year has afforded the lowest recorded non-effective rate in the history of the Army; a reduction of nearly 20 per cent in non-effectiveness from sickness and injury has resulted. There were only four cases of typhoid fever in the Army, including the Philippine Scouts. Two of these were cases of recruits of four and five days' service, respectively, who had not been immunized. Venereal diseases have decreased about 25 per cent. The rate for alcoholism is the lowest since 1873. The health of troops in camps over a long period of time has been extraordinarily good on account of the high efficiency of camp sanitation.

That the system of disciplinary companies which has been established bids fair to be very successful.

That a large part of the Army has been occupied in actual field service at Galveston, Vera Cruz, all along the Mexican border, and in Colorado and Arkansas. The character of this duty in each instance

was similar and was of an exceedingly difficult kind, in some respects even more difficult than actual warfare. It called for patience, self-control, discretion, and good judgment under very trying conditions, and required implicit obedience to orders—a prime military necessity. The fact that this duty was everywhere done in an exceptional manner and without untoward incident is gratifying in the highest degree and deserves recognition as difficult service extremely well rendered. Of a somewhat similar character was the work carried on in Europe by the officers sent over to aid the Americans marooned there because of the European war. Their service was done in a manner to reflect credit on themselves and the Army, and it is reckoned as of similar high character to that just mentioned.

The student camps were very successful and bid fair to be more so, and undoubtedly can and should be developed into a most valuable assistance.

At the session of Congress just closed the bill to provide for raising volunteers was passed. It is, of course, possible and probable that in minor details some slight corrections may have to be made therein, but on the whole it is probably the most important piece of military legislation which has been dealt with by Congress for many years past.

I am pleased to note that there has been a decrease in the number and percentage of desertions.

With respect to matters which do not relate to the military establishment as such, certain developments of importance occurred during the past year.

The matter of the proper handling of dams built in navigable streams by private capital, and the regulation of water power developed thereat and also at dams built by the Government itself, received careful and continued consideration at my hands, and, in cooperation with committees of Congress, a bill to deal with this subject was prepared. The House of Representatives passed a bill, and it is understood that the Senate at the coming session intends to take the same up with the determination of completing the legislation. The matter is one of supreme importance and should be speedily settled.

The matter of providing a more autonomous and better balanced government in Porto Rico received like consideration, and a bill for that purpose is being dealt with by the committees of each House.

A bill to extend the scope of self-government in the Philippine Islands was likewise given much consideration by the department, and the House has passed a measure, and it is now before the Senate, and there is every indication that it purposes having it considered by the proper committee with a view to passage at the coming session.

A complete organization of the government of the Panama Canal was prepared and put into effect on the 1st day of April, 1914.

For the purpose of enabling those who are interested to ascertain the various activities of the department I have annexed a table Appendix A, by reference to which it can be immediately learned in what reports a detailed discussion of various subjects can be found.

At the end of this report will be found Appendix B, containing a statement of the expenditures, appropriations, and estimates.

This, then, leaves for consideration the imminent questions of military policy; the considerations which, in my view, should be taken into account in determining the same; and the suggestions which occur to me to be pertinent in the circumstances.

It would be premature to attempt now to draw the ultimate lessons from the war in Europe. It is an imperative duty, however, to heed so much of what it brings home to us as is incontrovertible and not to be changed by any event, leaving for later and more detailed and comprehensive consideration what its later developments and final conclusions may indicate.

For orderly treatment certain preliminary considerations may be usefully adverted to. It is, of course, not necessary to dwell on the blessings of peace and the horrors of war. Everyone desires peace, just as everyone desires health, contentment, affection, sufficient means for comfortable existence, and other similarly beneficent things. But peace and the other states of being just mentioned are not always or even often solely within one's own control. Those who are thoughtful and have courage face the facts of life, take lessons from experience, and strive by wise conduct to attain the desirable things, and by provision and precaution to protect and defend them when obtained. It may truthfully be said that eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid in order to obtain the desirable things of life and to defend them.

In collective affairs the interests of the group are confided to the Government, and it thereupon is charged with the duty to preserve and defend these things. The Government must exercise for the Nation the precautionary, defensive, and preservative measures necessary to that end. All Governments must therefore have force—physical force, i. e., military force—for these purposes. The question for each nation when this matter is under consideration is, How much force should it have and of what should that force consist?

In the early history of our Nation there was a natural, almost inevitable, abhorrence of military force, because it connoted military despotism. Most, if not all, of the early settlers in this country came from nations where a few powerful persons tyrannically imposed their will upon the people by means of military power. The consequence was that the oppressed who fled to this country necessarily connected military force with despotism, and had a dread thereof. Of course all this has long since passed into history. No reasonable person in this country to-day has the slightest shadow of fear of military despotism, nor of any interference whatever by military force in the conduct of civil affairs. The military and the civil are just as completely and permanently separated in this country as the church and the state are; the subjection of the military to the civil is settled and unchangeable. The only reason for adverting to the obsolete condition is to anticipate the action of those who will cite from the works of the founders of the Republic excerpts showing a dread of military ascendancy in our Government. Undoubtedly at the time such sentiments were expressed there was a very real dread. At the present time such expressions are entirely inapplicable and do not furnish even a presentable pretext for opposing proper military preparation.

It also seems proper, in passing, to refer to the frame of mind of those who use the word "militarism" as the embodiment of the doctrine of brute force and loosely apply it to any organized preparation of military force, and therefore deprecate any adequate military preparation because it is a step in the direction of the contemned "militarism." It is perfectly apparent to anyone who approaches the matter with an unprejudiced mind that what constitutes undesirable militarism, as distinguished from a necessary, proper, and adequate preparation of the military resources of the Nation, depends upon the position in which each nation finds itself and varies with every nation and with different conditions in each nation at different times. Every nation must have adequate force to protect itself from domestic insurrections, to enforce its laws, and to repel invasions; that is, every



nation that has similar characteristics to those of a self-respecting man. (The Constitution obliges the United States to protect each State against invasion.) If it prepares and maintains more military force than is necessary for the purposes just named, then it is subject to the conviction, in the public opinion of the world, of having embraced "militarism," unless it intends aggression for a cause which the public opinion of the world conceives to be a righteous one. To the extent, however, that it confines its military preparedness to the purposes first mentioned, there is neither warrant nor justification in characterizing such action as "militarism." Those who would thus characterize it do so because they have reached the conclusion that a nation to-day can properly dispense with a prepared military force, and therefore they apply the word to any preparation or organization of the military resources of the nation. Not being able to conceive how a reasonable, prudent, patriotic man can reach such a conclusion, I can not conceive any arguments or statements that would alter such a state of mind. It disregards all known facts, flies in the face of all experience, and must rest upon faith in that which has not yet been made manifest.

Equally useless, in my view, is the discussion frequently indulged in as to whether military preparation tends or does not tend to avoid war. I term such discussion useless, because, so far as we are concerned, whatever conclusion might be reached thereon would not affect our duty. Since it is not in mind to suggest any military preparation of the Nation's resources beyond that absolutely essential under existing conditions, the question of whether more extensive preparation for the purpose of avoiding war would have that effect or not is futile. Unless this Nation has reached the conclusion that it has no need for the preparation of its military resources for the purposes I have above enumerated, then we must earnestly address ourselves to the question of such proper preparation. I have reached no such conclusion, and in fact am of the firm conviction that no reasonable, prudent man who faces facts could reach such a conclusion. Unless and until the Congress of the United States, representing the people of the country, places on record the conclusion of the people to the contrary, my duty is, I think, entirely clear; and that duty is to set forth the facts and the necessities growing out of the facts and suggestions as to the ways and means of fulfilling such necessities.

Whatever the future may hold in the way of agreements between nations, followed by actual disarmament thereof, of international courts of arbitration, and other greatly to be desired measures to lessen or prevent conflict between nation and nation, we all know that at present these conditions are not existing. We can and will eagerly adapt ourselves to each beneficent development along these lines; but to merely enfeeble ourselves in the meantime would, in my view, be unthinkable folly. By neglecting and refusing to provide ourselves with the necessary means of self-protection and self-defense we could not hasten or in any way favorably influence the ultimate results we desire in these respects.

What, then, does this Nation need in the way of military preparedness? Of course I am not attempting to lay down a counsel of perfection—that is, an extensive scheme which is ideal in its completeness. Such a scheme might well be considered and studied and adopted after long study. But to await the result of such a course would be to continue the undesirable situation in which we have so long been. In my view, it is much better to do those things which lie nearest at hand and can be done than to remain as we are, without moving along proper lines until a more comprehensive and perfect scheme can be agreed upon. Nothing done along the lines I am about to suggest will interfere with the carrying out of a more comprehensive and maturely developed plan, but, on the contrary, will fit into it exactly.

Let us approach the question by a brief consideration of certain facts necessary to be considered in reaching a proper conclusion:

In continental United States we have a territory consisting of 3,026,780 square miles, with a population of 98,781,324. In Alaska we have 590,884 square miles, with a population of 64,356. Our other territorial responsibilities which must be considered are: The Panama Canal, where, although the population is small, we have an investment of \$400,000,000, and the destruction of which waterway would be an international calamity; Hawaii, with 6,449 square miles and a population of 191,909; Porto Rico, with 3,606 square miles and a population of 1,118,012; the Philippine Islands, with 127,800 square miles and a population of 7,635,426, together with certain other islands not necessary to be considered in this connection.

The Regular Army of the United States on June 30, 1914, consisted of 4,701 officers and 87,781 men (includes Quartermaster Corps, 3,809, and Hospital Corps, 4,055). Of these, 758 officers and 17,901 men belong to the Coast Artillery, and are therefore practically stationary in coast defenses; 1,008 officers and 18,434 men belong to the staff, technical and noncombatant branches of the Army, including recruits and men engaged in recruiting. This leaves the Army which can be moved from place to place—that is, the mobile army, so called—composed of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men.

At that time the various characters of troops were disposed of approximately as follows:

In the Philippines, 3½ regiments Infantry, 2 regiments Cavalry, 1 regiment Field Artillery, 2 companies Engineers, 11 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength, 9,572). In the Hawaiian Islands, 3 regiments Infantry, 1 regiment Cavalry, 1 regiment Field Artillery, 1 company Engineers, 8 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength, 8,195). In the Canal Zone, 1 regiment Infantry, 3 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength, 2,179). In China, 2 battalions Infantry (aggregate strength, 849). In Alaska, 1 regiment Infantry (aggregate strength, 862). In Vera Cruz, 4 regiments Infantry, 2 troops Cavalry, 1 battalion Field Artillery, 1 company Engineers (aggregate strength, 4,090). In Porto Rico, a 2-battalion regiment Infantry (strength, 707). In United States, 17 regiments Infantry, 11½ regiments Cavalry, 3½ regiments Field Artillery, 2 battalions Engineers, 148 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength, 64,579). Troops en route and officers at other foreign stations, 1,449.

Practically all these organizations in the United States are on what is known as a peace footing, which means that an Infantry company, which upon a war footing should have 150 men, now has 65 men; a Cavalry troop, which upon a war footing should have 100 men, now has 71 men; an Artillery battery, which upon a war footing should have 190 men, now has 133 men. The Coast Artillery companies are always kept on a war footing of 104 men each.

In addition to work with the troops themselves, the officers of the Army are called upon to do a great variety of work known as detached service. For instance, the Engineers have 66 officers detached for river and harbor work, and the other branches of the Army have 578 officers of the line detached for service in training the Organized Militia of the several States, on duty at schools, recruiting, etc.

As a result, scarcely any unit in the Army ever has its proper complement of officers, and the need for an increase of officers is urgent

and imperative. In continental United States we had in the mobile army on June 30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.

We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in time of war—consisting of 16 men.

The Organized Militia of the various States totals 8,323 officers and 119,087 men. The enlisted men thereof are required, in order to obtain the financial aid which the Congress authorizes the Secretary of War to extend under certain conditions, to attend 24 drills a year and five days annually in the field. If all of the National Guard could be summoned in the event of war and should all respond—an inconceivable result—and if they were all found fairly efficient in the first line—that is, the troops who would be expected to immediately take the field—we could summon a force in this country of Regulars and National Guard amounting to 9,818 officers and 148,492 men.

And this is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be volunteers; and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready would take, at the smallest possible estimate, six months.

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest.

With respect to reserve matériel, one or two obvious things had perhaps better be stated. This matériel, of course, can not be quickly improvised. It requires long periods of time to produce; it is the absolute essential of modern warfare, and must be kept on hand if emergencies are to be prepared for. We have on hand in reserve sufficient small arms, small-arm ammunition, and equipment, roughly figuring, for the 500,000 men that would have to be called into the field in any large emergency. We have nothing like sufficient artillery and artillery ammunition. This has been urgently presented in all of the recent reports of the head of this department and the Chiefs of Staff, and Congress has from time to time recently increased the appropriations for these purposes. There is universal agreement among all who know that artillery is an essential feature of modern warfare, and that a proper proportion thereof to any army is indispensable if success is to be even hoped for. It is imperative that the manufacture of artillery and artillery ammunition should progress as rapidly as is possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained.

In present-day strategy and tactics the Aviation Corps has bid fair to become the eyes of the Army, and a general commanding an army without an adequate flying corps against an army of equal strength in other respects but with an adequate flying corps would be in the position of a blind man contending against a man with sight. The present Congress made a good start toward putting aviation on a substantial basis. This work should be followed up and consistently pressed.

The universal utilization of motor transportation in the present war has vastly increased the mobility of armies. It is necessary that we keep abreast of the times in utilizing motor vehicles for Army transportation. It might be well worth while to devise ways and means of organizing into a volunteer motor transportation reserve the motor vehicles adaptable to military use now in the hands of private citizens.

We now come to the question of what, then, should we presently do, in view of the existing conditions and considerations. That we are below any proper standard or minimum in this respect is conceded. I have adverted briefly, in what I have heretofore said, to our situation in this regard concerning matériel. I have not, of course, burdened this report with the details. The reports of the Chiefs of Staff and of Ordnance go into this matter with particularity.

We will therefore next address ourselves to personnel.

The first question is whether the proper remedy is to so largely increase the standing Army as to constantly have under arms a military force of sufficient size to meet our contemplated needs. What shall be concluded in this respect after the mature and comprehensive study which I have suggested should be made of the subject must, of course, be left for the present. Following the lines that I have laid down for myself, which are to deal now only with those things which clearly should be done now, I do not advocate any such considerable increase as would probably result from the comprehensive study suggested.

For the purpose of information the following table is presented showing the area, population, and military resources on a peace and war footing of other nations in comparison with ours:

Land forces of various countries.				
	Area (square miles).	Popula- tion.	Peace strength.	Total trained war strength.
Germany.....	208,830	64,903,423	620,000	4,000,000
France.....	207,054	38,961,945	560,000	3,000,000
Russia.....	8,647,657	160,095,200	1,200,000	4,500,000
Great Britain and colonies.....	11,467,294	396,294,752	254,500	1,800,000
Italy.....	110,550	32,475,253	275,000	1,200,000
Austria-Hungary.....	261,035	49,418,596	360,000	2,000,000
Japan.....	147,655	53,875,390	230,000	1,200,000
Turkey.....	1,186,874	35,764,876	420,000	1,200,000
Spain.....	194,783	19,503,008	115,000	300,000
Switzerland.....	15,976	3,741,971	140,000	275,000
Sweden.....	172,876	5,476,441	75,000	400,000
Belgium.....	11,373	7,074,910	42,000	180,000
United States (including Philip- pine Scouts).....	3,026,789	98,781,324	97,760	* 225,170

\* Excluding native army, 160,000.

\* Including Organized Militia and Philippine Scouts.

Whatever else may properly be drawn from the facts as disclosed, it can not be disputed that it is imperative that we have in this country a very much larger percentage of men who have had proper military training and who are in a position to instantly respond to the call of the Nation. Of the troops that we now have, the numbers and organizations of which are shown above, it will be necessary in the very near future to take from the United States and put in the Philippine Islands 13 companies of Coast Artillery, 1,950 men; in the Hawaiian Islands, 3 regiments of Infantry, 1 battalion of Field Artillery, and 2 companies of Coast Artillery, 6,380 men; and in the Panama Canal Zone, 1 regiment of Infantry, 1 squadron of Cavalry, 1 battalion of Field Artillery, 1 company of Engineers, and 12 companies of Coast



Artillery, 4,774 men. I may say in this connection that I do not consider the Panama Canal Zone garrison sufficient, even when these contemplated additions are made. This will then leave in the United States proper 12,610 Coast Artillery troops and 24,602 of the mobile arm, the latter being then not much more than twice the size of the police force of the city of New York.

My recommendation of what we should immediately do is to fill up the existing organizations which compose the aggregate mobile Army force just mentioned to their full strength. This would require 25,000 men. In addition to the enlisted men just mentioned, we should be authorized to obtain 1,000 more officers. The legislation to accomplish these purposes would be of the very simplest character, being merely authorizations to the department to do these things.

On June 30, 1914, 20.43 per cent of the line officers of the Army were away from their commands. This results in depleting the proper quota of instructors in the Army. The instruction of the Organized Militia suffers woefully from the lack of officers available for service with the militia. Efficient officers, above all things, can not be improvised. Depending, as we are, upon a small regular force, and contemplating a large expansion in time of war, it is essential that we at least should not permit the number of officers to fall below that number which is absolutely requisite for the proper performance of current military duties.

An increase of the enlisted personnel of the Army by 25,000 men would accomplish threefold results. It would, as before mentioned, bring up to full strength the existing units of the mobile Army in continental United States and thus supply a more adequate force. Second, it would afford training for the officers in the command of such units as they must command in time of war and would prevent, as far as the Regular Army is concerned, the crowding of the ranks with raw levies which always disorganize and render inefficient the organizations into which they come. Third, it would be a wise investment from the standpoint of economy, in that no material increase of overhead charges would be necessary, and the addition of these men could be effected at a per capita cost to the Government of about one-third the per capita cost under existing conditions. Since the existing physical plant and the administrative organization would not have to be in any way increased to take care of this increased force, the only additional expense would be the clothing, feeding, and paying thereof.

By the time these 25,000 men could be procured the mobile forces in the United States, as hereinbefore pointed out, would number 24,602; so that after the addition the mobile Army in continental United States would consist of 49,602 men.

With the Army thus increased, we would then be able to undertake the next necessity, which is absolutely imperative, and that is the preparation of a reserve. The present legislation with respect to a reserve has proven utterly useless for the purpose, it having produced in 24 months only 16 men, and there is little or no hope that it will ever properly accomplish its purpose. The reasons why it will not do so it is not profitable to discuss.

Again, without attempting to wait until perfection has been reached, it seems to me that it is only the part of wisdom to do that which we know will produce a beneficial result, and one that approximates the best. I am firmly convinced that if we can use the standing Army as a school through which to pass men who come into it, with the knowledge that if they are proficient they can be discharged at any time after a year or 18 months, we will begin at once to build up the necessary reserve, and will, for the first time in the military history of this country, have something approximating a balanced organization. There is unfortunately opposition to this policy. I say "unfortunately" because it is always the part of wisdom, it seems to me, to select the best that is possible, out of what is obtainable, rather than to reject that obtainable best because it is not perfect. Some of the opposition is on economical grounds, and, in my view, should not be determinative if the other considerations that I have noted are true. Other of the opposition is based upon the idea that one year or 18 months is not sufficient to train a soldier. As to this, it is a curious exhibition of mental operations to realize that those who make this argument and who have to acknowledge that those reserves we must depend upon volunteers, are constantly asserting that we can safely rely upon volunteers because they can be thoroughly trained in six months. It is furthermore true that by intensive military training, any young man of good health and average mentality can be made a serviceable soldier in 12 months, and, in fact, has been so made. This has been tried abroad, and I have caused it to be tried under my own administration and inspection. Even if there were doubt about it, it would not cause a different conclusion to be reached by a reasonable man, because we certainly would be better off with a reserve of men who had had one year's training than we are without any reserve at all and having to depend, as we do, upon men who have never had any training whatever. I caused, about a year ago, recruits, as they came in, and without selection, to be organized into a battery of Artillery, a troop of Cavalry, and a company of Infantry; and from my own observation and from the reports of experts, each of these units, well within a year, was found proficient to a very high degree.

I am therefore firmly convinced that we should have immediate legislation dealing with the matter of enlistment and reserve. I am not so much concerned with the length of the enlistment, provided the Secretary of War is given power to discharge into the reserve, at the end of 12 months, those who have shown themselves proficient up to a required standard.

A practically similar provision should exist in every State which maintains an Organized Militia. It is just as essential that the Organized Militia should have a proper reserve to fill up its ranks as it is that the Regular Army should. Of course I have been viewing this in the light of its military necessity. But there is a concomitant advantage which should not be overlooked. Inquiry among those who have employed men who have been discharged with good records from the Army shows that they esteem them as among their very best employees; and there is no doubt that any community would be economically benefited by the presence in it of strong, vigorous young men who have learned, in the only school which really teaches—that is, experience—the qualities of self-control, obedience to discipline, and determination to carry out the task which has been set for one.

I am convinced with equal firmness that we should adopt some one or more of the methods which have been suggested for the training of more civilians to become officers in case of necessity. The potentiality of the student military camps and of the schools and colleges at which military training is obtainable suggests a fruitful source of accomplishing this purpose.

I realize that one of the matters which will be much debated in connection with this whole subject will be the matter of expense. I do not

overlook this, but shall not attempt extensively to go into it here. I do think, however, that those who are charged with responsibility on behalf of the public should realize the greatness of that responsibility; should realize the unanswerable indictment that will lie against them if they shrink from incurring expense for what is vital to the Nation. When one has reached the conclusion, as I have, that a minimum of military preparedness is essential, the question of its cost is secondary and can not be permitted to be the determining factor. No citizen will or can properly object to the expenditure of money for vital national purposes.

Comparisons between costs of military establishments here and abroad will not result, as they usually do, in assuming an unwarranted expenditure for those purposes here, if the factors necessary to be considered are kept in mind. Briefly, these factors are: The vast distances in this country; the smallness of the number of our troops, which makes it necessary to move them from place to place when troops are required; the upkeep of numerous posts in various States; and the absolute demand of the American citizen, whether in private or public life, that he should be fed, clothed, and compensated in a manner unexampled in any other country in the world. Money appropriated for military purposes is not diverted therefrom, is not wasted in the sense that it is not expended for purposes for which it is appropriated, and a dollar's worth of value is obtained for a dollar's worth of expenditure. The size of the appropriation is governed by the considerations above mentioned; and so long as the American citizen insists upon living up to a certain standard himself and concedes that his public servants should have the right to live up to that standard, there should be, and I am convinced will be, no grumbling at the necessary expense involved.

It is a pleasure to be able to turn from a consideration of what we need to a realization of what we already have. While our existing organization is of the exceeding small numbers already mentioned, it is unquestionably in as excellent condition as any similar number of men in any other military establishment in the world. Were it not for a desire to avoid invidious comparisons I should say that, man for man, it is better than any similar existing military establishment in the world. I do not believe that anyone will dispute the statement that the Army has never been in better condition than it is to-day, from the most recently enlisted man up to the highest officers. There is an esprit de corps, an eagerness to constantly strive toward perfection, a willingness to undertake and satisfactorily perform any and every duty, that is most commendable and encouraging. If we are authorized to use this exceedingly valuable nucleus to produce the reserve needed, there never was a time when the experiment had so great a chance of success as now. Both the enlisted personnel and the officers furnish a school of unexampled excellence for just such work.

LINDLEY M. GARRISON,  
Secretary of War.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I have some hesitancy in speaking in answer, as it were, to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], because I feel that everything he said is based upon an assumption and that he is more or less a victim of dreams and visions which, in my judgment, will never become facts.

It is true, and I have never denied it, nor have I ever claimed, that this country was in such a state of preparedness for war, that if one of the first-class powers of Europe were to land all her forces upon the shores of this country at one time, and immediately after war was declared, we were ready to meet such a condition as that. But that is the condition which the gentleman from Massachusetts talks about, and it is a condition which never can arise. [Applause.]

I say, without fear of contradiction, that we are pursuing a reasonable and prudent course, so far as the Committee on Military Affairs is concerned, in order that this country may be prudently and reasonably prepared for any emergency which may arise. [Applause.] The time has never been since I have been on the Committee on Military Affairs, except for two years, when we have not appropriated money for material of war to put in our reserve, and we have done it upon the advice of the War Department, upon the advice of boards in the War Department, which are responsible, and who know, as far as anybody can know, what we ought reasonably to do in order to be reasonably prepared.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has laid much stress upon the report of Gen. Witherspoon, the late Chief of Staff, and then he talks about not wanting to take the advice of gray-beards, when this man has been retired for age and is no longer on the active list of the United States Army.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. KAHN. Is it not a fact that it has developed in the European war now going on that all of the great generals are virtually of the age at which we retire our officers?

Mr. HAY. That is true. I want to say in the matter of Gen. Witherspoon, that he is a bold man to undertake before the European war is ended, before our observers there can be properly informed of the conditions that now exist, before they can report the results of their observations to our War Department and to this Congress, to say how much ammunition we ought to have or how many troops we ought to have in order to meet a supposititious condition which may arise, if we have a war with a first-class European power. Mr. Chairman, there is no prospect of any such thing. To-day the United States is safer from attack than she has ever been in her history. [Applause.]



How people can claim that those great nations which are now at war, which are exhausting themselves financially and physically, as soon as that war is over, are going to turn around and attack the strongest nation on earth, is beyond my comprehension. [Applause.] Why, Mr. Chairman, the United States has a latent power greater than that of any other country or of any other three countries in the civilized world. It is now maintaining peace with all the world. That is the policy of the country—not only of the administration, but of the entire country. Nobody wants war. We are not going to do anything to bring about war, and all this talk of our not being prepared for war, and of conditions having arisen in Europe which make it necessary for us to go into large military expenditures, at the expense of building up the peaceful arts in this country, at the expense of our harbors, of our public buildings, of our roads, and of all the other activities which ought to engage our attention, is, to my mind, a most unfortunate position for gentlemen to take. [Applause.]

I have always been in favor of a reasonable and prudent course in getting ready for any emergency which may possibly arise. But I am utterly opposed to a large standing Army. [Applause.] I am utterly opposed to adding a single man to the standing Army as it now exists. I am not in sympathy with those who want to add 25,000 men and 1,000 officers to the Regular Army now. What would that cost? It would cost \$27,000,000 alone, just that, and would add to our military expenditures \$27,000,000 a year. There are other ways for building up the national defense than by increasing the Regular Army.

I want to call attention to some statements made by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], and made by gentlemen from other quarters, as to how many enlisted men we will have in this country with the Army which we now have.

I have here figures taken from a statement of the Adjutant General, showing the number of enlisted men and where they are stationed. We had on January 5, 1915, exclusive of Philippine Scouts, 91,904 enlisted men. If you will deduct from that number the Hospital and Quartermaster Corps, which are not composed of fighting men, numbering 8,030, you have 83,873 enlisted men. If you will deduct from that number 18,092 in the Coast Artillery Corps, you have in the mobile army 65,781 men.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Virginia yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. GARDNER. Has not the gentleman omitted 9,572 in the Philippines?

Mr. HAY. Just wait a minute until I get to that. The gentleman need not be afraid that I am not going to be frank with the House. We have in the Philippines 9,859 men; in Panama, 3,149; in Hawaii, 7,351; in China, 674; and in Alaska, 488. That is what we have.

I will give you now what the Secretary of War says we ought to have.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. GARDNER. The Secretary of War, on page 8 of his report, says in continental United States we had in the mobile army on June 30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men. That is on the eighth page of his report, in the fourth line.

Mr. HAY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am taking a statement of the Adjutant General of the Army on the 5th day of this month, and I am not bound by the report of the Secretary of War or anybody else.

The Secretary of War states that there are in the Philippines now 9,859 men. The Secretary of War in his hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs on December 16, 1913—about a year ago—when asked the question how many men it was necessary to have at Panama and in Hawaii, stated that it was necessary to have at Panama 8,305 men and in Hawaii 15,665; and we have in China 674 and in Alaska 488. And thus we would have out of the country 34,991 men, and we would have for the mobile army in continental United States 30,790 men—5,000 more than we had before the Spanish-American War.

I want to ask gentlemen why do we need any more men than that in continental United States? What are we going to do with them? If we are going to undertake to maintain a standing army of sufficient size to cope with the standing armies of first-class powers in Europe, why, then the army of 100,000 or the 200,000 mentioned by Gen. Wotherspoon amounts to nothing. If you are going to enter upon a policy which will entail upon this country an army large enough to cope with the armies

of Europe, you can not maintain here less than 600,000 men, a standing army of that number; and that, gentlemen, will cost this country not less than \$700,000,000 a year, unless you go to the system of compulsory military service and compel every man in the United States of military age to give service in the Army, as they do in continental Europe. That is the alternative. There is no middle way between a small standing army and a large standing army.

Now, besides those 30,790 men which we already have, the President, if he saw fit to do so, could authorize 10,729 more men. But the President of the United States did not think it necessary to estimate to this Congress for the full strength of the Army which is authorized by law, which is 100,000 men. He saw fit only to estimate for the figures that I am giving you. He has the power to estimate for 100,000 men. He did not do it. He did not think it necessary to do so.

And so, my friends, I do not see why it is necessary to be alarmed at this situation, when the President does not think it is necessary to estimate even for the Army which the law authorizes him to estimate for.

Now, let us take up the proposition of ammunition, which the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] dwelt upon. He has made much of the rounds of small-arms ammunition. We have 196,000,000 in reserve; and I want to call attention to this fact, that when you undertake to have a large amount of ammunition in reserve, like 646,000,000 rounds, as recommended by Gen. Wotherspoon, you forget that half of that ammunition when war came on would be utterly worthless, because it would have been kept so long in stock that it would either not be fit for use or would be so uncertain that we could not safely depend upon it.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. GARDNER. Would it not be possible to use a large part of that for target practice for our militia?

Mr. HAY. No, sir; it would be utterly impossible to use any large quantity of it for that purpose if we had it in reserve.

Mr. GARDNER. If it was going bad, but before it went bad.

Mr. HAY. Gen. Wotherspoon says we ought to have 646,000,000. That is his opinion. Gen. Crozier thinks we ought to have 196,000,000. That is his opinion, and I am willing to put the opinion of Gen. Crozier against the opinion of Gen. Wotherspoon. That would furnish every rifle in an army of 500,000 men with 340 rounds.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. COX. How soon does that rifle ammunition begin to deteriorate?

Mr. HAY. In about four or five years, although I will not give that as an expert opinion.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. How much time have I consumed, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 15 minutes.

Mr. HAY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GARDNER. I call the gentleman's attention to the hearings last year:

The CHAIRMAN—

That is the gentleman now speaking, said to Gen. Crozier—

I remember you said a year ago that you thought you were the only person who thought 180,000,000 was sufficient.

Gen. CROZIER. That is a fact.

Mr. HAY. Very well. I have not denied that. I just said that I was willing to take Gen. Crozier's opinion against Gen. Wotherspoon's opinion. But I was going on to say that 196,000,000 rounds in reserve—and, mind you, this is in reserve—will furnish an army of 450,000 men with 340 rounds per man. I have just stated that in the Russo-Japanese War, in the first six months of that war, when they had about 200,000 men on each side, the Japanese during that six months only fired 97 rounds to a man, and the Russians only fired 56 rounds per man.

But, gentlemen, our capacity for making this small-arms ammunition is very great. The capacity of this country to-day is 1,000,000 rounds per day, and if we were to get into a war that capacity would necessarily be very largely increased. So I think that we are reasonably prepared in small-arms ammunition.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield again?

Mr. HAY. I will yield for a question. I will not yield to read from the hearings.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman says our capacity is a million rounds a day. Is not the evidence of Gen. Crozier that you could not begin to get that until two months had gone by, and that it would take six months to duplicate the 196,000,000 rounds?



Mr. HAY. I make the statement upon my own responsibility that to-day the country has a capacity to turn out a million rounds a day.

Mr. GARDNER. Gen. Crozier says otherwise.

Mr. HAY. I do not care what Gen. Crozier says. [Applause on the Democratic side.] I happen to have inquired into this matter, and I find that owing to the European war our manufacturers of small-arms ammunition have increased their capacity, so that to-day we are turning out a million rounds of ammunition a day, or could do it if we desired to do it. Now, that is all about that.

We have on hand 700,000 service rifles of the new model, and we have on hand about 300,000 of the Krag-Jørgensen, making a million rifles on hand. And, gentlemen, when we come to store up these large reserves we must remember that these models change, that they are improved, and that it would be folly for us to lay up too large a reserve; because, take the Krag-Jørgensen, for instance, that was for a while the rifle which the Ordnance Department adopted. Then they found that they could do better with the new service rifle, and they abandoned the manufacture of the Krag-Jørgensen and began the manufacture of the service rifle. If somebody were to come along with a better rifle than the present service rifle, we would be derelict in our duty if we did not accept a better rifle and manufacture that.

In talking about these reserves it is necessary to bear in mind that things become obsolete, and that we ought not to throw away large sums of money upon things which may become obsolete. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

We have in reserve 65,000 pistols. We have 1,000 machine guns, and it is said that we ought to have 1,361, so that we have very nearly what the War Department says we ought to have.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Thirteen hundred and sixty-one guns for what size army?

Mr. HAY. An army of 450,000 or 500,000 men. We have field artillery guns, 634, and appropriated for, 226, and in this bill 52 more will be appropriated for, making 912. Gen. Wood, who can not be charged with wishing not to have enough, says that we need 1,292, so that we are within 370 guns for an army of 500,000 men.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. Was not that an estimate made before the war?

Mr. HAY. It was; and if the gentleman from Massachusetts will permit, it seems to me that if it was made before the war it would not be as large as it is now.

Mr. GARDNER. What, for artillery?

Mr. HAY. Yes; because there is not as much danger now as there was before the war. [Applause.] The gentleman seems to live in an atmosphere of dreams.

Mr. GARDNER. You might as well have no field artillery at all.

Mr. HAY. It will take, with the appropriations we are making now, six years to complete 1,292 guns. So that we will have the whole of them in six years' time.

We have field ammunition for field artillery in reserve and provided for the guns we need, 38 per cent, and the appropriations in this bill will raise that to 60 per cent.

I want to call attention to the fact that the life of these guns that we are providing the ammunition for depends largely upon the number of times the gun is fired. Therefore, it may be, and probably is, more necessary to have the guns than it is to have a large quantity of reserve ammunition. I want to call attention to the fact that last year and this year we are making larger appropriations for field artillery guns and field artillery ammunition than has ever been made before in the history of our country except in time of war.

As to the estimate that there should be 1,800 rounds for each gun, under the present rate of appropriation, we could in four years get all the ammunition we wanted in reserve at the rate we are now going. I will now state what the powder capacity of the country is: Before the outbreak of the European war the daily capacity of the cannon powder was 36,000 pounds, and the daily capacity of the small-arms powder was 10,000 pounds, which makes in a year 12,940,000 pounds of cannon powder and 3,650,000 pounds of small-arms powder. That was the daily output before the European war. It is estimated that since the European war the capacity has largely increased, and no man can tell exactly what it is to-day.

We are trying, in the Committee on Military Affairs, to follow up, as far as we can and with reasonableness, the recommendations made by the General Staff as to what is necessary to be done, and when it is said that we are making appropri-

tions haphazard, I want to say that that statement is without any foundation in fact.

I might call attention to the personnel of the Army, and the disposition among some to have an Army reserve. I want to say, gentlemen, that I have studied the question of an Army reserve with as much care as anybody could who has been intrusted by the House with these matters.

Mr. J. M. C. SMITH. Before the gentleman concludes, will he be kind enough to tell us what has been done about aeroplanes?

Mr. HAY. I will first finish what I was going to say. It is an extremely complex question. Of course, in countries where they have a compulsory military service it is easy enough to have a reserve. About every country in continental Europe has the compulsory military service, but in England, which has the same voluntary service that we have, they have failed to get a dependable reserve.

They have even gone so far as to pay their reserves, and yet they have not been able to accomplish anything in that line; and, Mr. Chairman, we will never be able to get the citizens of this country to enlist in the Army for a term of years, then go into the reserve for another term of years, and bind themselves to put themselves under the control of the War Department to be called upon whenever the War Department chooses to do it. [Applause.] Therefore I have been unable to reach any conclusion which would enable me to give any opinion as to what is the best way to get a reserve.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. I am very much interested to hear the gentleman's idea on the reserve. As I understand, under our reserve system now we pay a man a bonus if he comes back to the colors, whether he enrolls himself in that reserve or not. Is that true?

Mr. HAY. We have a law on the statute books providing that in time of war if a man who has served in the Regular Army comes back to the colors and enlists for the war he is to be paid a bounty of \$300.

Mr. GARDNER. Suppose we repealed that law and had a reserve law where we pay them for being in the reserve, much along the line suggested for the Navy. Does the gentleman think that we would then be able to get a reserve army? I am not arguing with the gentleman, but I want to get his views.

Mr. HAY. I do not think that would be paying them enough. I want to say this about the Army: The enlisted men of the Army are a very different class of men from what they used to be. They are a very good class of people. A great deal of care is taken with enlistments. Of 167,000 men who applied for enlistment last year, only 41,000 were taken. Over 100,000 men were rejected as not being either physically fit or morally fit to go into the United States Army. These men, when they come in and serve a full enlistment of four years, either make the Army a career and stay in it or they go out and go into business and marry and settle down, and those men you can not get for your reserve with a small sum of money, in my judgment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Michigan asked me about aviation. The amount appropriated for aviation in this bill is \$300,000. The amount appropriated last year was \$250,000, an increase of \$50,000. We have on hand 11 aeroplanes, and we have contracted for 8 under the appropriation of last year. We have 2 training machines, which makes in all 21. The Chief of the Signal Corps says he wishes to accumulate 32 for active service, and that he wants a reserve of 16, so that makes 48 that he wants to get together. The cost of one of these machines is \$10,000.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. Those 16 are in spare parts, are they not?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. GARDNER. It is only 32 machines and spare parts that make up 16 more.

Mr. HAY. As a reserve. These machines cost \$10,000 each, so that under the appropriation which we give them this year they will be able to accumulate the 32 machines and some of the 16, or the parts of the 16.

Something has been said by my friend from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] about Zeppelins. So far as I have been able to read in this war in Europe the Zeppelins have proved to be a failure as an offensive weapon. They have not done anything except kill innocent people, and from a military standpoint they have not been of any service whatever to the countries which have used them. One Zeppelin costs \$1,000,000. Should we go into the purchase of Zeppelins until we find out from the experience of this war whether or not it is absolutely necessary



to have a machine of that kind in our Army? I do not think we should.

The Aviation Corps has 60 officers allowed, and they now have only, as I understand, 29 officers. They have 260 enlisted men allowed, and according to the report of Gen. Scriven, the Chief Signal Officer, they have 24 officers and 115 enlisted men now in the corps.

Mr. GARDNER. Not in the Aviation Corps—in the whole Signal Corps.

Mr. HAY. No; in the Aviation Corps. I will say to the gentleman that I drew the bill, and that I know I provided in the bill for 60 officers and 260 enlisted men.

Mr. GARDNER. In this bill?

Mr. HAY. No; I mean in the bill creating the Aviation Corps.

Mr. OGLESBY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. OGLESBY. In regard to the Zeppelin proposition, is it not a fact that the proximity of the countries in Europe where these Zeppelins are used would be more apt to make them of use there than in this country, where you have to go so far before we get to another country?

Mr. HAY. Undoubtedly. I do not think they would come 3,000 miles across the ocean to get here.

Mr. OGLESBY. And they would not be of any use to them.

Mr. HAY. They would not be of any use to us, and they would not be of any harm to us in the possession of other countries.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MONTAGUE. Are Zeppelins used for scouting purposes at all?

Mr. HAY. Not at all; they are used in offensive warfare.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. GARDNER. I think the gentleman ought to correct the hearings, then. Gen. Scriven says on page 642:

We only want to accumulate 32 machines in the first line and a reserve of 50 per cent, because we have under the bill 60 aviator officers, and we are only allowed 12 enlisted men for instruction in flying. The limit, therefore, is 72.

Mr. HAY. I said nothing to the contrary of that. I said they have 60 officers allowed, and that turns out to be true.

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; but—

Mr. HAY. And they had 260 enlisted men in the Aviation Corps. Now, 12 of those men are to be educated as flyers.

Mr. GARDNER. The gentleman means the others are on the ground?

Mr. HAY. The others are on the ground doing aviation work.

Mr. GARDNER. I beg the gentleman's pardon; I thought the gentleman meant there were 120 flyers. I am very glad to have the explanation, for I think the committee understood that there were that number of enlisted men in the flying business.

Mr. HAY. I do not think they did, because I think they knew what the bill does.

Mr. SMITH of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I do.

Mr. SMITH of New York. In case of a conflict how rapidly could additional aeroplanes be obtained?

Mr. HAY. I think from the evidence in the hearings that they could not be obtained very quickly, because in this country there are only three manufacturers who are now making aeroplanes which can be used for military purposes. Now, of course, if a war came on and we placed very large orders they might manufacture them more quickly, but the aeroplane business does not seem to be a very profitable one and there are few people engaged in it.

I hardly think it necessary, Mr. Chairman, for me to continue these remarks, desultory as they are. I want, however, to call attention to the fact that we are in no danger of a large army landing in this country in a very short time, and that we will have ample time for a great deal of preparation. Why, when Canada sent her first 33,000 troops to England to take part in this war it took 31 transports and 62 war vessels to take them over there; and if any great force is landed in this country you must presuppose that our fleet has been destroyed and our coast defenses leveled to the ground and the people of this country have all taken to the woods. I do not believe that time will ever come. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. HULINGS].

Mr. HULINGS. Mr. Chairman, I believe the result of the dreadful war in Europe will so sicken and disgust the heart of

mankind with militarism and everything that pertains to war that enlightened, universal human nature will seek some other means of settling their disputes than going to war. [Applause.] I believe it will clear up the road to the establishment of an international court with an international police to enforce the decrees of that court. However, that is only a hope. Meantime, we must take the world as it is. War is a fact, liable to appear when least expected. Two months before the Spanish War the man who would have suggested war between the United States and Spain would have been deemed wild. Some of the young Spanish bloods over there in Habana, in talking with some young Americans, suggested that Spain could land a force at Key West and march through to the Capitol. The young Americans said that if any Spaniards came over here they had better behave themselves or the police would run them in. [Laughter.] Well, now, the contrary was the fact. I believe at the beginning of the Spanish War a division of well-trained Spanish troops under the command of a leader like Stonewall Jackson or Phil Sheridan landed at Key West could have marched right straight through to the Hudson River without effective opposition. We were very confident; we were wild for the encounter; but we were not prepared for war. The military expedition that we sent over to Cuba was one of the most lamentable affairs. We loaded ships with quinine and with cannon balls, and when they wanted quinine they found cannon balls on top of the medicine. Everything was topsy-turvy; and it was the Regular Army, not the militia, that was responsible for everything. We have learned much since, but any large levy of troops would create the same confusion. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are in great danger of war with any powerful military nation; and yet these wars come. Eight months ago no person would have been so rash as to have said that within two months there would be the greatest and most destructive war the world has ever seen; yet war came like a lightning stroke from a clear sky, and nobody is yet wise enough to tell what the underlying cause is. It is only the part of prudence, therefore, to make reasonable preparation for such emergencies as may arise.

I have listened to discussions on this subject before the Military Committee, and I am sure that that committee has given to the subject very earnest attention. I think they are almost as one with the idea that there is at present, with some exceptions, mostly in the aviation field, reasonable preparation. The President of the United States, like all other reasonable men, thinks that there should be "adequate" defense. The only trouble is that we differ as to what "adequate" defense may be. The President thinks that we should depend upon a "citizenry trained to arms." Now, that is something that does not exist, and it seems to me it is to that very point that we should give most earnest attention. It is well known that this country will not stand for a great standing army in time of peace. This needs no discussion. There does not appear to be sufficient reason, even after considering the earnest argument of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] as to lack of preparation, for a large standing army. It seems to me the scale of preparation that he would insist upon would be that preparation that would be necessary to resist a great invading force.

Mr. GARDNER. Since the gentleman has mentioned my name, will he yield?

Mr. HULINGS. Certainly.

Mr. GARDNER. Does not the gentleman know, as he has heard it time and again, that I insist on nothing but an investigation and report from an impartial commission?

Mr. HULINGS. I suppose it would be fair to say that the gentleman has insisted before the committee and also before this House that there should be an investigation by a competent body to see what the preparation should be. Now, it seems to me, gentlemen, that we do not need any great increase, perhaps no increase, in our standing Army beyond the 100,000 men that are now authorized. I do believe that we should have a Navy capable of making it so difficult for an invading force to land, that whilst they were landing here a large army, from whatever source they might come, we could be organizing and training our own troops. A gentleman the other day on the floor suggested that they had enough of squirrel shooters down in Arkansas to pick the eyes out of any invading force that might come here. Well, I suppose he had not thought of shrapnel fire at a range of 6 miles. These forts that we have would not stand in the way of any invading force. I do not suppose that the commander of any invading force would select a fort to go up against with his fleet. His warships would convoy his transports with his troops to any one of one hundred places where they could land without opposition, except from the military force, unless we had a Navy to prevent the landing. And



for that reason, Mr. Chairman, I believe the expenditure of money in preparation for defense should be expended largely on the Navy. I do not believe that it is necessary at this time to increase the military force, because a proper and reasonable increase of our naval force would make a foreign invasion so difficult as to be improbable, and thus we would have no use for increased military force, except probably to garrison the Panama Canal.

Mr. Chairman, I have introduced a bill into this House that has been lying in the committee room for some time. I have never been able to get any consideration of that bill there, but I want to take this opportunity to call the attention of the committee to a suggestion that is made in the bill that is just in line with the preparation or the training of citizenry for the national defense. That bill would provide that the President of the United States might enlist a force, to be called the public service corps, the number not named in the bill, of young men from the ages of 16 to 25, who should be drilled and subsisted and disciplined as soldiers, armed and equipped as soldiers in campaign, the private soldiers being paid \$30 per month, double the pay of regular soldiers, and that force would be employed in the building of roads or other public works. They would serve one year, not eligible for reenlistment, but the corps would be kept filled with new men; the officers to be appointed by the President. Such a corps—officers and men—would get training in actual military life; the officers especially would get training in the handling of supplies and materials, the handling of large bodies of men, and the administration of subsistence and quartermaster's stores, something that they do not get either in the National Guard or in the Regular Army itself when scattered in a multitude of small posts. That would train officers in actual military life and would fill the country in a few years with a large number of young men who had had actual military training.

I submit this matter to the House as a contribution to a subject that I think is of very great importance, and it seems to me precisely along the lines suggested by President Wilson in his address, suggesting that our defense must be by a "citizenry trained to arms." This corps would not be subject to military duty. It would not be a part of the Army. It would be a body of men employed at useful work under military discipline, providing work for the unemployed at fair wages, and in a few years the country would have a great number of young men trained in military life, who in an emergency would volunteer for the defense of the country.

And I might say that incidentally we would get about two miles of public road built for what we now pay for one. I know there are a lot of fellows in the Army who would say that that would be soldiers' work, and soldiers do not like to work. A good many of them think it is derogatory. The sooner they get that idea out of their heads the better. But, at any rate, there is no room for professional jealousy, because this corps would not be a military force. It would provide in a few years a large body of "citizenry trained to arms," upon which the country could depend in time of need to fill the ranks of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back two minutes.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. McKENZIE].

Mr. McKENZIE. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the committee I felt perhaps it would be better to allow others to use the time in general debate on this bill. Therefore, I will take only a few minutes in which to make a few observations.

When Gen. Scott, the Chief of Staff of our Army, was before our committee I asked him the following questions:

General, how long have you been connected with the service of the Army?

He answered:

Since 1876.

I asked:

What would you say of the action of the Congress of the United States in the past 20 years in regard to looking after the national defense? Have they been derelict in their duty, or have we been constantly improving our national defenses?

His answer was:

Constantly improving.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the great political party which has been controlling the destinies of this country and taking care of the national defenses for the past 20 years, with the exception of the last two years, is the party to which I am proud to belong, and I would regret very much if that great party had been derelict in its duty along this line. But I think any man who has sat here this afternoon and heard the statistics that have

been read into the RECORD will go away feeling that at least ample money has been appropriated in the last 20 years to care for the national defense.

I want to say, further, that if that money has not been properly expended by the men in charge of the defenses of our country, then these men ought to be court-martialed and dismissed from the service. But I want to say that I am satisfied beyond any doubt that not only have sufficient appropriations been made, but that the money has been expended judiciously, not only in building up the coast defenses of our country, but in building up a reserve that will take care of an army of 500,000 men, should occasion require, and it will take only a few years more at the rate we are now appropriating money to have that entire reserve in field artillery, small arms, small-arms ammunition, and field artillery ammunition, as well as ammunition for the coast defenses.

Now, gentlemen, if I had it in my power, I would make some changes in regard to our Army. In the first place, I would limit the term of enlistment to two years; in the second place, I would encourage and aid the militia of the several States, to make it a more efficient body of military men. Another thing I would do would be to make a flat rate of retirement pay for Army officers and prevent the political pulling and boosting that goes on in pushing our Army officers up from captains to colonels, and so on, and retiring them at the highest rate of pay. I think it is no reflection on our Army officers to say that they would do their duty just as well and just as loyally if we took away from them the hope of retiring as a brigadier or a major instead of retiring as a captain or a colonel.

So far as increasing the Army is concerned, I would increase it only by the enlistment of sufficient men to bring it up to the standard authorized by law. The idea that we have to have more officers and more organizations in order to defend our country at this time is, to my mind, absurd. We have power now to enlist all companies up to the full capacity of 150 in each company, and if we need men, let us do that without increasing the heavy overhead expenses by increasing the number of organizations in the Army.

I am called a conservative. I hope I am when it comes to this matter. But I believe in the adequate defense of our country. I believe in reasonable preparation for war, and I think that is being taken care of in the proper way. I know that we are not safe or immune from war so long as the passions of men remain as they are. But if war comes, with the Regular Army that we have, with our Navy and the militia that we have, and relying on the spirit that prevails in the breasts of the patriotic sons of this country, I have no fears of this country of ours being crushed. [Applause.]

There are not enough men, in my judgment, in all Europe to ever make a trail, as Abraham Lincoln said, on the crest of the Allegheny Mountains and one of them get back to the Atlantic coast alive.

When any nation embarks 100,000 men on transports to come across the sea to attack us, that when they have dispelled our Navy from the seas, sunk our battleships beneath the waves, and they come to our coasts and tear down our defenses, I want to assure those gentlemen that there will be one of the finest reception committees at the shore to meet them that they have ever met in their lives. [Applause.]

And more than that, if they start anywhere into the interior of our country, the sons not only of one part of our country, but the sons of Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, and Wisconsin will gather together as one united, mighty force to repel any invader who may dare to touch this soil of ours. [Applause.]

But suppose they destroyed our fleet and got into our country for a distance, we could still live on and on, for we need not the products of foreign lands to support and sustain us in our trial, and we could fight them as long as they desired to continue the conflict. But let us hope that that time will never come. [Applause.]

I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. HOWARD]. [Applause.]

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that the time I shall consume necessitates my inflicting myself upon you when you are practically wearied out with the length of this debate, but I have a few observations, as a member of the Committee on Military Affairs, that I would like to submit for the consideration of the House.

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, it is time for Congress to take "stock," as it were, and investigate the present cost of our military establishment and what the cost would amount to if we followed the program laid down by many of the great so-called military experts and unduly excited Senators and Congressmen.



Recently the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] has received much newspaper notice throughout the country on account of his insistent demand for a commission to investigate and report to Congress our unpreparedness for war. We need no such commission. The report of such a commission would be worthless. For unless it was endowed with omniscient powers it could not possibly conclude which of the great nations of the earth we were to engage in war and when the fighting would commence. But, for the sake of argument, let us take one of the great powers of Europe, Germany, and see what would be the price we would have to pay to prepare to meet her army man for man.

The peace strength of the German Army has been kept at a minimum of 620,000 men. Under the German system of compulsory military service between the ages of 16 and 45 years this army cost Germany in 1913 \$248,000,000.

Our Regular Army, according to the last reports of the War Department, is shown to be 4,652 officers and 80,740 enlisted men, a total of 85,392. The appropriations for the upkeep of this Army will cost the American people for the ensuing fiscal year in round figures \$130,000,000. So if we must prepare to meet world power with the strength of Germany's Army of 620,000 men, it would cost us about \$750,000,000 annually, or a little more than \$7.50 per year for each man, woman, and child in the United States.

To state such a proposition is an assurance that the American people would not stand for such tomfoolery.

About two months ago, in a statement to the press, I said that there was but little excuse for us to get excited and nervous. To-day we are more secure from war than we have been at any period in 40 years. Practically the whole world is in a death struggle. Europe is daily expending millions of dollars in money, millions upon millions of dollars worth of property is being destroyed, her hillsides are saturated with and her rivers are crimson with the blood of tens of thousands of the very flower of her manhood.

Mr. Chairman, all America stands appalled at the unprecedented cataclysm in which our friends across the water are now engaged. We hope and pray for the speedy restoration of peace, but if that happy condition were brought about this minute, already the bloodiest, most destructive, and costly war the world has ever witnessed has been fought. It will take years of deprivation and toil to rebuild the destroyed cities, replace the wasted millions expended for the death-dealing instruments of war, and no man can foresee the day when the payment of interest will end upon the bonded indebtedness of these nations.

Surely no one will be bold enough, in the face of recent events, to seriously urge that preparedness for war is the best insurance against war. Germany and France, England and Russia were all well prepared for war—and they are at war. As has been aptly said, "The breeding of bulldogs in no manner promotes peace in the canine family."

Mr. Chairman, many of the great thinkers of the world have proposed plans for universal peace, and in like manner many have planned preparations to protect against war. So far neither have met with success. It seems that no matter how many international peace conferences we have the nations of the world will not agree to lay down their arms forever and dwell upon the earth in "brotherly love." On the other hand, no nation has yet determined when it had enough battleships or enough armed men to say with confidence, "We are secure against attack." My judgment is that we will see universal peace on the earth long before we will ever see the war lords and militarists of the world satisfied with a nation's preparedness for war. It would be a task as impossible as the extinguishment of an erupting volcano with a squirt gun.

If I were called upon to insure this country against invasion by a foreign nation my plan would be along entirely different lines from those of the jingoist. I would prudently and gradually secure my country with the necessary equipment and scatter it through the Nation, and keep our gunlock oiled and our powder dry. When this was done, I would turn my attention to instilling in the hearts and minds of my countrymen the glories of peace and the horrors of a war of conquest. I would educate the youth of the land and equip him for a life of usefulness. I would stimulate our commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities. I would encourage the maintenance of American ideals and make secure the blessing of our country for our native countrymen, and thus inspire a patriotism and a courage that would secure our Nation against a world of hostile foes—for such a nation is worth a thousand nations composed of tax-ridden slaves and a conscripted and unwilling soldiery.

Mr. Chairman, few men would resent an insult against his boarding house; but any man will resent an insult against his home. The reason is obvious. He has no innate love for a boarding house, but a heaven-born love for his home and his fire-side. So it is with a nation. A tax-ridden and enslaved people are devoid of patriotism, but the happy and contented home is the very corner stone of a prosperous and secure nation.

This great Nation is the most liberal of any nation in its allowance in pay to the men in the ranks and its officers. We are profligate in the payment of pensions, and we find ourselves 50 years after the only great war in which we were ever engaged, expending about 70 cents out of every dollar we collect in revenue to meet our bills for pensions, Army, Navy, and coast defenses.

So, Mr. Chairman, in view of the insistent demand for a commission to report on our unpreparedness for war, and in view of the clamor of many daily papers of the country for a greater Navy and a greater Army, I have thought it only fair to those who pay the bills and who will really do the fighting, if we are ever involved in war, to let them know what the cost of our present war establishment is and how we expend their money.

The cost per soldier in our Regular Army is now a little over \$1,000 per annum. As I said in the beginning, such an expenditure per man is the most costly of any nation's army on earth.

Now, let us give some items of the expenditures going to make up the stupendous sums we are annually spending on the Army, Navy, and pensions. In the year 1914 we expended for—

Army (including rivers and harbors).....	\$165,646,297.77
Navy.....	140,736,536.35
Pensions.....	172,408,518.29
Total.....	478,791,352.41

Without the least prejudice toward the old veterans of the Union Army who really did the fighting during the Civil War, this pension roll would furnish splendid material for a humorous novel if its consequences did not fall so heavily upon the shoulders of the weary taxpayers of the country. Fighting soldier after soldier has written me agreeing to the outrages committed upon the people in the name of the Union soldier through private pension bills. We all know this is true; but who can stop it? The truth is, it has almost gotten beyond control. Those of us from the States once comprising the Confederate States dare not fight these outrages, for when we do the "bloody shirt" is waved at us and they call it "rebel prejudice." On the other hand, those from the States where these pensioners live dare not oppose them, for it means political annihilation, and the people are between the "devil and the deep blue sea," and we find both contending parties in the North urging their election to Congress largely upon the ability of the candidate to get money out of the Treasury and place more men on the pension roll.

A Mississippi River gallinipper could drink all the blood spilled in the Spanish-American War for its supper and suffer no ill consequences in the process of digestion, and yet out of the 215,000 men who were mustered in the service in that war 1 out of every 7 men in the 15 years past have been able to connect themselves to poor old Uncle Sam for the balance of their lives as pensioners, and thousands of them are hammering at the door for admission to-day.

Essential to a more economical administration of our Army is its divorce from undue political influence in its administrative affairs. The officers of the Army should not be imbued with the idea that great political influence can obtain for them that which they are unwilling to strive for among their brother officers. Promotion should be preceded by a record of efficiency. This will have a tendency to put "ginger" in our officers and bring out their very best qualities. No officer should be promoted over his fellow officer because he is close to the "swivel chair" brigade or because his daddy-in-law is a Senator or Congressman or a political factor in a State. Nothing is more disgusting to a real Army officer than to see officers promoted 900 numbers, from a captain to a major general, which was done not so long ago by a President of the United States, when, in fact, that officer never commanded a squad in his life. The Secretary of War ought to have plenary power to weed out the inefficient political pets and social katydid of our Army. This should be done at once; the quicker the better. We have many very fine officers in our Army who are to-day silently suffering injustice for this very reason.

Mr. Chairman, it is my judgment—and this is simply my own notion about it—that as we are short of officers all the time and can only partially furnish Regular Army officers for the troops we have, there are too many officers on detached duty in the War Department. Many of them are assigned to purely clerical



duty, and these officers could spend their time more profitably with the troops in the field where they belong, and their places be filled with men from civil life under the civil-service rules and regulations. This would save a great deal of money for the taxpayers.

Again, Mr. Chairman, our system of retiring officers is so liberal that it rather encourages the "drone" to seek retirement, even before he reaches the age limit or has served the 30 years required before making application for retirement.

For instance, a major may stand an examination for promotion to the next higher grade, and in two weeks be entitled to retire for age or length of service in the next higher grade, which in this instance would be that of colonel. Without further comment on this subject you will see that we have 220 brigadier generals on the retired list drawing \$990,000 per annum for doing absolutely nothing. This is enough brigadier generals to general the armies of the European allies. No officer should be retired as long as he is capable of giving efficient service, and if we could get rid of those who were inefficient there would be but little trouble about a healthy flow of promotion.

This abuse runs down to the enlisted men. Out of the 3,832 men on the retired list only 168 of them are privates; the others are of the higher grade noncommissioned officers.

We have 49 Army posts in the United States. All of these posts except eight have been recommended for abandonment. Yet political influence and nothing else is preventing their abandonment. They have long since served their purpose and only hinder the economical mobilization of our Army for proper maneuver training and military instruction. Hundreds of thousands of dollars could be saved annually by following the recommendations of the War Department as to this useless branch of the service.

Mr. Chairman, I have already consumed more time than I had expected to when I took the floor. I can not take my seat without adding to what I have said that I hope nothing in the way of criticism will be construed as a reflection upon the painstaking and able committee presided over by the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY]—of course, excluding myself from that statement—but it applies to both Democrats and Republicans alike. The committee as a body has devoted hours and days to the hearings in an effort to make up an intelligent, economical, yet ample, bill for the Army wing of our Military Establishment. This, I think, has been done. No committee of this House now has or has ever had an abler, more diligent, conscientious, and industrious chairman to counsel with and preside over it than has the Military Affairs Committee. My solemn judgment is that he is one of the best-informed men in the United States on the military status of our own and other great powers of the world, and it is consoling to us all that he is not the least "nervous or excited" about our ability to defend ourselves against all comers.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARD].

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman and fellow Members, as a retiring member of the Committee on Military Affairs in the House of Representatives, having lately been assigned to service on another committee, I wish first to voice my appreciation of the work of the members of this most important committee.

Partisanship has not intruded itself to prevent the proper consideration of all matters coming before this committee, and every member I am sure has been guided by the sole desire to do that which was absolutely right and just.

The most pleasant personal relations have existed, and no committee of this House is presided over by a more patriotic and efficient chairman than the chairman of this committee, Mr. HAY, of Virginia. [Applause.]

The present Army appropriation bill is one which is almost entirely an appropriation bill, for very little legislation is carried.

At a time when a great part of the world is bearing arms there might have been some temptation to have made of this bill an occasion for evidencing by legislative action something really foreign to an appropriation bill, but the country will be gratified to know that this committee has pursued the even tenor of its way and has not gone beyond the bounds of legitimate appropriation.

So-called "preparedness" has been the topic of much discussion in the press, in this Chamber, and elsewhere throughout this land, and the very big thing for the realization of our people is that by the action of the Committee on Military Affairs preparedness is actually and continually being carried on so as to give proper strength to every department of the service.

I am of those who subscribe to preparation for national defense, and would do all things and everything to protect in-

violate our institutions, our country, and our citizenship. [Applause.]

I do not share the opinion of those who fear almost immediate assault upon our national integrity for with all the great nations of the world we are at peace.

No policy of armed aggression is ours or ever has been, and the impress we seek to make upon history is attended by the arts of peace, not war; and we strive to have the best development of industries and of commerce make for our national progress.

Nor would I be lured into false security by the idea that all nations are to lay down their arms, for most desirable as this would be, the time does not give it proof; and we are to face the conditions of to-day and to-morrow as they are and probably will be, not as we would have them.

Some have deplored the publicity given to our Army and Navy affairs, but it seems to me that this is exactly what is wanted, so that our people may know, and that an honest and patriotic public sentiment may be builded up based on facts, and not on misinformation.

It is well for the great public, of which we are all members, to know that this bill is carefully following conditions, even unto possibilities, and that it carries and maintains rational preparations for our national defense.

Munitions of war can not be made or provided in a week or in a month, and the present method is to bring strength to all departments of the service, so that at any and all times our house may be in order.

It is this well thought out and considered plan as exemplified in this bill which must stand as the true American idea of a proper army for national defense.

Shall the American policy as we have known it for years, as it has gone with us in our development into the greatest Nation on the earth, be now changed?

Shall we have an immense standing army?

Shall we have a greatly increased standing army?

I am sure the very best sentiment of our citizens would echo the answer "No" to these questions.

The strength of our defense lies in the spirit of our people, which has never failed to rally upon an occasion of national emergency. [Applause.]

That which we should most look forward to is the best possible physical, mental, and moral condition of our young men. There is no better training for the boy and the young man than the exercises and requirements of the so-called military training.

Discipline, regulation, and order soon manifest themselves in the erect carriage, the clear eye, the splendid condition which so well reflect proper exercise, good conduct, and good health.

Many plans have been suggested concerning an Army reserve, and it would seem to me that our continued attention should be increasingly drawn to the promotion of the efficiency of the National Guard.

Despite criticism and discouragement, the militia has maintained itself and now stands on a plane of higher public regard than ever before. As munitions of war can not be procured in a relatively short time, so likewise it takes time and training to make an efficient soldier.

Not alone is a knowledge of military tactics necessary, but the man must learn how to live under conditions as they exist in the camp, on the march, or in the field.

The very nucleus of any reserve Army for national defense would be the National Guard.

The assistance given to the militia in the present bill is an indication of its potential strength as a war reserve, and with future enlargement of training and equipment, with the field instruction accorded to troops of the Regular Army, these bodies of troops may most fittingly and efficiently aid our Army of regularly enlisted men.

The training given to the thousands of the very best young men of the country who would give their service to the National Guard would in itself in the great results of experience, knowledge, and health furnish that high standard of patriotism which is the best guardian of the honor and security of the Nation.

The message which comes to this country from the present Army appropriation bill is that our established national policy is held inviolate and that the events of the times are being observed for our own good; that there has been no neglect, but that steadily we are doing all that can be done for the complete protection of our country.

This message greets a united people who do not wish any great advance of militarism here, but who would maintain the policy of preparation for our national protection alone, yet provide every man and every munition which is needed for the defense of the United States of America. [Applause.]



Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. PROUTY].

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. Chairman, one of the world's greatest warriors has said that "War is hell." If Sherman's definition is scientifically correct, and I guess it is, it follows a priori that war has no legitimate place in the world's economy and should be banished to the country where it belongs. The horrors of war are indescribable and incomprehensible. It has saturated the soil of every country with its best blood. It has sacrificed on its fields of battle the flower of its manly youth. It has made countless billions of widows and orphans. It has wrung unquenchable grief from untold millions of mothers and wives. It has scattered throughout the world in all ages hungry, emaciated orphans begging for bread. It has brought to this old world nothing but sorrow, distress, and horror. It has consumed the wealth, devastated the resources, and destroyed the property of nations, and has placed an intolerable and unbearable burden of taxation upon the laboring and producing masses. It has changed men from loving fathers and kind husbands to warring demons with an insatiable thirst for blood. It has changed the instinct of love and humanity to an uncontrollable mania for revenge. During all time it has not brought one ray of sunshine into any home or heart. It has not added one dollar to the Nation's wealth. It has not settled one question of right. Its whole record is demolition, destruction, devastation, sadness, and sorrow. It is therefore not strange that the best thought and conscience of the world are now turning their attention to the discovery of a means by which war shall be lessened if not entirely prevented.

In the few moments allotted to me I wish to calmly and candidly consider the methods that have been tried and the remedies that are proposed for an amelioration of this condition. That nations, like individuals, have and will have differences that they can not settle between themselves must be accepted as inevitable; that there does arise and will arise grave questions between them which can not be adjusted to the satisfaction of one or the other of the contending parties. So long as selfish interests and instincts bias the judgment of men and of nations it will often be impossible for them to agree upon what is right and fair between themselves, and so long as human nature remains the same as it is there are only two ways of settling these final differences. One is by the arbitrament of war and the other is by the decision of an impartial, unbiased, and disinterested tribunal. All good men, all patriotic men shrink from the horrors of war. Few can now be found who will justify it as a means or defend it as a method of settling questions of right. All want peace; but there are two divergent and clearly defined classes of thought by which it can be obtained. One class believes and advocates that the only way to prevent war is to be constantly prepared for it; that the only way for a nation to preserve its own peace is to become so strong in its military and naval equipment that no other nation will be tempted to declare war on it. This is called "armed peace." The whole history of the world demonstrates that armament does not prevent war; but, on the contrary, as a rule, invites it. No nation can become so strong and powerful in its military equipment as to guarantee itself against attack unless it becomes stronger than all the nations of the world; and that, under existing conditions, is impossible and certainly undesirable. No individual has ever undertaken to play the bully that did not find himself sooner or later confronted by a man or combination of men that would lay him low. No nation has ever undertaken to play the bully that did not sooner or later find some other nation or combination of nations strong enough to overcome it. I undertake to say, in the light of all history, that no nation ever secured its permanent peace by its prowess of war equipment. I undertake further to say that the nations that have had most war are those that have made most preparation for it, and the nations that have had the greatest peace are those that have given the least attention to the preparation for war. We do not need to delve into ancient history to verify these propositions. Ever since I was a boy I have read the history of England and the pronouncement of all of her premiers, lords of admiralty, and great statesmen. They have all justified England's great armament on the ground of protecting her own peace and the peace of the world. But she has done neither. She has been almost constantly in war or in the throes of threatened war. She has seen the whole world drenched in the carnage of blood and fire. If her purpose in maintaining this great armament has been to secure peace, every candid man must admit that it has been a failure. She has squandered her wealth, impoverished her people, and heaped upon them burdens of taxation, under which they stagger without having accomplished her avowed or declared purpose.

I have read the history of France. I have seen her spend billions of dollars in war preparation. I have read the state-

ments of her Emperors, her Presidents, her premiers, and her warriors, and they have all proclaimed that these expenditures were made in the interests of peace. France has taxed her subjects almost to the point of exhaustion for the purpose of maintaining her naval and military equipment, and all this was done, according to the declaration of her statesmen, to guarantee peace. And yet the history of France is but a history of its wars. France has neither secured its own peace nor contributed to the peace of the world by her preparedness.

Russia, that great colossus of the north, has impoverished her peasants and depleted the revenues of her Empire in maintaining her standing army and in building her fortifications and armament, under the delusion that she could awe the world. She has dreamed that she could become so strong and powerful that she could secure her own peace and command the peace of the world. This has been the dream of her Czars and her statesmen. But the folly and supineness of her policy has been revealed by every page of her national history. She has neither been able to secure peace for herself nor add to the world's peace. Neither the presence nor preparedness of her vast hordes were able to command peace for her humblest protégé—Serbia.

I have been intensely interested in the history of Germany. I have been fascinated with her wonderful development and have been astonished at her growth in the arts, science, and literature, and, most of all, in her industrial and commercial progress; but I have been shocked and astounded at her military preparations. She has taxed her people to the last point that they would endure, and several times she has been on the verge of domestic disquietude, if not revolution. Her populace has groaned under the burdens of her war budgets. But their murmurings of disquietude have been hushed by the declarations of her Emperors and chancellors that these things were necessary to preserve her own peace and the peace of Europe. She has turned Germany into a war camp and bedecked her hills and hamlets with glittering bayonets and helmets. Her military conscription has made every able-bodied man a warrior. She has created a military aristocracy and has made dominant the science of war over the arts of peace. If it is possible to secure peace by preparedness, Germany ought to have had perpetual peace. But her preparedness did not protect her. We now find her engaged in the most terrific war the world has ever seen, a war that not only challenges her military prowess but, by her own words, threatens her existence. If the superhuman preparedness of Germany has not been able to protect herself or contribute to the peace of the world, it leads every thoughtful man to inquire just how much preparedness is necessary in order to guarantee peace and protection to a nation.

This war clearly demonstrates the fallacy that war can be prevented by preparedness. In the last 40 years, since the close of the Franco-Prussian War, the nations now at war have expended more than \$40,000,000,000 in preparedness for war. I saw a map the other day printing in black the portions of the globe now engaged in war and in white the countries blessed with peace. This map showed that three-fifths of the globe is now black and two-fifths is white, and it strangely and conclusively shows that preparedness for war does not prevent war. The countries that have expended the most money and made the greatest preparations for war are now engaged in war, while the countries that have made the least preparation are now enjoying the blessings of peace. In viewing that map I noticed the little spot on the Western Hemisphere marked the "United States," and it was in white. The jingo press of the country and the military chivalrists on this floor tell you that we are not prepared for war. For one I thank God that that is true—that we are prepared for peace. If in this crucial hour we had as large an Army as some men advocate, if we had a Navy as large as some men on this floor would wish, if we had the military spirit aroused as some are attempting to do, if we had as commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States a man of warlike temperament this country, like those other unfortunate countries, would now be grappling in the world's titanic struggle, and the little white spot now appearing on the Western Hemisphere as the United States would be added to the hideous map of black that now appalls the world. But if preparedness could purchase peace it could not secure justice. The rights of the strong would be respected or enforced while those of the weak would be disregarded or outraged. This world will not be civilized until it provides a method of securing international justice as well as peace.

The spectacle of this hour demonstrates that war can not be prevented by preparedness. It even demonstrates a stronger proposition that preparedness for war incites and invites war. The war spirit that was aroused in order to sustain the Governments



in their policy of expenditures could not be satisfied with the mere building of war vessels or the construction of superior military equipment. This spirit demanded their use, the trying of them out in actual conflict. A nation that has been taught to believe that it has the strongest navy and an invincible army can not be contented until it has tested its prowess in real conflict. You might as well say that a football team would be satisfied with its months of training without ever allowing them to enter the real game. It thus happens that whenever a nation has developed the military spirit, in times of serious or even slight trouble this military spirit gets beyond the power of control by the conservative and peaceful forces, and on the slightest provocation demands war. The pages of history are replete with instances where nations have been driven to war against the calm, cool judgment of the people. In my judgment, if we desire to secure the blessings of peace for ourselves and for our posterity we should encourage the arts of peace instead of stimulating and emulating the arts of war. You can not stimulate peace and good order in a community by encouraging every man to carry a revolver, bowie knife, and brass knuckles, however effective they are in personal defense. But no man ever added to his own personal safety in a community by strapping a belt of revolvers about him or by leaving protrude from his boots the handles of bowie knives. He thereby only added to the danger of personal attack. Such preparedness only invites encounter, and this is just as true of nations as of individuals. The law of cause and effect works the same with one as with the other. The world's late craze for naval and military armament has brought its logical and natural climax—a world war.

Now, since war can not be prevented or even ameliorated by preparedness, it leads every man that wants peace to make a candid inquiry as to whether there is another method of prevention or amelioration. As I have said before, nations, like individuals, will have controversies that they can not settle between themselves. Nations, like individuals, are biased and warped by self-interest. Most questions arising between nations, like those arising between individuals, can be settled by negotiations through diplomacy. Most nations, like individuals, want to do that which is right. But the question of interest or expediency makes them look at it from different standpoints. Both are honest in their belief that they want to do what is right, but they can not see it alike. When nations reach that point there is nothing to do but to submit the difference to arbitration or war.

Take as an illustration the negotiations now taking place between this country and England over the rights of neutral commerce. It is the interest of England to cripple her opponent as much as possible by cutting off her food supply. It is the interest of the United States to keep open these markets for food products of which she produces a superabundance. The viewpoint of each is determined more or less by self-interest, and it could hardly be expected that either party thus biased or prejudiced could determine the question according to the very rights of the matter. But after a full discussion through diplomatic channels this country and England still disagree. America demands and England refuses. What then? Either war or the honorable submission of the question to some disinterested court of arbitration. Which of these methods is the saner one? The submission of a question to the determination of war never settled a question of right. It would not prove that we were wrong in the contention if England should whip us, nor would it prove that we were right if we should whip England. It would simply demonstrate which was the stronger. I believe that most, if not all, of the wars of the world could be prevented by the nations adopting the same judicial machinery that has been tried and made effective in determining the rights and settling the disputes of organized society. Primitive and barbarous men determined their own rights and settled them by force. But civilization has now reached the point when no man has the privilege of determining his own rights nor the power of enforcing them. Society has assumed through properly constituted tribunals the prerogative of determining the rights of the citizens and has created the instrumentality for enforcing them. Inherently I see no difference between the relations of individuals to each other and the relations of nations to each other. There are strong men who declare that there are questions of national honor that can not be submitted to arbitration. Logically and inherently it is just as true that there are certain questions of personal honor that can not be submitted to the arbitration of courts. But experience has demonstrated that peaceful society can not be maintained by allowing any man to determine his own rights or methods of enforcing them. However sacred these personal rights may be to every man, society has demanded their surrender, except the one of self-defense, and this can only be exercised in the manner and under the rules prescribed by law, and even then society

undertakes to punish the aggressor and protect the attacked. It is by this method that individual man has emerged from barbarism to civilization. The very minute that we recognize the right of every man to determine his own rights and use his own methods of enforcement, that minute we sink to barbarism. The progress and perfection of civilization is determined at once by the readiness and willingness of men to submit their rights to the determination of society.

It is a strange fact that while men in their individual capacity have made wonderful progress, as nations we are as barbarous as we were in the Dark Ages. The same methods of determining rights between nations are employed now as then. The same wild ferocity is just as much manifested now as then. The desperate carnage is just as great if not greater than then. Man in his individual relation is becoming marvelously civilized, but as a part of the nation he is still a barbarian. I ask, is it not possible that the same forces that have made man in his individual capacity civilized are capable of being applied to national civilization? The same reasoning that took from the man his gun, his pistol, and his bowie knife should deprive nations of them. When two men undertake to fight out their difficulties they do not simply involve themselves. They involve the best welfare and comfort of others, and therefore society has the right to demand that they desist, even though the matter in controversy is purely personal. So with nations. No two nations can go to war without involving the whole world. They not only disturb the commercial, social, and business relations, but they often involve other nations in the combat.

Take, for illustration, the present war. Serbia and Austria-Hungary had a controversy. The exchanges of diplomacy failed to settle that controversy to the satisfaction of both parties. It is more than possible that Austria-Hungary had a real grievance and that Serbia had a real right that was involved in that controversy. How much more sane and sensible it would have been to submit that controversy to disinterested parties. This war with its awful ravages will not settle the question as to which was right in that controversy. But the world had a real interest in that controversy as well as these two countries. In attempting to settle that controversy by arms they have involved the whole world. There is perhaps not a man, woman, or child in all the world who has not been affected by it. All Europe has been immediately affected by it and the rest of the world in a more or less direct degree. That little trouble started between Austria-Hungary and Serbia has involved all Europe in a war that will probably cost more than 10,000,000 lives and twenty billions of money, and when one or the other wins at this awful sacrifice the question as to whether Austria-Hungary or Serbia was right will not have been determined.

But there are those who will say that Austria-Hungary had a right to make the demand and enforce its observance at the point of the bayonet and that Serbia had a right to resist, regardless of what effect it might have on the rest of the world. I challenge that proposition. Nations, like individuals, are part of a great community, and they are responsible to that community for their conduct. Neither of them had a right to settle their grievances in a way that might involve the whole world. National society has a right to protect itself as well as local society.

The nations of the world will never become really civilized until they have created machinery for settling such controversies and averting such national disasters. In my judgment, this can be easily done by the nations agreeing to create a court of arbitration to which all disputes might be referred. I know they say it is impossible to do this. I can not see why. Individuals in organized society have made such a compact through their common law. Why can not Governments? A supreme international court is not new nor novel. Since The Hague conference in 1899 the dream of the utopian has become the sober purpose of the real statesman. But some say it would be impossible to get impartial judges or tribunals. Every difficulty that is involved in securing such a court to settle international disputes is involved in securing courts or juries to settle individual disputes. There are prejudiced judges and partial juries. But no one would think for that reason that we should abandon the whole system of judicial procedure for determining and enforcing rights and go back to the old method. In my judgment it would be easier, subject to less difficulty and complications, to secure fair, impartial, and high-minded judges to sit in an international court than in a national court. It would be no more difficult to provide for the proper enforcement of the orders and decrees of this court than to provide for the enforcement of the decrees and judgments of a national court. Of course this court must be established by national agreement, like the local courts are established, and



their powers determined by local agreement. If nations want peace they can secure it through an international court of arbitration. If they want war they can continue their present barbarous system of determining national disputes. For one, I am in favor of an international court.

But I wish now to devote a few minutes to the present situation in this country. There is a propaganda now going on in the press of the country for a large increase of the naval and military forces of the United States, and it is shared in and promoted by certain Members of this House. With some it has reached a stage of hysteria. They try to make us believe that the United States is constantly in danger of attack and that we are in no position to defend ourselves. I wish to examine that question not from the standpoint of a military or naval man, but from the standpoint of a common citizen and apply to it not merely the rules of war strategy, but of common sense.

In the first place our situation is our best protection. We are isolated from any possible enemies on the east by an ocean expanse of about 3,000 miles, and on the west by about 5,000 miles. Any country that would undertake to attack the continental United States would have to transport its armies with all its equipment across these vast expanses before they could attack us. The impracticability, if not impossibility of the transportation of any dangerous forces must be apparent. It would take at least 100 vessels to transfer 100,000 men, and such a flotilla could not be brought together, equipped, and landed in the United States in less than two months after the declaration of war, and probably not inside of three or four months. We may get some idea of this task from recent occurrences. After the declaration of war between Germany and England it took England nearly three weeks to land 60,000 men across the channel, a distance of only 25 miles. In the published conversations that took place between military officers of Belgium and England looking to the defense of Belgium by England in the event of attack by Germany, England would not agree that it was possible to land 100,000 English troops in Belgium in less than two weeks. If it would take two weeks to get together a flotilla for transporting 100,000 soldiers 25 miles, where every vessel could make five or six trips a day, how long would it take to get together a flotilla for transporting that number of men 3,000 miles? Such a task would be stupendous, so great that no nation has yet ever considered it, and, in my judgment, no nation ever will seriously consider it.

But now what would they do if they arrived here? It is conceded by every cool, level-headed naval man that they could not land their troops at any of our fortified ports. There is no naval officer that will now risk his ships within the range of land batteries. The contest between land batteries and a ship is too unequal to be hazarded. One well-directed shot from a land battery may sink a large dreadnaught. Its size and position make it an easy target. But the guns from the ship with difficulty locate the land battery, and its size and concealment make it a very doubtful target, and even if found and hit may do but little damage. It certainly can not be sunk. At most it can be silenced, while other batteries can keep up the contest. This constitutes such an unequal situation that it is becoming the recognized naval policy to never allow a fleet to engage in combat with a land battery. But the length of time that would be absolutely necessary for the moving of such a flotilla would make it easily possible to mine all of our ports, and against the destruction of these mines no naval officer will jeopardize his war vessels.

So it is conceded by all military men, I believe, that if any landing of such a fleet could be had on the eastern coast of the United States it would have to be on the open seashore. Now, let us see what are the difficulties connected with such a landing. Such a flotilla could not be organized and brought to our coast unknown or unobserved. Our ships on the sea could and would keep track of them, and their direction and probable landing place would be communicated by our modern system of wireless telegraphy. They could not creep up by stealth. The contemplated place of landing could and would be known a reasonable time at least before their approach, and our troops, through rapid transportation by rail, could be easily concentrated at such point. Now, what would happen? Neither the war vessels, colliers, nor transports could reach the shore so as to unload their soldiers direct. They would have to anchor at sea and send in their soldiers and their equipment in small boats. By the modern system our armies could be easily entrenched on the shore and could easily pick off these soldiers approaching in the small boats as fast as any attempt to land them was made. Our men would be in trenches and their men would be in boats on the open sea. What kind of a show would they stand in making such a landing? But it might be said

that the war vessels would drive our men from the trenches. That is not so easily done. The present war has demonstrated that it is very difficult to drive men from trenches by cannonading, even with shrapnel. For months men have lain in trenches along the fighting line between Germany and France under almost constant artillery fire. It would be almost impossible to hold a naval fleet in one position long enough to completely drive our men from the trenches. Certainly it could not be done until large numbers of the landing soldiers had been slain. But suppose that the artillery from the war vessels was able to drive back our men so as to allow their soldiers to land. It would only be necessary for us to withdraw our soldiers far enough from the seashore to get out of range of the guns where we could retrench, and then what would 100,000 men do toward conquering the United States on land? How far could they or would they dare to follow our soldiers into the interior?

What kind of an army could we organize in 60 days to meet such an invading army? We have a Regular Army of 80,000 men, a large part of which could be made available in the time that would be necessary for the transportation of this invading force. We now have about 120,000 national guards, all of whom are more or less trained in military tactics and operation. How long would it take to secure a million volunteers to defend our coast against foreign invasion? We now have more than a million arms with which to equip them. I undertake to say, judging from the experiences of the past, that in 60 days the United States could assemble a million men with sufficient training and ability to meet such an invading force. Such an invading force would not dare to leave the protection of their ships and undertake to go inland. Abraham Lincoln was right when he said that all the armies of the world could not water their horses in the Ohio River. Any such force as that which would undertake to penetrate that far would be surrounded, enveloped, and annihilated. Napoleon once said that he had figured out a hundred ways in which to land troops in England, but he never had been able to figure out one way by which he could get them out. Every military man in Europe that has ever contemplated the invasion of the United States has been confronted with Napoleon's dilemma. This may account for the fact that although we have been here now for 125 years no nation has ever yet declared nor, so far as I know, contemplated the declaration of an offensive war on the United States. It will be noticed that in my analysis of this defense I have left out of consideration entirely the American Navy, except such parts of it as might be necessary for scouting the seas and keeping track of the movements of the invading fleet.

But these advocates of increased militarism when confronted by the fact that it is practically impossible for an invading force to approach us from the seas at once say that England could land her troops in Canada and bring them across the border, and there is something sane and sensible in that suggestion. England could send her troops to Canada and mass an army that could attack us on the north, and that is the only place from which we could be endangered. And yet that but reveals the inconsistency of the advocates of armament, fortifications, and big armies. The only place from which an attack could be made is not fortified, and there is not any proposition in their program to fortify it. Here is a line between Canada and the United States that extends for more than 3,000 miles that has not a gun, a fortification, or a soldier, and this bill does not carry a cent for the purpose of increasing the fortifications along the line of our only possible danger of attack. When put to its final analysis it shows that the American people are depending for protection against England not upon her armies, not upon her fortifications, but upon the friendship, good will, and sense of justice of the English people. We are spending millions and millions of money in protecting ourselves against imaginary or impossible enemies and leaving absolutely exposed the only possible point of invasion. The very fact that that line has remained there unprotected and unfortified for a century and a quarter without a single hostile foe having even threatened its passage is the best argument in the world in favor of the proposition that war can best be prevented by amicable relations and adjustments and not by fortifications and armaments. Now, if we really have a nightmare of invasion, if we are hysterical, if we are scared out of our boots, let us be sensible and fortify and protect the only line of possible danger.

But when and where is this mad craze for increased armament going to stop? Every time one nation builds warships it is necessary for every other nation to build others to match them. Every time one nation increases its army it is necessary for other nations to increase theirs. This process has been going on for the last two decades, until it is sapping the financial resources and industrial activities of the people. Al-



ready our war expenses have reached the point where 73 cents out of every dollar that is paid by taxes into the Federal Treasury goes into the war chest. Sir Edward Grey said, on March 13, 1911, in the halls of Parliament, that—

If this tremendous expenditure on and rivalry of armaments goes on it must in the long run break civilization down.

In the last two decades Germany has increased its annual war budget in times of peace from \$177,000,000 to \$313,000,000; Russia has increased from \$135,000,000 to \$285,000,000; France from \$180,000,000 to \$233,000,000; Great Britain from \$164,000,000 to \$312,000,000; Japan from \$9,000,000 to \$74,000,000; and the United States from \$137,000,000 to \$409,000,000. Men on this floor talk about the passive unpreparedness of the United States, and yet our war budget is larger than any other nation in the world—almost \$100,000,000 more than the largest, that of Germany. I chose the year 1910 as the proper one for comparison because the great powers of the world were then at peace. But while we are still at peace, the war budget of this session of Congress as reported carries nearly \$20,000,000 more than it did in 1910. When are we going to reach a stage of defense that will satisfy the hysterical jingoes of this country?

Let us be practical for a moment. If we are going to maintain an army that will fairly match the standing armies of the leading powers of the Old World no one would place it at less than 600,000 men. If it costs \$100,000,000 to keep a standing army of 80,000 men, what would it cost to keep a standing army of 600,000 men? Mathematics would tell you that it would cost at least \$700,000,000. This would be for mere support. With this vast army, of course, the pension roll would be greatly increased. If we are to build a navy that is ample to protect us under all circumstances on the sea we must have a navy as strong or stronger than the strongest. The construction of such a navy within the next decade would call for an appropriation of at least \$200,000,000 annually and would cost at least \$300,000,000 a year for support. This, with our pension roll, would make an annual war budget of approximately \$1,360,000,000. This would more than exhaust the entire present revenues of the Government, including the postal receipts. These cold figures ought to be sufficient to convince anyone that the American people are unwilling to enter upon a program of complete defense by military and naval prowess.

There are things that will furnish better protection than military preparedness. Nations like individuals can keep out of trouble best by tending to their own business and recognizing and respecting the rights of others. He is a big, brave, strong man that is always ready to defend his rights, but he is a bigger, braver, stronger man who is capable of recognizing and respecting the rights of others. It is a big, brave, strong nation that is ready at all times and under all circumstances to defend its rights, but it is a bigger, braver, and stronger nation that is capable at all times of recognizing and respecting the rights of other nations. It is by this course, and by this course only, that any nation can remain at peace. Justice, equity, humanity, respect for the rights of others are the only things that can secure peace. Armies and armaments do not even make for peace, let alone guarantee it.

But every nation is confronted by the danger of a natural and cultivated war spirit. Human nature is such that it is easy to stir up strife. One hot-headed man can start a riot that 10,000 cool, level-headed men can not stop. One real coward can stir a thrill of terror that a thousand brave men can not quiet. The world is one great magazine of war spirit that is easy to arouse, and when started is almost impossible to control. One schoolboy started a conflagration of war that has involved all Europe, that popes, presidents, sovereigns, and the united prayers of all civilized men can not stop; and if prayer is or can be answered it raises the question as to whether the Almighty Himself can stop it. The flames and passions of war can be easily fanned and the siren of peace becomes almost voiceless before its mad rage.

This situation and condition is utilized by those who are interested financially in the making of instruments of war equipment. In a recent speech made by Dr. Karl Liebknecht in the Reichstag, it was charged that the Krupps had been using their money freely in exploiting patriotism for the same reason and to the same end that manufacturers of other materials spent their money in creating a demand for their wares. It was alleged that this firm, for instance, would go to France and hire some scientific journal to publish an article exploiting the wonderful power of new instruments of war that were being manufactured by France. This in turn was published in all the leading papers of Germany and created a war scare that brought big orders to the Krupps for increased guns. They were constantly having published in foreign papers threats or preparations for war and these were republished at home. In

this way they were able to stimulate public sentiment in Germany to the necessity of tremendous war preparations and equipment. After an investigation the substance of these charges were admitted on the floor of the Reichstag by the war minister of Germany. I venture the suggestion that when the real cause of the present terrible war in Europe is finally ascertained it will be found to lie at the door of those large concerns in the various countries that are interested commercially in furnishing war equipment. They have carried on a regular and systematic propaganda for the purpose of arousing envy and hatred between the nations and creating a war spirit at home. I am not without strong suspicions that such forces have been at play during the last two decades at least in the United States. I think the time has fairly arisen when the peace-loving people of this country should take a firm stand against this terrible and indefensible clamor for war, when we should as a Nation turn our attention to the arts, bounties, and blessings of peace, when we should conserve our resources for improving the living conditions of our people rather than wasting them in these fruitless attempts of securing armed peace.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, we have listened for some hours to a rather academic discussion as to whether we are prepared for war or not. Personally, I am far from being a militarist, but I do believe in rational preparedness for emergencies. I, too, have read a little of world history, and I find that no nation is, or ever has been, the sole arbiter of its own destiny. Take the conditions we find in Europe to-day. Six months ago we saw the little country of Belgium—the most densely populated section of the globe, for its area—with its people at peace, engaged in husbandry, in manufactures, in the arts. That little country was suddenly invaded, and its citizens were called upon at a moment's notice to defend themselves against the German invaders. At the same time, over in Asia, was China, the most populous country in the world, with 400,000,000 of people. It represents the oldest civilization on the habitable globe, so far as recorded history goes; yet this nation, with its teeming millions of inhabitants, appealed pathetically to the civilized world to protect it against the invading forces of England and Japan.

As a matter of fact we did not start our own last war, the war with Spain. Spain herself delivered his passports to the American minister and declared war against us. We were not prepared at that time to fight even a poor, weak, decadent nation. Our unpreparedness then has doubtlessly cost us many millions of the dollars that gentlemen have spoken of this afternoon. The very pensions to Spanish-American War soldiers that have been alluded to are in large part due to the unpreparedness of the United States in that conflict. If we had had the proper medical supplies and could have taken care of our boys even in the camps on our own soil, let alone the soil of foreign lands, many of those who fell sick and who incurred incurable diseases would not now find themselves in that sorry plight which compels them to seek a pension from a grateful country.

Crises in national affairs usually come unexpectedly. The war in Europe came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. If two or three months earlier any man had predicted such a conflict, he would have been looked upon as a fit subject for a lunatic asylum. But suddenly this great cataclysm burst into existence, and millions of men rushed to the front to fight the battles of their respective fatherlands.

Unfortunately jingoism is found in every country, and it is frequently jingoism that brings on armed conflict. Most of the countries of the world have ministries that resign when defeated in the parliament. If a jingo parliament obtains control of the reins of government, such a parliament can force the nation into war. And even though the disposition of our own people and our own Government were absolutely opposed to an armed conflict it is possible for us to be assailed and compelled to defend ourselves.

I have heard talk of war on this floor in very recent times, from men who are constantly opposing appropriations for moderate preparedness. I recall an incident that occurred about two years ago, when there was a controversy in my own State about the passage by our legislature of an alien land law. The people of California felt that they had a right under our constitution and our laws to regulate the ownership of land in that State. A country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean became intensely excited over the proposed legislation. There were threatening crowds in the streets of that country's capital. Excitement ran high. A gentleman on this floor, who has constantly opposed any appropriation for armament, said that he thoroughly agreed with the position the people of California had taken in this matter. In my own opinion he was right. I believe the people of California had the absolute right to take the stand they did. Then this gentleman went on to say



that if the other country was displeased with the action of California and should attempt to interfere with the undoubted rights of the people of that Commonwealth, he, for one, was ready to fight—yes, to go to war to compel that other country to respect our rights. But what did he want to go to war with? He is opposed to armaments, but he was willing to fight in defense of principles he believed to be right. Do you think you can fight unless you have the munitions of war? Unless you have battleships, and cruisers, and submarines, and all the vessels that are required in a modern navy—and unless you have a thoroughly equipped army? And yet the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Sisson] was willing to fight another country unless the people of that country were content to accept the views of one of the States of the American Union.

Mr. Chairman, the American people are a race-proud people. We speak with pride of our history, our institutions, our commercial development, our material progress. We glory in our past triumphs and rejoice in the achievements of our martial heroes on land and on sea; and on account of the fact that we have been fortunate and have had success heretofore we are too apt to minimize the necessity for adequate preparedness.

I do not doubt, and no man can doubt, the intense patriotism of the American people. Patriotism, however, is not the only requirement for winning battles. The pages of history are replete with instances where the greatest personal patriotism succumbed on the field of battle to superior forces or better-equipped adversaries. We are too prone in this country to exaggerate our prowess, our fighting ability. The gentleman who spoke a moment ago, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Prouty], delivered a speech on this floor about three or four weeks ago in which he pointed out the impossibility of landing an invading force from the transports of an enemy on the coast of some unprotected bay. He went on to say, as I now recall, that such a thing was impossible; that he could go out to Arkansas and get a regiment of squirrel hunters, take them to the shore of that bay, and just pop off the invaders as they were trying to land.

That kind of talk is pernicious. Did the gentleman ever consider that there would be great battleships of the enemy behind those transports, and that they would be firing 700 and 800 pound shells to drive off and scatter those squirrel hunters? The squirrel hunters would not get within 6 or 8 miles of the shore, and, as a matter of fact, they could not. The heavy shells from the battleships would just drive them inland while the landing was being effected. And yet that kind of bombast is uttered on this floor in the attempt to induce the American people to lull themselves into a belief that there is absolutely no danger from invasion at any time, and that we can drive off an enemy without difficulty and without any preparedness.

Mr. BOOHER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. BOOHER. I would like to ask the gentleman what our Navy would be doing at the same time that the transports were landing their men?

Mr. KAHN. The assumption was that we had lost control of the sea.

Mr. BOOHER. Before a gun had been fired?

Mr. KAHN. No; after a disastrous naval battle we had lost control of the sea. The enemy were trying to land their men. That happens, as the gentleman must know, once in a while.

Mr. BOOHER. It does not happen that we have ever been licked.

Mr. KAHN. We have been licked in some fights, but generally we have been successful; thank God for that.

Mr. BOOHER. And I think we will be again.

Mr. KAHN. I have no doubt that if the time shall ever come when the Army and Navy of the United States are called upon to give an account of themselves, we will find them both ready to defend our country and our flag with all the valor that has inspired them in our past conflicts. They will give an account of themselves that will bring a flush of pride to their admiring countrymen. But all the same I still believe that the old saying, "Trust in God, but keep your powder dry," applies in our day even as it did in the early days of the Republic, and I for one want a good deal of reserve powder to be kept dry.

Now, I recall one occasion in the Committee on Military Affairs when we were taking up this very question of possible invasion, and one of my colleagues said, "Oh, there is no danger; we will sweep them off into the Pacific Ocean with brooms." Well, we will find out that any nation that picks

a quarrel with us and goes to war with us will not be fighting us with brooms. We will have to meet them with the same kind of weapons that they have, and, if possible, better ones. I heard a great deal, about two years ago, about the great work for world's peace that was going to be performed by the two good ships, Fellowship and Friendship. I think they were both scuttled at Vera Cruz. [Laughter.]

Mr. BOOHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. BOOHER. The gentleman has not given up all hope yet that good-fellowship and good friendship will yet reign in the world?

Mr. KAHN. Oh, good-fellowship and good friendship are mighty fine qualities to possess, not only for individuals, but even for nations; but, unfortunately, the selfishness that has been referred to repeatedly on this floor this afternoon still dominates the breasts of many individuals and even the rulers of nations. Therefore, we must be practical and take conditions as they are, and prepare ourselves accordingly.

Mr. BOOHER. Just one more question. The gentleman from California has not given up all hope of a final court of arbitration to settle questions between nations, has he?

Mr. KAHN. I am hoping there may be a court of arbitration some day, but even if we want to enforce the decrees of that court we will have to have ships of war and armed forces to do it, because the decrees of the court will never enforce themselves.

Mr. BOOHER. Then, the gentleman means to say that a nation that would enter into this arbitration agreement would not keep its contract with the other nations?

Mr. KAHN. Oh, I have seen nations tear up treaties as though they were scraps of paper, and I believe that even with the establishment of a court of arbitration every nation will still have to maintain a part of the world's police force in order to enforce the decrees of that court.

Mr. BOOHER. The gentleman does not believe that to enforce those decrees it would be necessary for this Government of ours to increase our standing army?

Mr. KAHN. Oh, I have not favored the increase of the standing army. I have never at any time favored the increase of the standing army. I have said that I am not a militarist, but for all that I believe in being prepared for possible emergencies.

Mr. BOOHER. The gentleman is in favor of an adequate defense?

Mr. KAHN. Absolutely.

Mr. FARR. And have we an adequate defense?

Mr. KAHN. No, we have not.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. McKELLAR. In reference to these treaties of peace, does not the gentleman think if they serve no other good purpose, they serve the purpose of permitting us to become very much better prepared while we are parleying about this?

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I have no fear of any early trouble with any foreign country. And yet I recognize the fact that rulers and cabinets and peoples are all human, with all human frailties and passions, and emotions, and failings. We hope that we may never again be embroiled in war, but the best thing to do, in my judgment, is to be so well equipped that in case any country wants to engage in war with us that country will think twice or even three times before it undertakes to pick a quarrel with us.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio, Judge GARD, who, until very recently, was a very distinguished member of the Committee on Military Affairs, and we all have the highest regard for him, told the House this afternoon that the question of national defense is not a partisan question. I fully agree with that sentiment. It never should be a partisan question. Partisanship should never be injected into the question of the national defense, and yet I was greatly surprised a week ago or thereabouts to read in the newspapers that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy had invited the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, and the chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee on fortifications to a conference on national defense. Not a single Member of the minority upon this floor was invited to that conference. I complain of that. If the national defense is not a partisan matter, and it should not be, then conferences of that character for discussing the question of a national defense ought to include Members of the minority. [Applause on the Republican side.] A gentleman on this floor, discussing the matter a few



days ago with the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], referred to the national defense as a partisan matter. I refer now to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BLACKMON]. He asked the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] why the latter's party had allowed the conditions that he was complaining of to continue while the Republicans were in control of Congress. Thus the gentleman from Alabama sought to bring partisanship into the discussion. As a matter of fact, under the domination of the Republican majority, many things were done for our military preparedness. The reorganization of the Army was brought about, and the law creating the staff corps was enacted.

Most of the great coast-defense guns were emplaced. Mine planters were constructed and put into all the principal harbors of the United States so as to enable the coast-defense artillerymen at those ports to receive instruction in mining and defending those harbors in case of invasion. We even accumulated a considerable reserve of medical supplies, clothing, ammunition, rifles, and field artillery. And the only time that these reserves were eaten into was when the Democrats secured a majority in the House of Representatives and thus obtained control of the Committee on Military Affairs in the Sixty-second Congress. It was then that for the first time in the history of the committee and the House the reserve supplies were eaten into. I had not intended to refer to these matters, but when Members try to force partisanship into the discussion I think the truth ought to be told. [Applause.]

Mr. FITZGERALD. Does the gentleman mean that if this were a nonpartisan arrangement he would not tell the truth? Is that the advantage of nonpartisanship in these matters?

Mr. KAHN. Oh, no; I think the gentleman himself knows that the truth will be brought out, no matter whether Republicans or Democrats control the committee, and it is a good thing for the country that the truth be told. There has never been any desire on the part of the Republican members of the committee to hide the truth, and I know that there is no disposition on the part of the Democratic members of the committee to hide or distort the truth.

We have always worked in absolute harmony on questions of the national defense, and it has been rarely that a minority report has been brought in from the Committee on Military Affairs. The only occasion I can recall is when the attempt was made to increase the term of enlistment; and Members still differ, and honestly differ, as to what good, if any, has been accomplished by having changed the term of enlistment from three to four years.

A great deal has been said on this floor to-day, as well as on other occasions, to the effect that 70 cents on every dollar of taxation is now being expended for armament or for wars past and preparation for wars to come. Mr. Chairman, much of that expenditure is due to the large cost that was incurred by the people of the United States on account of their unpreparedness at the outset of hostilities in our past wars. But that cost is not a fair argument in favor of shutting off necessary military and naval supplies. I recall that in the early days of the Republic a similar argument was made against the continuation of the courts. Arguing from a similar viewpoint, there were many Americans who wanted to close the courts of the land because 50 cents out of every dollar that was collected from the taxpayers of the country was being used to run the courts of the 13 States. Men rose in the Continental Congress in those days—yes, and in the State legislatures—and urged that the courts be closed on account of this great expenditure of public money for their maintenance.

Sir, it is much cheaper to build up our military defenses in times of peace and the taxpayers' burden will be much lighter than if we await the opening of actual hostilities before we begin the necessary preparation for the national defense. The present cost of the Army is largely due to the increase of the military forces after the Spanish-American War and to the increase of the pay of officers and enlisted men. I may say in that connection that our country is practically the only country in the world that makes a soldier's life a career for its citizens. That is why we are spending so much money for the Army. We pay \$15 a month to the enlisted man during the first enlistment, with increased pay and bonuses for subsequent enlistments, and retire him at three-fourths pay after 30 years' service. Why, this very bill carries \$2,850,000 for the pay of enlisted men on the retired list of the United States Army. We do not want conscription in this country. No man wants to see a great armed camp in the United States.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. How does our pay to the private soldiers compare with the pay to the private soldiers in the armies of the other important nations of the world?

Mr. KAHN. England is the only other country that pays any considerable sum. I believe England pays something like \$8 a month to her enlisted men, but in the armies of continental Europe the pay is about 60 cents a month to the soldier—about 2 cents a day. The countries that have conscription laws work upon the principle that it is the duty of every male citizen to defend the home and the fatherland. That is the principle upon which their system is founded, and they demand two years' service in the Army—in some of the countries three years' service—of every male citizen capable of bearing arms. The people of the United States would never consent to a proposition of that kind in this country.

But I do believe that we could form a very large reserve force in the United States that would come to the colors upon the first call of the President; a reserve of men who will have had at least one year's service in the Regular Army, and possibly two years.

In other words, I believe that we ought to reduce the term of enlistment to a period of not exceeding two years, with the right of a soldier to receive an honorable discharge at the end of one year. Gentlemen on this floor say that we can not build up an army of that character in the United States—that we can not turn out fully trained soldiers in two years. That statement discounts the ability of the American boy. Let me give you a bit of history.

In 1808 the treaty of Tilsit was signed between Napoleon Bonaparte and the King of Prussia. Under the terms of that treaty Prussia was restricted to an army of 42,000 men. She was not allowed to have any more soldiers than that, and these 42,000 men were to be distributed in her infantry, cavalry, and artillery organizations. She had a great general at the head of her War Department at that time, General von Scharnhorst. He was backed up in his plans by the great premier of Prussia, Baron Stein. They had to accept the humiliating terms that were imposed by Napoleon. They agreed to the army of 42,000 men. But Scharnhorst pointed out that the treaty did not state that those 42,000 men would have to be kept in the Army until they died. So he decided that a large percentage of 42,000 men could be discharged every year, and that new men could be enlisted to take their places immediately, so that the army could be kept up to a maximum enlisted strength of 42,000 men, while large numbers of men who had had a year's military training, could be sent back to the body of the citizenship of that country. Thus they could maintain the terms of the treaty and still build up a good-sized army reserve. They carried out that program.

Then, in the closing years of the Napoleonic wars, if history has been properly recorded, we recall that late in the afternoon of June 18, 1815, the Prussians, led by Blücher, came on the field of Waterloo and completed the downfall of the great Napoleon. Blücher's army was recruited from the thousands who had served a short period in the Prussian army under Scharnhorst's plan. They had all had military training, and on the call to arms they had promptly responded to the colors. [Applause.] And on that memorable afternoon they won the final victory for the allied forces against the flower of Napoleon's grand army, the "old guard."

Mr. Chairman, why can not the American youth be turned out a good soldier at the end of one or two years? I am satisfied that if the Prussian boy can make a good soldier in that brief period, certainly the American boy can make as good a soldier in that time. [Applause.] And I would not have the American boy tied to the Army by a hard and fast agreement that he must come to arms in time of trouble. I would trust to his love of and devotion to his country and Old Glory to bring him to the colors in the hour of need. When I would give him his honorable discharge from the Military Service I would say to him, "Take it, my son. We hope we will never again need your services. You now have an honorable discharge from the Army of the United States. But should the god of battles ever decree that the United States should require of her sons that they should fly to the colors in defense of Old Glory and the homes and firesides of the Nation, we hope that you will promptly return to the ranks and give your country the benefit of the training that you have received." [Applause.] And I am satisfied that they would return to the colors by the thousands, yes, by the hundreds of thousands.

Mr. Chairman, with that force and the force of the Regular Army and the force of the Organized Militia, we could put into the field within a week after a declaration of war a half million men who had had ample training to fit them for a first line



of defense and who could hold at bay any possible invaders until the volunteer forces of the United States could be properly trained in the manual of arms and in preparedness for a campaign.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, something has been said here about the contest that is now going on in Europe. A great soldier died about two months ago in France. He was an English soldier—Lord Roberts. For years he had been dinnning into the ears of the English people the fact of their absolute unpreparedness so far as their military establishment was concerned. But his words fell upon deaf ears. His countrymen did not listen to his words of counsel and advice. What has been the consequence? So far as her land forces are concerned, England has not been able to give a real helping hand to her allies in the present struggle. The brunt of battle has been borne by Belgians, by Frenchmen, and by Russians, and not, as a rule, by Englishmen.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield? One or two of the Members have suggested that there might be an error in the statement as to nationality. Lord Roberts was an Irishman.

Mr. KAHN. He was the head of the English Army. I know that he was born in Ireland. He made a good soldier, as the Irishmen invariably do. [Applause.]

Mr. CHAIRMAN, there is another way in which I think our Army Establishment could be materially improved. I think the law which compels the retirement of officers at the age of 64 years ought to be amended. I think officers should be continued much longer than that in the regular service. A man at 64 is still capable of giving his country excellent service and can materially help in solving the great problems of a military character that confront the American people. As I stated a short while ago, the great officers in the titanic struggle going on in Europe to-day are men practically every one of whom is beyond 64 years of age. Our retired officers have been educated by the Government. They have been trained by years of experience to that standard of excellence that will enable them effectively to do the work which they have chosen as a life career, and the country ought to have the benefit of their services far beyond the sixty-fourth year of their lives.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, I do not wish to detain the committee any longer. I believe this European war will have an excellent effect upon the military establishment of the United States, so far as educating the American people for preparedness is concerned. We are learning much about the flying machine, the aeroplane forces. We will continue to learn many things in that direction. We have learned already the practical use of armored automobiles, and we will learn much more about them. We are painfully deficient in that branch of our military service, but we expect to have a force of that kind attached to the Army of the United States that will at least make a beginning in the right direction. The pending bill makes appropriation for the inauguration of such a force. We must keep abreast of the times in military preparedness. A little expenditure of money now will save enormous extravagances in case we should be thrown into possible hostilities at any time in the future.

I do not believe, as I said, in an enormous military establishment; but such as we have ought to be the very best on earth. It ought to be so perfect that it can be extended and expanded without difficulty or delay. And then if war should come, we would be ready, so far as our first line of defense is concerned, to meet the emergency promptly and effectively.

The bill that is before us is, in my judgment, a fair bill. It takes proper care of all the various branches of the Army; and while the sum appropriated is a little larger than was the sum appropriated under the last appropriation bill, I feel satisfied that the needs of the country warrant the slight increase, and that from the funds thus appropriated material benefit will accrue, not only to the Army and to the military establishment, but to all the people of the United States. [Applause.]

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois does not seem to be present. The Clerk will read the bill.

Mr. HAY. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the Clerk read the bill. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the bill for amendment.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. BRYAN. I would like the RECORD to show how the time stands.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty minutes were not used. Does the gentleman desire recognition?

Mr. HAY. I have the floor, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BRYAN. No; I do not desire recognition, unless as much as 40 minutes remained, which could be used by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. TAVENNER].

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

*Be it enacted, etc.,* That the following sums be, and they are hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1916.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

The committee accordingly rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 20347, the Army appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. STOUT, as requested by Mr. EVANS, for three days, on account of illness.

To Mr. RAINEY, for five days, to accompany to Illinois the remains of S. A. Murdock, an employee of the House, who died on Tuesday night.

#### SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE FOR SUNDAY SESSION.

The SPEAKER. The Chair assigns the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. BAKER] to preside next Sunday at the memorial exercises on account of the death of the late Mr. BREMER, of New Jersey.

#### HOOR OF MEETING TO-MORROW.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourn to meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] asks unanimous consent that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow morning. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

#### LEAVE TO PRINT.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all gentlemen may have five legislative days in which to print or extend their remarks on the Army appropriation bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the gentleman's request?

There was no objection.

#### URGENT DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (H. R. 20241) making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year 1915 and prior years, and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the accompanying statement be read in lieu of the report.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent that the statement be read in lieu of the report. Is there objection?

Mr. BURKE of South Dakota. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, in the absence of the minority leader I would like to ask the gentleman from New York whether there is anything in this conference report that will take any considerable time, and whether he has consulted the minority leader with reference to it?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I spoke to the minority leader yesterday, and thought I would endeavor to get the report up yesterday by unanimous consent without printing, and he said he would not object, but we had to wait until the Senate acted upon it. I do not think there is anything in the agreement to which anybody has objection, and my reason for calling it up to-night is that the Department of Agriculture is very anxious to get the appropriation for the suppression of the foot-and-mouth disease.

Mr. BURKE of South Dakota. Is it a unanimous report?

Mr. FITZGERALD. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GILLET], the minority representative, signed the report.

Mr. BURKE of South Dakota. Did he desire to be present when the report was considered?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I did not speak to him about that, but I do not believe that he desires to discuss it. There were only four amendments. One amendment involved an appropriation in which there was a disagreement, and that was the item for the employees for the collection of the war-revenue tax. The



House recommended \$75,000 and the Senate put in \$180,000. The conferees agreed on \$100,000.

There was one item of \$1,200 for rent in North Carolina, an actual deficiency. Then there was an amendment by the Senate authorizing the widening of Fourteenth Street between F Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, and that has been eliminated. There was also an item referring to the Panama Canal, which merely makes available money to do certain work at once. So that there were no matters of any great importance in controversy between the two Houses.

Mr. BURKE of South Dakota. Mr. Speaker, I have no objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and the Clerk will read the statement.

The conference report is as follows:

#### CONFERENCE REPORT (NO. 1306).

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 20241) making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year 1915 and prior years, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendment numbered 3.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 1 and 5 and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 2: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 2, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$100,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 4: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the amended paragraph insert the following:

"For the emergency caused by the infectious nature and continued spread of the destructive disease of citrus trees known as citrus canker, by conducting such investigations of the nature and means of communication of the disease, and by applying such methods of eradication or control of the disease as in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture may be necessary, \$35,000; and the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to pay such expense and employ such persons and means, and to cooperate with such authorities of the States concerned, organizations of growers, or individuals, as he may deem necessary to accomplish such purpose."

And the Senate agree to the same.

JOHN J. FITZGERALD,  
C. L. BARTLETT,  
F. H. GILLET,  
*Managers on the part of the House.*

LEE S. OVERMAN,  
N. P. BRYAN,  
REED SMOOT,  
*Managers on the part of the Senate.*

The Clerk read the statement, as follows:

#### STATEMENT.

The managers on the part of the House, at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 20241) making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year 1915 and prior years, and for other purposes, submit the following written statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conference committee and submitted in the accompanying conference report as to each of the said amendments, namely:

On amendment No. 1: Appropriates \$1,200, as proposed by the Senate, for rent of temporary quarters for Government officials at Raleigh, N. C.

On amendment No. 2: Appropriates \$100,000, instead of \$75,000 proposed by the House and \$180,000 proposed by the Senate, for salaries and expenses of collectors of internal revenue.

On amendment No. 3: Strikes out the paragraph, proposed by the Senate, authorizing the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to increase the width of the roadway of Fourteenth Street between F Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., and to repave the street with asphalt or asphalt block.

On amendment No. 4: Limits the amount to be used for personal services of the appropriation of \$35,000 for eradication of citrus canker to employment of persons outside of the city of Washington.

On amendment No. 5: Inserts the paragraph, proposed by the Senate, constituting one fund of the appropriations heretofore made for the "Fortification of the Panama Canal."

JOHN J. FITZGERALD,  
C. L. BARTLETT,  
F. H. GILLET,  
*Managers on the part of the House.*

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The question was taken, and the conference report was agreed to.

#### ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 35 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, January 22, 1915, at 11 o'clock a. m.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, a letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting, with a letter from the Chief of Engineers, report on preliminary examination and survey of channel at Seadrift, Tex., with a view to providing a suitable connection with the Texas coast waterway (H. Doc. No. 1511), was taken from the Speaker's table, referred to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, and ordered to be printed, with illustrations.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII,

Mr. VINSON, from the Committee on Pensions, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 21089) granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Regular Army and Navy, and certain soldiers and sailors of wars other than the Civil War, and to widows of such soldiers and sailors, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1307), which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

#### PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. PARK: A bill (H. R. 21090) to prevent cheating and swindling in interstate and foreign commerce; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. DIES: A bill (H. R. 21091) to make Beaumont, Tex., a subport of entry; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21092) to make Orange, Tex., a subport of entry; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FRENCH: A bill (H. R. 21093) to extend the franking privilege to the American National Red Cross; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21094) to amend section — of an act defining matter that may be admitted to second-class mail privileges; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. MOTT: A bill (H. R. 21095) to increase the military strength of the United States; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. PORTER: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 407) to prohibit the export of wheat and the products thereof; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SMITH of New York: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 408) to establish the priority of discovery of the North Pole and the region contiguous thereto; to the Committee on Education.

By Mr. SMITH of Maryland: Resolution (H. Res. 709) providing for action by Congress to increase the postal revenue; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. SMITH of Texas: Resolution (H. Res. 710) to amend the rules of the House of Representatives; to the Committee on Rules.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause I of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. VINSON: A bill (H. R. 21089) granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Regular Army and Navy, and certain soldiers and sailors of wars other than the Civil War, and to widows of such soldiers and sailors; to the Committee of the Whole House.



By Mr. AINEY: A bill (H. R. 21096) granting an increase of pension to Calvin C. Halsey; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BOOHER: A bill (H. R. 21097) granting an increase of pension to Eliza J. Michaels; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BORLAND: A bill (H. R. 21098) granting a pension to Lida W. Ashton; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21099) granting a pension to Ella C. Squires; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21100) granting a pension to Julia A. Sheck; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21101) granting an increase of pension to Ann M. Ellenberger; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21102) granting an increase of pension to Sarah H. Hunter; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21103) granting an increase of pension to William S. King; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21104) granting an increase of pension to Lucy M. Settle; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21105) granting an increase of pension to Joseph J. Massey; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FRENCH: A bill (H. R. 21106) for the relief of Edward B. Sappington and William Vane; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. GRAHAM of Illinois: A bill (H. R. 21107) granting an increase of pension to Daniel Hinkle; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21108) granting an increase of pension to Charles W. Lair; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: A bill (H. R. 21109) granting an increase of pension to Henry Marsden; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KEY of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 21110) granting an increase of pension to Adam Exline; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21111) granting an increase of pension to Jeffrey Williams; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LESHER: A bill (H. R. 21112) granting a pension to Angeline Kelchner Wolfe; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MITCHELL: A bill (H. R. 21113) providing for the refund of duties collected on flax-preparatory machines, parts, and accessories, such as described in the act of Congress approved February 7, 1913, imported subsequently to August 5, 1909, and prior to January 1, 1911; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MOORE: A bill (H. R. 21114) granting a pension to Mary A. Scott; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. POU: A bill (H. R. 21115) for the relief of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. RAINEY: A bill (H. R. 21116) granting an increase of pension to John N. King; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. ROUSE: A bill (H. R. 21117) granting a pension to Fannie Baird; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. UNDERHILL: A bill (H. R. 21118) granting an increase of pension to John S. Early; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 21119) granting an increase of pension to John Heimroth; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WINGO: A bill (H. R. 21120) granting an increase of pension to Mary Willhoff; to the Committee on Pensions.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Petition of John J. Stein, New Philadelphia; John J. Kaserman and Joseph Schwitzer Delaware; F. V. W. Trott, Coshocton; Martin Ahner, Blissfield; L. C. Geib, Millersburg; D. E. Garver, Wooster; Julius Eck and G. Arnold, Coshocton, all in the State of Ohio, favoring the passage of House joint resolution 377; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BAILEY: Petitions of Bert S. Overdorff and J. W. Lint, of Johnstown, Pa., and Levi B. McGregor, of Altoona, Pa., protesting against amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill relative to freedom of the press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petitions of Pennsylvania German Catholic Societies, of Johnstown, and Washington Camp, No. 60, Patriotic Order Sons of America, Altoona, Pa., favoring passage of resolution to prohibit export of munitions of war by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BURKE of Wisconsin: Petition of E. J. Czamansbe, E. A. Schatz, and 165 other citizens of the village of Randolph, Wis., asking for the passage at this session of Senate bill 6688 or any similar measure to levy an embargo on all contraband of war save foodstuffs only; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Charles Marschall and 15 other citizens of Theresa, Wis., asking for the passage of Senate bill 6688 or any similar resolution or bill to levy an embargo on all material useful in war, save foodstuffs, wearing apparel, and surgical supplies only; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Rev. A. Werr and 33 other citizens of Brownsville, Wis., asking for the passage of Senate bill 6688, or any similar measure, to levy an embargo upon all contraband of war, save foodstuffs only; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition signed by Franz Radloff and 162 other citizens of the city of Plymouth, Wis., asking for the passage at this session of House joint resolution 377, to levy an embargo on and prohibit the exportation of arms and munitions of war to any of the European countries now at war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Rev. J. W. Halboth and 52 other citizens of Cascade, Wis., asking for the passage of Senate bill 6688, or any similar measure, to levy an embargo on all material useful in war save foodstuffs and wearing apparel and surgical supplies only; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, resolutions adopted by St. Joseph's Society, of Newburg, Washington County, Wis., composed of 69 members, asking for the passage at this session of House joint resolution 377, to levy an embargo upon and prohibit the exportation of arms, ammunition, etc., to any of the belligerent European nations; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, resolutions adopted by Port Washington Branch of the German-American National Society, representing 86 citizens, asking for the passage of a law at this session of Congress that will enable the President of the United States to lay an embargo upon all contraband of war save and excepting foodstuffs only; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. CARY: Petition of George Munclegler, George Kappel, H. Burkard, Alois Stephen, Charles Fischer, August Dellman, Albert Schacht, H. Eggebrecht, Reinhard Ruhnke, William Jordan, and 176 others, all residents of Milwaukee, Wis., urging the passage of House joint resolution 377; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. CLINE: Petitions of citizens of the twelfth congressional district of Indiana, urging the passage of House joint resolution 377; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. CRAMTON: Petitions of Ludwig C. Schober and 30 others of New Haven; Ferd Zielesch, of Allenton; Eugene Moser, of Mount Clemens; Henry Ortmann, of Washington, and William Paetow, of Romeo, all in the State of Michigan, in support of House joint resolution 377, proposing to prohibit exportation of arms, etc.; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of board of supervisors of St. Clair County, Mich., favoring embargo upon shipment of foodstuffs from this country during the present European war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. DALE: Petition of William H. Taylor, of New York City, protesting against the amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill relative to freedom of the press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, memorial of German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Irish Alliance of America, favoring resolution prohibiting export of munitions of war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial of priests of the Scranton (Pa.) diocese, relative to excluding from the mails publication called the Menace; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. DILLON: Petitions of citizens of Ramona, Parker, and Delmont, S. Dak., favoring passage of House joint resolution 377, prohibiting export of munitions of war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ESCH: Petition of Rev. E. G. A. Wachholz and 24 citizens of Lyndon Station, Wis., urging passage of House joint resolution 377, relative to export of munitions of war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. FESS: Petition of sundry citizens of Urbana, Ohio, protesting against amendment to the Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania: Memorial of priests of the Scranton (Pa.) diocese, protesting against publication called the Menace through the mails; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GREEN of Iowa: Petition of numerous citizens of Atlantic, Iowa, urging the passage of House joint resolution 377; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.



By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Petition of Annabel L. Berry, of Newport, R. I., and Rev. L. L. Daniel, of Providence, R. I., favoring Owen-Palmer child-labor bill; to the Committee on Labor.

Also, petition of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Rhode Island, favoring passage of bill for censorship of moving pictures; to the Committee on Education.

Also, petition of Arthur Carney, of Providence, R. I., protesting against persecution of Catholic priests and sisters in Mexico; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of J. L. Jenks, of Pawtucket, R. I., favoring Palmer-Owen child-labor bill; to the Committee on Labor.

Also, petition of John J. Shanley, of Providence, R. I., favoring protection for Catholics in Mexico; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Rhode Island, favoring passage of House bill 1864; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KINKEAD of New Jersey: Petition of Glos Narodn, of Jersey City, N. J., protesting against the Smith-Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. LOBECK: Petition from 94 citizens of Omaha, Nebr., favoring an amendment to our present Federal game law allowing an open season of 20 days in the spring of each year for hunting on rivers, lakes, and streams; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of 150 members of St. Peter's Verein, of Omaha, Nebr., favoring legislation to prohibit export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. LONERGAN: Letter of Oscar Becker, secretary of St. Stephen's Benevolent Society, Elmwood, Conn., in re legislation prohibiting the sale of munitions of war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. McCLELLAN: Petition of Guy Cochran and Owen Barnard, of Kingston, N. Y., against amendment offered by Representative FITZGERALD to Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of John Reis and 142 others, of Kingston, N. Y., favoring prohibition of export of munitions of war by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MAGUIRE of Nebraska: Memorial of 300 members of Teutonia Lodge, of Nebraska City, Nebr., favoring resolution prohibiting export of munitions of war by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MAHAN: Petitions of sundry citizens of Norwich, Conn., favoring the adoption of House joint resolution 377, to prohibit the export of munitions of war by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MOORE: Memorial of Philadelphia (Pa.) Board of Trade, protesting against the railway-mail-pay provision of the Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. SCULLY: Petition of Branch 497 of the Polish National Alliance of the borough of South River, N. J., protesting against Smith-Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. J. M. C. SMITH: Protest of H. A. Stafford and 87 citizens of Kalamazoo, 7 citizens of Grand Rapids, 1 citizen of Martin, and 1 citizen of Comstock, all in the State of Michigan, against amendment to Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of F. H. Seitz and 25 citizens of Hillsdale, favoring Senate bill 6688, to prohibit export of arms; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. TALCOTT of New York: Petition of Polish National Alliance, Branch No. 447, Utica, N. Y., against Smith-Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of citizens of Little Falls, N. Y.; also of A. B. Russell and D. C. Markham, of Ilion, N. Y., favoring Senate bill 3672, providing for cession to State of New York of certain lands in the bed of the Harlem Ship Canal heretofore ceded to the United States; to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

By Mr. UNDERHILL: Petition of citizens of Los Angeles, Cal., favoring observance of strict neutrality by the United States; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, petition of Branch 1281, Polish National Alliance, Elmira, N. Y., against Smith-Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. VOLLMER: Petition of Federation of Evangelical Brotherhoods of St. Louis, Mo., and M. G. V. Aurora, of Newark, N. J., and 925 American citizens, favoring resolution prohibiting export of war materials; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

## SENATE.

FRIDAY, January 22, 1915.

(Legislative day of Friday, January 15, 1915.)

The Senate reassembled at 11 o'clock a. m., on the expiration of the recess.

## NAMING A PRESIDING OFFICER.

The Secretary (James M. Baker) read the following communication:

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D. C., January 22, 1915.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. NATHAN P. BRYAN, a Senator from the State of Florida, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

JAMES P. CLARKE,  
President pro Tempore.

Mr. BRYAN thereupon took the chair as Presiding Officer.

## THE MERCHANT MARINE.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 6856) to authorize the United States, acting through a shipping board, to subscribe to the capital stock of a corporation to be organized under the laws of the United States or of a State thereof or of the District of Columbia, to purchase, construct, equip, maintain, and operate merchant vessels in the foreign trade of the United States, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BRYAN in the chair). The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS], having preferred a request for a unanimous-consent agreement, the Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Ashurst	Hitchcock	Oliver	Smith, Md.
Bankhead	Hollis	Overman	Smoot
Brady	Johnson	Page	Sterling
Bryan	Jones	Perkins	Stone
Catron	Kenyon	Pittman	Swanson
Chamberlain	Kern	Poindexter	Thomas
Clark, Wyo.	La Follette	Reed	Thompson
Culberson	Lane	Robinson	Thornton
Cummins	Lea, Tenn.	Saulsbury	Townsend
Dillingham	McLean	Shafroth	Vardaman
du Pont	Martin, Va.	Sheppard	Warren
Fletcher	Martine, N. J.	Sherman	White
Gallinger	Myers	Shields	Williams
Gronna	Nelson	Smith, Ga.	

Mr. THORNTON. I was requested to announce the unavoidable absence of the junior Senator from New York [Mr. O'GORMAN]. I ask that this announcement may stand for the day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-five Senators have responded to the roll call. There is a quorum present. The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] makes a request for unanimous consent, which the Secretary will state.

The SECRETARY. The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS] asks unanimous consent that on Thursday, January 28, 1915, the Senate will vote upon any amendment that may be pending or that may be offered to the bill (S. 6856) to authorize the United States, acting through a shipping board, to subscribe to the capital stock of a corporation, etc., and that before adjournment on that day the Senate will also vote upon the bill itself, through the regular parliamentary stages, to its final disposition.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I object to the proposed unanimous-consent agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is made. The pending question is on the motion of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. TOWNSEND], upon which the yeas and nays have been demanded.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. SMOOT. I ask that the question be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will state the bill the consideration of which has been moved by the Senator from Michigan. It is the so-called omnibus claims bill.

The SECRETARY. The pending question is on the motion of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. TOWNSEND] that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the bill H. R. 8846, its title being "An act making appropriation for payment of certain claims in accordance with findings of the Court of Claims, reported under the provisions of the acts approved March 3, 1883, and March 3, 1887, and commonly known as the Bowman and the Tucker Acts, and under the provisions of section 151 of the act approved March 3, 1911, commonly known as the Judicial Code."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will call the roll on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Michigan.

The Secretary proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GALLINGER (when his name was called). I have a general pair with the junior Senator from New York [Mr.